ZERO-KNOWLEDGE VERIFIABLY ATTESTABLE TRANSACTION CONTAINERS USING SECURE PROCESSORS

• US 20180294962A1
• Filed: 04/11/2017
• Published: 10/11/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 04/11/2017
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: KRAEMER, James R., LINTON, Jeb R.
• Granted Patent: US 10,587,411 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/4401 Bootstrapping security arrangements therefor G06F21/57
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/4406 Loading of operating system
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 1/00 Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3221 interactive zero-knowledge proofs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853

Abstract

A method, system and computer program product for providing an attestation of an operating environment. The method begins with booting, with a secure boot process with attestation, at least one processor with secure processor technology that allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory which are protected from processes running at higher privilege levels. Next, one or more operating system containers are loaded in a server or a virtual machine. Each of the one or more operating system containers use each of their own process space and network space in order to operate on a single operating system kernel without creating separate virtual machines. If a set of one or more conditions of booting and loading has been satisfied using zero-knowledge verifiable computing then an attestation is sent calculated using a zero-knowledge verifiable computing technique to a second processor-based device.

Claims

1. A method for providing attestation of an operating system environment, the method comprising:

booting, with a secure boot process with attestation, at least one processor with secure processor technology that allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory which are protected from processes running at higher privilege levels;

loading one or more operating system containers in a server or a virtual machine, where each of the one or more operating system containers use each of their own process space and network space in order to operate on a single operating system kernel without creating separate virtual machines;

determining if a set of one or more conditions of booting and loading has been satisfied using zero-knowledge verifiable computing; and

in response to the set of one or more conditions having been satisfied, sending an attestation calculated using a zero-knowledge verifiable computing technique to a second processor-based device that the set of one or more conditions have been satisfied.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the sending the attestation is sent using a zero knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of a user of the at least one processor.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

receiving a request for the attestation of the set of one or more conditions from another user using a zero-knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of a user of the at least one processor.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

determining if a settable time period is expired; and

in response to the settable time period is expired along with the set of one or more conditions having been satisfied, sending an attestation that the set of one or more conditions have been satisfied using a zero-knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of the user.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure processor technology is one of IBM Secure Blue, IBM Secure Blue++, IBM Secure Memory Facility, ARM TrustZone, and Intel Software Guard Extensions.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of one or more conditions are a privilege violation of one or more processes running at higher privilege levels accessing private regions of memory.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of one or more conditions are a physical attack of the at least one processor.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge verifiable computing is one of

succinct computational integrity and privacy (SCIP) technique;

succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-snark) technique; and

probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) technique.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the set of one or more conditions is a verification that the secure boot process had executed to completion without a failed integrity check.

10. A system for providing attestation of an operating system environment, the system comprising:

a memory;

a processor communicatively coupled to the memory, where the processor is configured to perform

booting, with a secure boot process with attestation, at least one processor with secure processor technology that allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory which are protected from processes running at higher privilege levels;

loading one or more operating system containers in a server or a virtual machine, where each of the one or more operating system containers use each of their own process space and network space in order to operate on a single operating system kernel without creating separate virtual machines;

determining if a set of one or more conditions of booting and loading has been satisfied using zero-knowledge verifiable computing; and

in response to the set of one or more conditions having been satisfied, sending an attestation calculated using a zero-knowledge verifiable computing technique to a second processor-based device that the set of one or more conditions have been satisfied.

11. The system of claim 10, wherein the sending the attestation is sent using a zero knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of a user of the at least one processor.

12. The system of claim 10, further comprising:

receiving a request for the attestation of the set of one or more conditions from another user using a zero-knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of a user of the at least one processor.

13. The system of claim 10, further comprising:

determining if a settable time period is expired; and

in response to the settable time period is expired along with the set of one or more conditions having been satisfied, sending an attestation that the set of one or more conditions have been satisfied using a zero-knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of the user.

14. The system of claim 10, wherein the secure processor technology is one of IBM Secure Blue, IBM Secure Blue++, IBM Secure Memory Facility, ARM TrustZone, and Intel Software Guard Extensions.

15. The system of claim 10, wherein the set of one or more conditions are a privilege violation of one or more processes running at higher privilege levels accessing private regions of memory.

16. The system of claim 10, wherein the set of one or more conditions are a physical attack of the at least one processor.

17. The system of claim 10, wherein the zero-knowledge verifiable computing is one of

succinct computational integrity and privacy (SCIP) technique;

succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-snark) technique; and

probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) technique.

18. The system of claim 10, wherein the set of one or more conditions is a verification that the secure boot process had executed to completion without a failed integrity check.

19. A non-transitory computer program product for providing attestation of an operating system environment comprising a computer readable storage medium having computer readable program code embodied therewith, the computer readable program code configured to perform:

booting, with a secure boot process with attestation, at least one processor with secure processor technology that allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory which are protected from processes running at higher privilege levels;

loading one or more operating system containers in a server or a virtual machine, where each of the one or more operating system containers use each of their own process space and network space in order to operate on a single operating system kernel without creating separate virtual machines;

determining if a set of one or more conditions of booting and loading has been satisfied using zero-knowledge verifiable computing; and

in response to the set of one or more conditions having been satisfied, sending an attestation calculated using a zero-knowledge verifiable computing technique to a second processor-based device that the set of one or more conditions have been satisfied.

20. The non-transitory computer program product of claim 19, wherein the sending the attestation is sent using a zero knowledge protocol to maintain privacy of a user of the at least one processor.