Method and system for changing an authorization password or key in a distributed communication network

• US 5,778,065 A
• Filed: 02/08/1996
• Issued: 07/07/1998
• Est. Priority Date: 09/20/1993
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Van Herreweghen, Elsie, Tsudik, Gene, Molva, Refik, Janson, Philippe, Hauser, Ralf
• Primary Examiner(s): CANGIALOSI, SALVATORE A
• Application Number:
  US08/598,481
• Time in Patent Office: 880 Days
• Field of Search: 380/21, 380/25, 380/4
• US Class Current: 713/155
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

Abstract

A robust and secure password (or key) change method between a user and an authentication server in a distributed communication network is disclosed. The protocol requires the exchange of only two messages between the user desiring the key change and the server, the user'"'"'s request including, at least partly encrypted, an identification of the sending user, old and new keys, and two nonces, at least one including a time indication. The authentication server'"'"'s response includes a possibly encrypted accept/reject indication and the regularly encrypted request from the user.

Claims

1. A method for providing exchange of a new key (Kwew) in a communication network with at least one user and at least one server for authentication between a user (P) and a server (AS), comprising the following steps:

a. the user requests a key change (REQ_-- CPW) by transmitting at least the following information to the server (AS);

two nonces (N1, N2), at least one of which contains freshness information, the user'"'"'s identifier (P), an encryption (E{Knew}Kold) of a selected new key (Knew) under a present key (Kold), and an encryption (E{Kold}Knew) of the present key (Kold) under the new key (Knew),

b. the server identifies the user, determines a potential new key (Knew") from the received encryption (E{Knew}Kold) of the new key under the present key by employing the stored present key (Kold) of said user, determines a potential present key (Kold") from the received encryption (E{Kold}Knew) of the present key under the new key, compares the determined potential present key (Kold") with the stored present key (Kold), and

c1. rejects the potential new key (Knew"), when any one of the following conditions occurs;

said comparison shows inequality,

said potential new key does not comply with all predetermined key selection rules, and

one of the nonces (N1, N2) has a value that is outside of a respective predetermined range thereof, or

c2. accepts the new key when said comparison shows equality and the potential new key (Knew") is correctly chosen and the nonces (N1, N2) each have a value that is inside of the respective predetermined ranges thereof, and

d. acknowledges by replying (REP_-- CPW) to said user with at least the following information;

an accept/reject indication whether the potential new key (Knew") is accepted by the server (AS) or not, and an encryption of the received change key request (REQ_-- CPW), and

e. the user determines from the received reply message (REP_-- CPW) whether the selected new key (Knew) is accepted, and authenticates this determination by decrypting the returned change key request (REQ_-- CPW).

2. The key exchange method of claim 1, wherein the encryption (T{Knew}Kold) in the user'"'"'s key change request is an encryption of the nonces (N1, N2), the user name (P), and the server name (AS) under the present key (Kold), X-ORed with the selected new key (Knew),

T{Knew}Kold={N1, N2, P, AS}Kold+Knew, and

the encryption (T{Kold}Knew) is an encryption of the nonces (N1,g) at least one nonce being modified under a preselected asymmetric function (g), the user name (P), and the server name (AS) under the new key (Knew), X-ORed with the present key (Kold),

T{Kold}Knew={N1, g(N2), P, AS} Knew+Kold.

3. The key exchange method of claim 1, wherein the reply message (REP_-- CPW) of the authentication server contains an encryption (E{REQ_-- CPW}Kold) of the received change key request (REQ_-- CPW) under the stored present key (Kold).

4. The key exchange method of claim 3, wherein the reply message (REP_-- CPW) of the authentication server further contains an encryption of the accept/reject indication under the stored present key (Kold).

5. The key exchange method of claim 1, wherein the reply message (REP_-- CPW) of the authentication server is in case of an accepted new key (Knew), an encryption of the accept indication and the original request (REQ_-- CPW) under the new key (Knew) and in case of a rejected new key (Knew), an encryption of the reject indication and the original request (REQ_-- CPW) under the stored present key (Kold).

6. The key exchange method of claim 2, wherein the preselected function (g), modifying one of the nonces (N2), is an encryption of the other nonce (N1) under the new key (Knew).

7. A system for providing exchange of a new key in accordance with the key exchange method of any one of claims 1 to 6 to enable secure communications between users of a communication network, said apparatus comprising:

a. at least one authentication server;

b. means in said server for storing an initial unique user key (Kold) for each said user;

c. means in the user desiring a key change, for encrypting and transmitting identity and freshness information from said user as a key change request to said server;

d. means for decrypting and interpreting the received key change request at said server;

e. means in said server for determining acceptance or non-acceptance of said key change request;

f. means in said server for encrypting and transmitting a reply to said user, indicating acceptance or non-acceptance; and

g. means in said user for receiving and interpreting a reply received from said server.

8. A method according to any one of claims 1 through 6 implemented in a communication system having a first plurality of users and a second plurality of servers, at least one of the servers being an authentication server, for changing passwords exclusively between users and said authentication server.