METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR APPLICATION ISOLATION

• US 20180103053A1
• Filed: 12/14/2017
• Published: 04/12/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 09/12/2008
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: George Mason Research Foundation Inc.
• Original Assignee: George Mason Research Foundation Inc.
• Inventors: GHOSH, Anup, HUANG, Yih, WANG, Jiang, STAVROU, Angelos
• Granted Patent: US 10,187,417 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45591 Monitoring or debugging support
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/53 by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/55 Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/554 involving event detection and direct action
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/034 Test or assess a computer or a system
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2149 Restricted operating environment
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45545 Guest-host, i.e. hypervisor is an application program itself, e.g. VirtualBox
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1416 Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1425 Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection

Abstract

Processor(s) for detecting malicious software. A hardware virtual machine monitor (HVMM) operates under a host OS. Container(s) initialized with network application template(s) operate under a guest OSVM. A detection module operates under the guest OSVM includes a trigger detection module, a logging module and a container command module. The trigger detection module monitors activity on container(s) for a trigger event. The logging module writes activity report(s) in response to trigger event(s). The container command module issues command(s) in response to trigger event(s). The command(s) include a container start, stop and revert commands. A virtual machine control console operates under the host OS and starts/stops the HVMM. A container control module operates under the guest OSVM and controls container(s) in response to the command(s). The server communication module sends activity report(s) to a central collection network appliance that maintains a repository of activities for infected devices.

Claims

1. An apparatus, comprising:

a memory; and

a hardware processor communicatively coupled to the memory, the hardware processor configured to execute a virtual machine monitor at least partially stored in the memory, the virtual machine monitor configured to provide a first level of virtualization,

the hardware processor configured to execute a virtual environment using the virtual machine monitor, the virtual environment configured to provide a second level of virtualization, the second level of virtualization operating within the first level of virtualization,

the hardware processor configured to execute the application within the virtual environment, access to data associated with a host operating system by the application being restricted to a shared memory configured to operate within the first level of virtualization,

the hardware processor configured to monitor behavior of the application within the virtual environment, the hardware processor configured to discard the virtual environment in response to detecting unauthorized activity of the application.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the virtual environment is configured to operate under control of a guest operating system operating within a virtual machine defined by the virtual machine monitor.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the unauthorized activity includes at least one of an unauthorized change to a non-modifiable section of the virtual environment, a registry write, a start of a new process, corruption to an existing process, a web site visited, a redirected Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an infection detail, an event timeline, a network connection, a file system write, or a configuration change.

4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the first level of virtualization is hardware level virtualization and the second level of virtualization is operating system level virtualization.

5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the virtual environment is executed within a guest operating system executing within the first level of virtualization,

the guest operating system being a first type of operating system and the host operating system being a second type of operating system different than the first type of operating system.

6. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the virtual environment is configured to operate in a protected memory space.

7. A non-transitory processor-readable medium storing code representing instructions to be executed by a processor, the code comprising code to cause the processor to:

initiate a virtual container to execute an application, the virtual container providing a first level of virtualization executed within a second level of virtualization, the application being isolated from a host operating system by the first level of virtualization and the second level of virtualization, access to data associated with the host operating system by the virtual container is restricted to a data store configured to operate within the second level of virtualization;

monitor behavior of the application within the virtual container;

detect, based on the monitoring, an unauthorized activity of the application; and

discard the virtual container in response to detecting the unauthorized activity.

8. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the unauthorized activity includes at least one of an unauthorized change to a non-modifiable section of the virtual container, a registry write, a start of a new process, corruption to an existing process, a web site visited, a redirected Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an infection detail, an event timeline, a network connection, a file system write, or a configuration change.

9. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the first level of virtualization is operating system level virtualization and the second level of virtualization is hardware level virtualization.

10. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the second level of virtualization is controlled by a virtual machine monitor executing on the host operating system.

11. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the virtual container is executed within a guest operating system executing within the second level of virtualization.

12. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the virtual container is executed within a guest operating system executing within the second level of virtualization,

the guest operating system being a first type of operating system and the host operating system being a second type of operating system different than the first type of operating system.

13. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein the virtual container is configured to operate in a protected memory space.

14. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 7, wherein contents of the data store are not discarded in response to detecting the unauthorized activity.

15. An apparatus, comprising:

a memory; and

a hardware processor communicatively coupled to the memory, the hardware processor configured to execute;

a virtual machine to define a first level of virtualization,

a virtual container within the virtual machine to define a second level of virtualization within the first level of virtualization, and

an application within the virtual container,

a shared memory configured to operate within the first level of virtualization, access to data associated with a host operating system by the application is restricted to the shared memory,

the hardware processor is configured to monitor behavior of the application within the virtual container, the hardware processor configured to discard the virtual container in response to detecting unauthorized activity of the application.

16. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the unauthorized activity includes at least one of an unauthorized change to a non-modifiable section of the virtual container, a registry write, a start of a new process, corruption to an existing process, a web site visited, a redirected Uniform Resource Locator (URL), an infection detail, an event timeline, a network connection, a file system write, or a configuration change.

17. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the first level of virtualization is hardware level virtualization and the second level of virtualization is operating system level virtualization.

18. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the first level of virtualization is controlled by a virtual machine monitor executing on the host operating system.

19. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein the virtual container is executed within a guest operating system executing within the first level of virtualization,

the guest operating system being a first type of operating system and the host operating system being a second type of operating system different than the first type of operating system.

20. The apparatus of claim 15, wherein contents of the shared memory are not discarded in response to detecting the unauthorized activity.