Method and arrangement for generating and checking a security imprint

• US 5,680,463 A
• Filed: 09/20/1994
• Issued: 10/21/1997
• Est. Priority Date: 12/21/1993
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Francotyp-Postalia GmbH
• Original Assignee: Francotyp-Postalia GmbH
• Inventors: Thiel, Wolfgang, Windel, Harald
• Primary Examiner(s): Barron, Jr., Gilberto
• Application Number:
  US08/309,986
• Time in Patent Office: 1,127 Days
• Field of Search: 380/51, 364/464.02
• US Class Current: 380/51
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00193 Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00435 Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00508 Printing or attaching on mailpieces printing mechanisms B41J; security printing B41M3/14; marking methods B41M5/00; inks C09D11/00; record carriers with at least a part designed to carry digital markings G06K19/00
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00733 Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00161 from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00258 Electronic hardware aspects, e.g. type of circuits used
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00443 Verification of mailpieces, e.g. by checking databases
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/0058 Printing of code
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00588 Barcode
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00604 Printing of advert or logo
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00645 Separating print into fixed and variable parts
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00701 Measuring the weight of mailpieces
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00709 Scanning mailpieces
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00741 using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/0075 Symmetric, secret-key algorithms, e.g. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, AES
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/0079 Time-dependency
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/0083 Postal data, e.g. postage, address, sender, machine ID, vendor

Abstract

A method for checking a security imprint in a postage meter machine having a microprocessor includes the steps of encoding data for a security mark pixel image and inserts the encoded data into the remaining, fixed and variable pixel image data during printing. The method includes steps for forming a mark symbol sequence from an encoded combination number which is composed of at least a first number (sum of all postage values since the last reloading date), an optional second number added to said first number, a third number (postage value) and a fourth number (of the serial number), and for enabling a check of the security imprint by a postal authority. Manipulations can be recognized using further data stored and/or calculated in a remote data canter. An arrangement conducting a for check includes a mark reader composed of a CCD line camera, a D/A converter, a comparator and an encoder which are connected via an input/output unit to an input unit. A communication link can be established between the meter and the data center to evaluate mark data in a computerized manner.

Claims

1. A method for checking a security imprint made by a postage meter machine capable of communicating with a remote central data station, comprising the steps of:

disposing a postage meter at a location remote from a central data station, said central data station being remote from a postal authority apparatus;

determining exclusively within said central data station that a postage meter machine qualifies as suspicious with respect to a breach of the security of said postage meter machine by obtaining and monitoring data associated with use of said postage meter machine exclusively within said data central station;

transmitting a message to said postal authority apparatus from said central data station identifying said postage meter machine as a suspicious postage meter machine; and

thereafter, at said postal authority, checking mailings franked by said postage meter machine against further data obtained at said central data station.

2. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising the additional step of:

calculating at least a part of said further data by identifying a presumed chronological duration t_K,n+1 up to a next credit reloading of said postage meter machine, wherein K identifies a user of said suspicious postage meter machine, according to the equation;

##EQU7## wherein P_K is an average postage use of the postage meter machine user K, G_K,n is a last credit reloading of said suspicious postage meter machine, and the term (1+1/β

) is a term for compensating for normal fluctuations of postage use.

3. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising the additional steps of:

classifying a user K of said suspicious postage meter machine, on the basis of average postal use P_K by said user K, into one of a plurality of use categories, each use category having a typical use time allocated thereto; and

employing said typical use time for the category into which said user K is classified as a presumed chronological duration which should elapse until a next credit reloading.

4. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein said further data includes a presumed chronological duration t_K,n+1 up to a next credit reloading of said postage meter machine, and comprising the additional step of calculating said presume chronological duration according to the following equation:

space="preserve" listing-type="equation">t.sub.K,n+1 =(G.sub.K,n+1 +R1·

α

.sub.x)·

1/P.sub.K,

wherein K identifies a user of said suspicious postage meter machine, P_K is an average postage use by said user K of said postage meter machine, G_K,n+1 is a requested reloading credit which is reloaded into said postage meter machine, and R1 is a remaining amount of postage funds in said postage meter machine at a time of said reloading, and α

_x is a disposition factor dependent on a classification of said postage meter machine user K into one of a plurality of use categories.

5. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein said further data includes a presumed chronological duration up to a next credit reloading of said postage meter machine, and comprising the additional step of calculating said presumed chronological duration in said postage meter machine for determining whether said postage meter machine is suspicious.

6. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein said further data includes a presumed chronological duration up to a next credit reloading of said postage meter machine, and comprising the additional step of calculating said presumed chronological duration in said remote central data station for determining whether said postage meter machine is suspicious.

7. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising the additional steps of:

storing register values relating to accounting information in said postage meter machine;

initiating a communication link from said postage meter machine to said central data station;

communicating said register values from said postage meter machine to said central data station via said communication link before a reloading of credit from said central data station into said postage meter machine;

in each communication link established for credit reloading, communicating said further data from said postage meter machine to said central data station and producing a postage meter machine profile from said further data in said central data station; and

continually postponing an on-site inspection of said postage meter machine as long as said postage meter machine establishes said communication link for a credit reloading with a predetermined regularity.

8. A method as claimed in claim 7 wherein the register values and further data communicated from said postage meter machine to said central data station include a register value R1 for a descending register which identifies a reminding amount of funds available for franking in said postage meter machine, a register value R2 for an ascending register identifying an aggregate used amount of funds in said postage meter machine, a register value R3 identifying a total resetting equaling a previous aggregate sum for all telesettings of said postage meter machine made by said central data station, a register value R4 which is a number of valid franking imprints made by said postage meter machine, a register value R8 which is a number of all imprint made by said postage meter machine, and a minimum franking value F_min, and respectively calculating V_susp1 and V_susp2 as values indicative of a level of suspiciousness of said postage meter machine, according to the following equations:

##EQU8## wherein R1_old is a value of R1 at an N^th credit reloading and R1_new is a value of R1 before an (n+1)^th credit reloading.

9. A method as claimed in claim 8 comprising the additional step of classifying said postage meter machine dependent on V_susp1 and V_susp2 as one of either a suspicious postage meter machine or a manipulated postage meter machine.

10. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising the additional step of, after a postage meter machine is determined suspicious by said central data station and said message identifying said postage meter machine as suspicious has been sent to said postage meter machine, generating in said postage meter machine a specific character and including said specific character at a predetermined location in a franking imprint made by said postage meter machine.

11. A method as claimed in claim 10 wherein the step of generating said specific character is further defined by generating a specific character as a cluster of printed pixels in said franking imprint.

12. A method as claimed in claim 10 wherein the step of generating a specific character is further defined by generating said specific character as a barcode in said franking imprint.

13. A method as claimed in claim 10 wherein the step of generating a specific character is further defined by generating said specific character as information in a mark symbol sequence in said franking imprint.

14. A method as claimed in claim 13 wherein said postage meter machine has a serial number, and wherein the step of generating said specific character as information in a mark symbol sequence is further defined by generating a number sequence, identifying said serial number, in said mark symbol sequence.

15. A method as claimed in claim 10 comprising the additional steps of:

searching, at said central data station, said predetermined location in said franking imprint of said postage meter machine to determine the presence of said specific character at said predetermined location; and

initiating an on-site inspection of said postage meter machine dependent on a recognition at said central data station of said specific character at said predetermined location in said franking imprint of said postage meter machine.

16. A method as claimed in claim 10 comprising the additional step of:

additionally including encrypted information, identifying said postage meter machine as a suspicious postage meter machine, in said franking imprint of said postage meter machine.

17. A method for checking a security imprint made by a postage meter machine, comprising the steps of:

disposing a postage meter machine, a central data station and an apparatus at a postal authority all remote from each other;

storing accounting register values in said postage meter machine;

establishing a communication link between said postage meter machine and said central data station;

communicating said register values from said postage meter machine to said central data station via said communication link for conducting a security check of said postage meter machine;

calculating a point in time of a next communication between said postage meter machine and said central data station;

analyzing said register values exclusively at said central data station and determining exclusively within said data central station whether said register values indicate that the security of said postage meter machine has been reached;

informing said postal authority in the event that said register values indicates said security of said postage meter machine has been breached by transmitting a communication from said data central station to said apparatus at said postal authority, and simultaneously and separately analyzing said security imprint at said postal authority by evaluating the presence or absence of selected characters in said security imprint to determine whether a manipulation of said postage meter machine has occurred; and

identifying a true sender of a franked item bearing said security imprint in the event of a manipulation.