ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION SCHEME FOR SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION

• US 20200136824A1
• Filed: 10/25/2018
• Published: 04/30/2020
• Est. Priority Date: 10/25/2018
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Mastercard International Incorporated (MasterCard Incorporated)
• Original Assignee: Mastercard International Incorporated (MasterCard Incorporated)
• Inventors: Allen, John, Groarke, Peter, Druta, Vladut
• Application Number:
  US16/171,011
• Publication Number:
  US 20200136824A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 10/0833 Tracking
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/0601 Electronic shopping [e-shopping]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0825 using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0877 using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3213 using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807

Abstract

A data access computing device is provided. The data access computing device receives a token request from a user computing device, generates a secret value unique to the token request, encrypts the secret value using a private key associated with the data access computing device, encrypts the secret value using a public key associated with the relying party to generate a sharing token, transmits the sharing token to the user computing device, receives a payload encrypted using a private key associated with the relying party from a relying party computing device, where the payload includes the secret value and a nonce value, decrypts the payload using the to recover the nonce value and the secret value, retrieves the at least one user data element from the database based on the secret value, and transmits the at least one user data element to the relying party computing device.

Claims

1. A data access computing device comprising a processor in communication with a database, wherein the database stores a plurality of user data elements associated with a user, the processor programmed to:

receive a token request from a user computing device, the token request including an authentication key, wherein the token request identifies (i) a relying party and (ii) at least one user data element of the user to be shared with the relying party;

generate, in response to validating the authentication key, a secret value unique to the token request;

associate, in the database, the secret value with the at least one user data element;

encrypt the secret value in a first encryption layer using a private key A associated with the data access computing device to generate an A-encrypted secret value;

encrypt the A-encrypted secret value in a second encryption layer using a public key B associated with the relying party to generate a sharing token;

transmit the sharing token to the user computing device;

receive a payload encrypted using a private key B associated with the relying party from a relying party computing device, wherein the payload includes the A-encrypted secret value and a nonce value, and wherein the private key B is complementary to the public key B;

decrypt the payload using the public key B to recover the nonce value and the A-encrypted secret value;

decrypt the A-encrypted secret value using a public key A to recover the secret value, wherein the public key A is complementary to the private key A;

retrieve the at least one user data element from the database based on the secret value; and

transmit the at least one user data element to the relying party computing device.

2. The data access computing device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further programmed to verify that the received payload has not already been processed by comparing the nonce value to a plurality of previously received nonce values.

3. The data access computing device of claim 1, wherein the nonce value includes a time stamp generated by the relying party computing device, and wherein the processor is further programmed to verify that the payload is not stale by comparing the time stamp from the nonce value against a time of receipt of the payload by the DA computing device.

4. The data access computing device of claim 1, wherein the token request includes an expiration time, and wherein the processor is further programmed to validate the recovered secret value against the expiration time.

5. The data access computing device of claim 1, wherein the secret value is not associated in the database with others of the plurality of user data elements of the user, such that the secret value is usable by the relying party to obtain solely the at least one user data element identified in the token request.

6. The data access computing device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further programmed to provide the authentication key to the user computing device in response to the user logging in to one of (i) a mobile application associated with the data access computing device and executing on the user computing device, and (ii) a website associated with the data access computing device.

7. A computer-implemented method for secure data transmission, said method implemented using a data access computing device including a processor in communication with a database, said method comprising:

receiving a token request from a user computing device, the token request including an authentication key, wherein the token request identifies (i) a relying party and (ii) at least one user data element of the user to be shared with the relying party;

generating, in response to validating the authentication key, a secret value unique to the token request;

associating, in the database, the secret value with the at least one user data element;

encrypting the secret value in a first encryption layer using a private key A associated with the data access computing device to generate an A-encrypted secret value;

encrypting the A-encrypted secret value in a second encryption layer using a public key B associated with the relying party to generate a sharing token;

transmitting the sharing token to the user computing device;

receiving a payload encrypted using a private key B associated with the relying party from a relying party computing device, wherein the payload includes the A-encrypted secret value and a nonce value, and wherein the private key B is complementary to the public key B;

decrypting the payload using the public key B to recover the nonce value and the A-encrypted secret value, and decrypting the A-encrypted secret value using a public key A to recover the secret value, wherein the public key A is complementary to the private key A;

retrieving the at least one user data element from the database based on the secret value; and

transmitting the at least one user data element to the relying party computing device.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising verifying that the received payload has not already been processed by comparing the nonce value to a plurality of previously received nonce values.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the nonce value includes a time stamp generated by the relying party computing device, the method further comprising verifying that the payload is not stale by comparing the time stamp from the nonce value against a time of receipt of the payload by the DA computing device.

