Tamper resistant packaging for information protection in electronic circuitry

• US 5,117,457 A
• Filed: 01/24/1990
• Issued: 05/26/1992
• Est. Priority Date: 11/05/1986
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Ledermann, Peter G., Comerford, Liam D., White, Steve R., Levy, Lawrence I.
• Primary Examiner(s): Gregory, Bernarr E.
• Application Number:
  US07/471,003
• Time in Patent Office: 853 Days
• Field of Search: 380/3-5, 380/59, 380/52, 342/27-28, 357/74, 357/80, 357/85, 307/202.1, 365/228, 365/244, 340/652
• US Class Current: 713/194
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/87 by means of encapsulation, e.g. for integrated circuits
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/576 using active circuits
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/00 Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/0002 Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00

Abstract

A tamper-resistant package for protecting information stored in electronic circuitry is described. An energy source provides energy (electrical current, optical energy, microwave energy or RF energy, for example) within a region occupied by the circuitry to be protected. The energy is applied to an energy distribution system comprising a path or paths for energy distribution. Sensing means are provided which respond to the distribution system for sensing an intrusion. The distribution system includes an arrangement for changing or altering the path or paths over which the energy travels or altering the topology of the path or paths. The sensing means is informed of the appearance of the distribution system and senses an intrusion by comparing the appearance of the path(s) with the predicted appearance. In one embodiment, electrical current is selectively applied to a subset of electrical conductors. The pattern of current flowing in the conductors is sensed and compared to an expected pattern which is determined by the subset of energized conductors. Intrusion is evidenced by a disparity between the pattern of energized paths sensed by the sensing means compared to the pattern predicted by the sensing means. Dynamically varying the identity of the energized paths makes it difficult for an attacker to bypass the tamper detection.

Claims

1. A tamper resistant apparatus for detecting intrusion into a region comprising:

an enclosure being part of and substantially surrounding said region;

energy distribution means including a plurality of paths, each supporting energy distribution, means for changing the condition of the region to any one of a plurality of different conditions by selecting certain of said paths to carry energy and selecting others of the paths not to carry energy;

means for sensing predictable results for said conditions assumed by said region when there is no intrusion into said enclosure and detecting intrusion into said enclosure when results other than said predictable results are sensed, wherein;

said means for sensing predictable results comprises means for sensing the presence and absence of energy on said paths and where an intrusion is detected based on the presence and absence of energy on said paths.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2 in which said enclosure includes at least one board including a first side coated with a conductor and a second side including a pattern of fine conductors;

and

said means for sensing includes an electrical circuit formed at least in part by said conductor coating and at least some of said fine conductors.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2 in which said enclosure includes a plurality of conducive elements and in which said means for sensing is coupled to said conductive elements to sense an intrusion by a change in the conductive relationship among at least some of said conductive elements.

5. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2 which includes a source of optical energy, at least one photodetector and an optical path therebetween.

6. The apparatus of claim 5 wherein said optical path is a free space path.

7. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2 wherein said means for changing and means for sensing includes:

means for generating and distributing electro-magnetic energy within said enclosure;

energy response means for detecting said electro-magnetic energy; and

means for comparing an output of said energy response means with a predetermined reference to detect an intrusion.

8. The apparatus of claim 7 wherein said means for generating and distributing includes selector means for varying the distribution of said energy at different times.

9. The apparatus of claim 8 in which said selector means produces an output identifying said distribution and means responsive to said output for generating said predetermined reference.

10. The apparatus of claim 8 in which said electro-magnetic energy is electrical current.

11. The apparatus of claim 8 in which said electro-magnetic energy is optical energy.

12. The apparatus of claim 8 in which said electro-magnetic energy is microwave energy.

13. The apparatus of claim 1 or 2 wherein said means for sensing includes a source of mechanical energy.

15. The apparatus of claim 4 in which said enclosure includes at least one board including a first side coated with a conductor and a second side including a pattern of fine conductors;

said means for sensing includes an electrical circuit formed at least in part by said conductor coating and at least some of said fine conductors, and wherein at least a part of said electrical circuit is connected in series with said impairing means.

2. A tamper resistant apparatus for protecting information stored in an electronic circuit comprising:

an enclosure being part of and substantially surrounding a region containing said electric circuit;

energy distribution means including a plurality of paths, each supporting energy distribution, means for changing the condition of the region to any one of a plurality of different conditions by selecting certain of said paths to carry energy and selecting others of the paths not to carry energy;

means for sensing predictable results for said conditions assumed by said enclsoure when there is no intrusion into said enclosure, and detecting intrusion into said enclosure when results other than said predictable results are sensed, wherein said means for sensing predictable results comprises means for sensing the presence and absence of energy on said paths and where an intrusion is detected based on the presence and absence of energy on said paths; and

impairing means for impairing said information contained in said electronic circuit when intrusion is detected by said sensing means.

14. The apparatus of claim 2 in which said electronic circuit comprises a CMOS chip and in which said impairing means interrupts electrical current flow to said CMOS chip.

16. The apparatus of claim 2 in which said enclosure includes at least one board including a first side coated with a conductor and a second side including a pattern of fine conductors;

and

said means for sensing includes an electrical circuit formed at least in part by said conductor coating and at least some of said fine conductors, wherein said means for changing includes a select means for selectively energizing only a first group of said fine conductors, wherein said means for sensing includes means for detecting current flow in said first group of said fine conductors and fine conductors not in said first group, to provide an output indication of those conductors supporting current flow and those conductors not supporting current flow;

means for comparing said output indication of said means for detecting with an output of said select means identifying said first group of conductors, and means coupling an output of said first means for comparing to said impairing means to impair said electronic circuit in the event said output of said means for comparing indicates that some of said fine conductors in said first group are not supporting current flow or some of said conductors not in said first group are supporting current flow.

17. A tamper resistant apparatus for detecting intrusion into a region comprising:

(a) means for generating a time sequence of drive signals;

(b) a plurality of sensing elements surrounding the region, the sensing elements responsive to a current one of said drive signals for assuming, in absence of intrusion, a particular state in conformity with the current one of the drive signals;

(c) means for comparing an actual pattern of states of said sensing elements with a pattern of states predicted from the currant drive signal; and

(d) means for detecting intrusion into said region when the actual pattern of states does not match the predicted pattern of states.

18. The apparatus of claim 17 wherein said region includes an electronic circuit and which further includes impairing means to impair said electronic circuit in response to sensing of intrusion by said detecting means.

19. The apparatus of claim 17 wherein said sensing elements comprise electrical conductors assuming either a current conducting state or a current non-conducting state.

20. The apparatus of claim 17 wherein said sensing elements include an optical source, a photodetector and an optical path therebetween.

21. The apparatus of claim 20 wherein said optical path is a free space path.

22. The apparatus of claim 17 wherein said means for sensing includes:

b1) means for generating and distributing electro-magnetic energy,

b2) energy response means for detecting electro-magnetic energy,

and wherein said means for comparing compares states of said energy response means with said pattern of states predicted from said current drive signal.

23. The apparatus of claim 22 in which said electro-magnetic energy is electrical current.

24. The apparatus of claim 22 in which said electro-magnetic energy is optical energy.

25. The apparatus of claim 22 in which said electro-magnetic energy is microwave energy.