Secure cryptographic methods for electronic transfer of information

• US 5,668,878 A
• Filed: 08/31/1995
• Issued: 09/16/1997
• Est. Priority Date: 02/28/1994
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Brands Stefan, Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC (Microsoft Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Brands Stefanus Alfonsus
• Inventors: Brands, Stefanus Alfonsus
• Primary Examiner(s): CANGIALOSI, SALVATORE A
• Application Number:
  US08/521,768
• Time in Patent Office: 747 Days
• Field of Search: 380/25, 380/28, 380/30, 380/24
• US Class Current: 380/30
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 7/725 over elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/06 Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/105 involving programming of a portable memory device, e.g. IC cards, "electronic purses"
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3672 initialising or reloading thereof
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/381 Currency conversion
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/42 Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3252 using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

Cryptographic methods and apparatus are disclosed relating to practical cryptographic systems for electronic transfer of information. Specifically, inventive techniques are described to allow the use of tamper-resistant computing devices without powerful processors; to guarantee security against criminals able to gain full control over computing devices of other parties; to allow value in privacy-protected off-line cash systems to be represented by counters instead of digital coins, without significantly compromising security against criminals who can by-pass tamper-resistance; and to allow secure currency conversion in privacy-protected off-line cash systems, without requiring tamper-resistance for receiver parties.

Claims

1. A method for a user-controlled first computing device to reduce the computational burden of a tamper-resistant second computing device, the second computing device having a first and second secret key and having to perform a cryptographic action with respect to a public key corresponding to the first secret key, the method comprising the steps of:

computing by a third computing device, at least one number, by applying a one-way function to the second secret key and a first serial number;

providing by the third computing device to the first computing device, the at least one number;

computing by the first computing device, information based on the at least one number, the information being synchronized with a second serial number of the tamper-resistant computing device;

providing by the first computing device to the second computing device, the information;

computing by the second computing device, at least one output, the output being based on the first secret key, the information, and an application of the one-way function to at least the second secret key and the second serial number; and

updating by the second computing device, the second serial number by applying an update function.

2. A method as in claim 1, wherein the first computing device stores the at least one number in a FIFO queue to synchronize the information.

3. A method as in claim 1, wherein the second computing device provides to the first computing device, the second serial number.

4. A method as in claim 1, wherein the cryptographic action is digital signing with respect to the public key.

5. A method as in claim 4, wherein the digital signing is based on one of the Schnorr digital signature scheme, the ElGamal digital signature scheme and the DSA.

6. A method as in claim 1, wherein the update function increments the second serial number by one.

7. A method as in claim 1, wherein the update function is secret.

8. A method as in claim 1, wherein the second secret key is the same as the first secret key.

9. A method as in claim 1, wherein the second secret key is substantially independent of the first secret key.

10. A method as in claim 1, wherein the first computing device is one of a desktop computer, a notebook computer, a laptop computer and a handheld computer, and the second computing device is either a smart card or a PCMCIA card.

11. A method for implementing a privacy-protected off-line electronic cheque system, in which an account holder holds a tamper-resistant first computing device and a user-controlled second computing device, and electronic cash is issued by an issuing party, the method comprising the steps of:

computing by the first computing device and the second computing device with the assistance of the issuing party, a first secret key, a corresponding public key and a digital certificate of the issuing party on the public key, the public key and the digital certificate being hidden from the issuing party, the first secret key comprising information certified by the issuing party, and the information certified by the issuing party comprising a second secret key of the first computing device;

receiving by the first computing device, a message specifying at least an amount of electronic cash;

updating by the first computing device a counter variable in accordance with the amount of electronic cash specified in the message;

computing by the first computing device, at least one output based on at least the message and the second secret key;

providing by the second computing device to a receiving party, the public key, the digital certificate, and a digital signature on the message with respect to the public key; and

verifying by the receiving party, the digital certificate and the digital signature on the message.

12. A method as in claim 11, wherein the first computing device updates the counter variable by decreasing it by the amount of electronic cash specified in the message.

13. A method as in claim 11, wherein the issuing party subtracts from an account of the account holder the maximum amount that may be signed with respect to the public key, and the first computing device updates the counter variable by increasing it by the maximum amount minus the amount of electronic cash specified in the message.

14. A method as in claim 11, wherein the message is determined by the second computing device, by including into the message a time-of-transaction value that is substantially close to that anticipated by the receiving party.

15. A method as in claim 11, wherein the information certified by the issuing party also comprises a table specifying currency conversion rates, and the first computing device, before updating the counter, converts the amount of electronic cash specified in the message by applying a currency conversion rate specified in the table.

16. A method as in claim 15, wherein the information certified by the issuing party also comprises a cheque expiration date.