Method for certifying the origin of at least one item of information stored in the memory of a first electronic device and transmitted to a second electronic device, and system for carrying out the method

• US 4,549,075 A
• Filed: 06/20/1983
• Issued: 10/22/1985
• Est. Priority Date: 07/08/1982
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: CII Honeywell Bull
• Original Assignee: CII Honeywell Bull
• Inventors: Mollier, Jean, Saada, Charles
• Primary Examiner(s): TRAFTON, DAVID
• Application Number:
  US06/505,975
• Time in Patent Office: 855 Days
• Field of Search: 235/380, 340/825.34, 178/22.08
• US Class Current: 713/169
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

The object of the invention is a process for certifying the origin of at least one item of information stored in the memory of a first electronic device such as a portable card and transmitted to a second electronic device such as a portable card, and a system for implementing said process. An individual A controls a card C_A which has a memory M_A that contains an item of information I_A specific to the individual A. An individual B controls a card C_B which has a memory M_B that contains an item of information I_B specific to individual B. In order for individual B, who receives the information I_A, to be certain of the origin of this information I_A, each of the two cards C_A and C_B calculates a result R related to the information I_A, to a secret set (S) shared by the two cards, to a random number (E_B) supplied by individual B, and to a parameter J which, in turn, is related to the two items of information (I_A, I.sub. B) which are combined in accordance with a predetermined symmetrical algorithm p. The invention applies in particular to mutual identification and certification between two individuals of the same group who have been issued individual cards. Each individual of the group is issued his own personal card.

Claims

1. A method for certifying the origin of at least one item of information I_A stored in the memory of a first electronic device C_A controlled by an individual A, said information I_A, being specific to individual A_M and being transmitted for certification to a second electronic device C_B controlled by an individual B, said individual B being assigned at least one specific item of information I_B which was previously stored into the memory M_B of the second electronic device C_B ;

comprising the steps of;

(a) causing to be calculated within each device C_A, C_B a result R calculated by the same predetermined secret algorithm f and taking account of the same predetermined secret set S and the same random number E_B supplied by the second electronic device C_B ; and

(b) comparing within the second device C_B, the two results R, the agreement between said two results R certifying to individual B that the first device C_A belongs to the same group as his device C_B owing to the fact that the two devices contain the same secret set S and the same algorithm f;

(c) information retrieval service individual certifying the origin of the information I_A, causing the algorithm f to take account of a supplementary parameter J which, in turn, takes account of both items of information I_A, I_B, combined in accordance with the same predetermined secret algorithm p and exchanged between two devices C_A, C_B ; and

(d) causing the first device C_A to calculate a result R=f (E_B, S, J) with J=p (I_A, I_B) and the second device to calculate a result R=f (E_B, S, J) with J=p (I_B, I_A), the algorithm p being symmetrical so that J=p (I_A, I_B)=p (I_B, I_A) and thus certifying to (information retrieval service) individual B, in case of an agreement between said two results R, that the information I_A has not been altered during its transfer from the first electronic device C_A, and that it comes solely from said first device C_A.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, further including the step of taking as the aforesaid algorithm p a trap algorithm.

4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, further including the step of causing the aforesaid secret algorithm p to take account of a supplementary parameter E_x which is a predetermined combination of the aforesaid two random numbers E_A and E_B.

2. A method for the mutual identification of two individuals (A, B) belonging to the same organization, the individual A holding a first electronic device C_A in the memory of which there is stored at least one item of information I_A specific to individual A, individual B holding a second electronic device C_B in the memory of which there is stored at least one item of information I_B specific to individual B, comprising:

(a) causing to be calculated within each device C_A, C_B a first result R calculated by the same predetermined secret algorithm f and taking account of the same predetermined secret set S and the same random number E_B supplied by the second electronic device C_B, and

(b) comparing within the second device C_B the two results R, the agreement between said two results R certifying to individual B that the first device C_A belongs to the same group as his device C_B owing to the fact that both devices contain the same secret set S and the same algorithm f,

(c) causing to be calculated within each device C_A, C_B a second result R calculated by the same predetermined secret algorithm f and taking account of the same predetermined secret set S and the same random number E_A supplied by the first electronic device C_A ; and

