Certificate revocation system

• US 5,960,083 A
• Filed: 03/24/1997
• Issued: 09/28/1999
• Est. Priority Date: 10/24/1995
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Assa Abloy AB
• Original Assignee: Silvio Micali
• Inventors: Micali, Silvio
• Primary Examiner(s): GREGORY, BERNARR E
• Application Number:
  US08/823,354
• Time in Patent Office: 918 Days
• Field of Search: 380/9, 380/21, 380/23, 380/25, 380/29, 380/30, 380/49, 380/50
• US Class Current: 713/175
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/02 involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]

Abstract

A method of managing certificates in a communication system having a certifying authority and a directory. Preferably, the method begins by having the certifying authority generate certificates by digitally signing a given piece of data. At a later point time, the certifying authority may produce a string that proves whether a particular certificate is currently valid without also proving the validity of at least some other certificates. The technique obviates use of certification revocation lists communicated between the certifying authority and the directory.

Claims

1. A method of generating a certificate for data, comprising the steps of:

(a) generating a final value by iterating a one-way function on a secret first value;

(b) generating certificate information that includes the data and the final value; and

(c) generating the certificate by digitally signing the certificate information.

2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the data includes a public key of a public-key cryptosystem.

3. A method according to claim 1, wherein a first entity generates the final value and a second entity digitally signs the certificate information.

4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the second entity is a CA.

5. A method according to claim 1, wherein the one-way function is a hash function.

6. A method according to claim 1, further comprising the step of:

(d) providing at least one additional value as an input to at least one iteration of the one-way function.

7. A method according to claim 1, further comprising the step of:

(d) providing at least one additional value as an input to every iteration of the one-way function.

8. A method of proving that previously certified information is valid at each date in a sequence of dates, comprising the steps of:

(a) at each of the sequence of dates, determining whether the previously certified information is valid; and

(b) if the certified information is valid at a date within the sequence of dates, producing a string unique to the certified information authenticating that the previously certified information is valid at the date.

9. A method according to claim 8, wherein the string is a digital signature.

10. A method according to claim 9, wherein the digital signature is off-line.

11. A method according to claim 9, wherein a certifying authority produces the digital signature.

12. A method of authenticating that each member of a subset of certifies that bind given keys to given users is valid at a given date, comprisign the steps of:

(a) determining each of the members of the subset that are valid at a given date specific to the member; and

(b) for each member of the subset that is determined to be valid, authenticating that the member is valid at the given date by producing a string unique to the member.

13. A method according to claim 12, wherein the string is a digital signature.

14. A method according to claim 13, wherein the digital signature is off-line.

15. A method according to claim 13, wherein a certifying authority produces the digital signature.