Method for establishing user authenication with composite session keys among cryptographically communicating nodes

• US 4,649,233 A
• Filed: 04/11/1985
• Issued: 03/10/1987
• Est. Priority Date: 04/11/1985
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Bass, Walter E., Matyas, Stephen M., Oseas, Jonathan
• Primary Examiner(s): Cangialosi, Salvatore
• Assistant Examiner(s): Lewis, Aaron J.
• Application Number:
  US06/722,091
• Time in Patent Office: 698 Days
• Field of Search: 178/22.08, 178/22.09, 178/22.14, 340/825.34, 235/380, 235/382
• US Class Current: 713/171
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0625 with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0637 Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds

Abstract

A method for authenticating nodes/users and in protecting data flow between nodes. This is facilitated by creating a dialogue involving authenticated encryption among the nodes. During each session, a key for use in cryptographic conversion is constructed among the node participants in order to permit symmetric authentication. The key is unique to the session. A different key is generated for each and every session. The building of the session key involves sharing of a minimal amount of information among the participants in the form of combining both a random number and authentication indicia.

Claims

1. A method for establishing a key commutatively between a pair of communicating nodes and for authenticating the node and user identities, said key being valid only for the duration of a single cryptographic session, each node of the pair having a local cryptographic facility including a pre-established cross-domain key and an identifier associated with the other node and user identity, comprising the steps at each node of:

(a) generating a local random number, encrypting said random number under the cross-domain key, transmitting said encrypted random number to the other node, and decrypting under the cross-domain key an encrypted random number received from said other node;

(b) forming a parameter by combining the attributes derived or associated with the identities of both nodes and users;

(c) forming an interim key from the composite of the local random and received encrypted random numbers; and

(d) combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key.

2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the cross-domain key includes a local and remote variant, all unidirectional keys being dissimilar.

3. A method according to claim 1, wherein the identifier associated with each node and user identity is selectively obtained by either table lookup or by way of computation.

4. A method according to claim 2, wherein the cryptographic facility of each node further includes no more than the local and remote variants of each of a plurality of distinguishable cross-domain keys corresponding to the number of nodes with which it can potentially cryptographically communicate.

5. A method according to claim 1, wherein the step of combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key includes the step of encrypting the parameter with the interim key.

11. A method according to claim 1 or 6, wherein the step of forming the interim key includes the exclusive OR'"'"'ing of the local and received random numbers.

12. A method according to claim 1 or 6, wherein the steps of combining the identifiers to form a parameter or forming a composite of local and received random numbers are commutative steps.

13. A method according to claim 1 or 6, wherein each identifier is a value ascertained as a one-way function of node/user identity or indicia.

14. A method according to claim 1 or 6, wherein there is provided the additional step of checking to verify that the session key so generated is the same at both the sending and receiving nodes.

15. A method as in claim 1 wherein the step of combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key includes the step of additively combining the attributes corresponding to the counterpart node and user identities, and then encrypting the additive combination with the interim key.

6. A method for establishing a key commutatively among n cryptographically communicating nodes and for authenticating node and user identities, said key being valid only for the duration of a single cryptographic session, each of the nodes having a local cryptographic facility including a plurality of pre-established cross-domain keys, and a concordance between a plurality of node and user identities and at least one identifier associated therewith, comprising the steps at each node of:

(a) transmitting its node and user identity to the (n-1) other nodes and responsively obtaining the identity of said (n-1) other nodes;

(b) generating a local random number, encrypting it under each of the pre-established cross-domain keys, transmitting each one of the set of encrypted random numbers to each one of the set of counterpart (n-1) other nodes, and decrypting under the counterpart cross-domain keys the encrypted random numbers received from the counterpart nodes;

(c) forming a parameter by combining the identifies derived or associated with the identities of the n nodes and users;

(d) forming an interim key from the composite of the local random and received encrypted random numbers; and

(e) combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key.

7. A method according to claim 6, wherein each cross-domain key includes a local and remote variant thereof.

8. A method according to claim 6, wherein generated random numbers are encrypted under the local variant corresponding to each cross-domain key while any received encrypted random numbers from counterpart nodes are decrypted under the remote variant of the counterpart cross-domain key.

9. A method according to claim 6, wherein the local and received random numbers which form an interim key are encrypted under the counterpart remote variant.

10. A method according to claim 6, wherein the step of combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key includes the step of encrypting the parameter with the interim key.

16. A method as in claim 6 wherein the step of combining the parameter with the interim key to produce the session key includes the step of additively combining the attributes corresponding to the counterpart node and user identities, and then encrypting the additive combination with the interim key.