10. The method of claim 7, wherein the token request includes an expiration time, the method further comprising validating the recovered secret value against the expiration time.

11. The method of claim 7, wherein the secret value is not associated in the database with others of the plurality of user data elements of the user, such that the secret value is usable by the relying party to obtain solely the at least one user data element identified in the token request.

12. The method of claim 7, further comprising providing the authentication key to the user computing device in response to the user logging in to one of (i) a mobile application associated with the data access computing device and executing on the user computing device, and (ii) a website associated with the data access computing device.

13. A non-transitory computer readable storage media having computer-executable instructions embodied thereon, wherein when executed by a data access computing device having a processor coupled to a database, the computer-executable instructions cause the processor to:

receive a token request from a user computing device, the token request including an authentication key, wherein the token request identifies (i) a relying party and (ii) at least one user data element of the user to be shared with the relying party;

generate, in response to validating the authentication key, a secret value unique to the token request;

associate, in the database, the secret value with the at least one user data element;

encrypt the secret value in a first encryption layer using a private key A associated with the data access computing device to generate an A-encrypted secret value;

encrypt the A-encrypted secret value in a second encryption layer using a public key B associated with the relying party to generate a sharing token;

transmit the sharing token to the user computing device;

receive a payload encrypted using a private key B associated with the relying party from a relying party computing device, wherein the payload includes the A-encrypted secret value and a nonce value, and wherein the private key B is complementary to the public key B;

decrypt the payload using the public key B to recover the nonce value and the A-encrypted secret value;

decrypt the A-encrypted secret value using a public key A to recover the secret value, wherein the public key A is complementary to the private key A;

retrieve the at least one user data element from the database based on the secret value; and

transmit the at least one user data element to the relying party computer system.

14. The computer-executable instructions of claim 13, wherein the computer-executable instructions, when executed by a relying party computing device having at least one processor coupled to at least one memory device, the computer-executable instructions cause the at least one processor to verify that the received payload has not already been processed by comparing the nonce value to a plurality of previously received nonce values.

15. The computer-executable instructions of claim 13, wherein the nonce value includes a time stamp generated by the relying party computing device, and wherein the computer-executable instructions further cause the at least one processor to verify that the payload is not stale by comparing the time stamp from the nonce value against a time of receipt of the payload by the DA computing device.

16. The computer-executable instructions of claim 13, wherein the token request includes an expiration time, and wherein the computer-executable instructions further cause the at least one processor to validate the recovered secret value against the expiration time.

17. A relying party computing device comprising at least one processor in communication with a memory, the at least one processor programmed to:

request at least one user data element from a user;

receive a sharing token from a user computing device associated with the user, the sharing token including a secret value encrypted in a first encryption layer using a private key A associated with a data access computing device, and in a second encryption layer using a public key B associated with the relying party computing device;

decrypt the sharing token using a private key B to recover to the A-encrypted secret value, wherein the private key B is complementary to the public key B;

generate a nonce value;

encrypt the A-encrypted secret value and the nonce value together using the private key B to generate a payload;

transmit the payload to the data access computing device; and

receive, in response to the transmission of the payload, the at least one user data element.

18. The relying party computing device of claim 17, further comprising a camera interface configured to scan a quick read code embodying the sharing token.

19. The relying party computing device of claim 17, wherein the at least one processor is further programmed to transmit a webpage to the user computing device, wherein the webpage is configured to cause the user computing device to obtain the sharing token and transmit the sharing token to the relying party computing device.

20. The relying party computing device of claim 17, wherein the at least one processor is further programmed to transmit a webpage to the user computing device, wherein the webpage includes an interactive form field configured to receive the sharing token.