(d) comparing, within the first device C_A, the first and the second results R, the agreement between said two results R certifying to individual A that the second device C_A belongs to the same group as his device C_A owing to the fact that both devices contain the same secret set S and the same algorithm f; and

(e) in order to enable individual B to be certain of the origin of the information I_A causing the algorithm f to take account of a supplementary parameter J which, in turn, takes account of the two items of information I_A, I_B combined according to the same predetermined secret algorithm p exchanged between the two devices C_A, C_B ; and

(f) causing the first device C_A to calculate a result R=f (E_B, S, J) with J=p (I_A, I_B) and causing the second device to calculate a result R=f (E_B, S, J) with J=p(I_B, I_A), the algorithm p being symmetrical so that J=p(I_A, I_B)=p (I_B, I_A), and thus certifying to individual B, in case of an agreement between said two results R, that the information I_A has not been altered during its transfer from the first device C_A, and that it comes solely from said device C_B ; and

that, in order to enable individual A to be certain of the origin of the information I_B,

(g) causing the algorithm f to take account of a supplementary parameter J which, in turn, takes account of both items of information I_A, I_B combined according to the same predetermined secret algorithm and exchanged between both devices C_A, C_B ; and

thus

causing the second device C_B to calculate a result R=f (E_A, S, J) with J=p (I_A, I_B) and causing the first device C_A to calculate a result R=f (E_A, S, J) with J=p (I_A, I_B)=p (I_B, I_A) and thus certifying to individual A, in case of an agreement between said two results R, that the information I_B has not altered during its transfer from the second device C_B, and that it comes solely from said second device C_B.

5. A system for certifying the origin of at least one item of information I_A stored in the memory of a first electronic device C_A controlled by an individual A, said information I_A, being specific to individual A_M and being transmitted for certification to a second electronic device C_B controlled by an individual B, said individual B being assigned at least one specific item of information I_B which was previously stored into the memory M_B of the second electronic device C_B wherein said electronic devices (C_A, C_B) each include a portable, electronic card (C_A, C_B) each comprising at least:

one memory (M_A, M_B) having stored therein at least one item of information (I_A, I_B) which is to be identified, a secret set (S) and a predetermined secret algorithm f;

control circuits (T_A, T_B) for operating on the algorithm f to provide a result (R);

said cards (C_A, C_B) being respectively adapted for connection to two linkup automatons (A_A, A_B), which are adopted to be connected by a transmission channel (L), each automaton comprising at least one random number generator (GNA;

GNB) and a comparator circuit (CCA, CCB) for comparing the results (R) calculated by the two cards (C_A, C_B).

6. The system according to claim 5, wherein the control circuit (T_A) of the card (C_A) is arranged to operate on the aforesaid algorithm f which takes account of the information (I_A) which is to be certified, the secret set (S), a random number (E_B) supplied by the aforesaid automaton (A_B) associated with the card (C_B), and a parameter (J) which, in turn, is related to the two items of information (I_A, I_B) combined in accordance with the aforesaid predetermined symmetrical algorithm p;

and the control circuit (T_B) of the card (C_B) operate on the aforesaid algorithm which takes account of the information (I_A) which is to be certified, the secret set (S), the random number (E_A) which is at least related to the two items of information (I_B, I_A) combined according to the aforesaid predetermined symmetrical algorithm p;

the comparator (CCB) being connected to both results of the processing circuits (T_A, T_B), such that agreement of said results certifies to individual B that the information I_A indeed comes from the card C_A.

7. The system according to claim 6 wherein the control circuit (T_A) of the card (C_A) operates on the aforesaid algorithm f which takes account of the information (I_B) which is to be certified, the secret set (S) a random number (E_A) supplied by the automaton (A_A) associated with the card (C_A), and a parameter (J) which, in turn, is at least related to the two items of information (I_A, I_B) combined according to the aforesaid predetermined symmetrical algorithm p;

and the control circuit (T_B) of the card (C_B) processes the aforesaid algorithm f which takes account of the information (I_B) which is to be certified, the secret set (S), the random number (E_A) which is at least related to both items of information (I_A, I_B) combined according to the aforesaid predetermined symmetrical algorithym p;

the comparator (CCA) comparing both results of the processing circuits (T_A, T_B), such that agreement of said results certifies to individual A that the information I_B indeed comes from the card C_B.