Outside access to computer resources through a firewall

• US 6,061,797 A
• Filed: 08/12/1998
• Issued: 05/09/2000
• Est. Priority Date: 10/21/1996
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Trend Micro Inc.
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Rao, Arun Mohan, Walters, Glen Robert, Jade, Prashanth, Moore, Victor Stuart
• Primary Examiner(s): Pan, Daniel H.
• Application Number:
  US09/132,915
• Time in Patent Office: 636 Days
• Field of Search: 709/218, 709/230, 709/217, 709/229, 709/749, 709/227, 709/207, 709/104, 345/331, 707/10, 707/9, 707/6, 707/8, 382/115, 235/380, 713/201, 380/23, 710/200, 350/201, 350/25, 711/203, 711/163
• US Class Current: 726/15
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/029 Firewall traversal, e.g. tunnelling or, creating pinholes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/40 Network security protocols

Abstract

A firewall isolates computer and network resources inside the firewall from networks, computers and computer applications outside the firewall. Typically, the inside resources could be privately owned databases and local area networks (LAN'"'"'s), and outside objects could include individuals and computer applications operating through public communication networks such as the Internet. Usually, a firewall allows for an inside user or object to originate connection to an outside object or network, but does not allow for connections to be generated in the reverse direction; i.e. from outside in. The disclosed invention provides a special "tunneling" mechanism, operating on both sides of a firewall, for establishing such "outside in" connections when they are requested by certain "trusted" individuals or objects or applications outside the firewall. The intent here is to minimize the resources required for establishing "tunneled" connections (connections through the firewall that are effectively requested from outside), while also minimizing the security risk involved in permitting such connections to be made at all. The mechanism includes special tunneling applications, running on interface servers inside and outside the firewall, and a special table of "trusted sockets" created and maintained by the inside tunneling application. Entries in the trusted sockets table define objects inside the firewall consisting of special inside ports, a telecommunication protocol to be used at each port, and a host object associated with each port. Each entry is "trusted" in the sense that it is supposedly known only by individuals authorized to have "tunneling" access through the firewall from outside.

Claims

1. A tunneling software application contained on computer-readable media, said tunneling application being useful, in first and second computers connecting directly to opposite sides of a network security firewall and respectively connecting said opposite sides to first and second data communication networks, for isolating secure objects in said first network from said second network, while allowing for transfer of data through said firewall and between said first and second networks without compromising security of said secure objects in said first network;

said tunneling application comprising;

first and second program segments respectively intended to run on said first and second computers;

said first program segment operating to provide a data communication interface between said firewall and said first network, and said second program segment operating to provide a data communication interface between said firewall and said second network;

said first program segment comprising means for operating said first computer to create and maintain a table of trusted objects including objects associated with said secure objects in said first network; and

means for operating said first computer, relative to said firewall and said second computer, to provide a copy of said table to said second computer for use by said second program segment.

2. A tunneling application in accordance with claim 1 wherein:

said first program segment comprises means for operating said first computer relative to said firewall said second computer to establish a private control connection through said firewall between said first and second computers;

said private control connection being normally inaccessible to communications directed from said second network to said first network; and

said second program segment comprises means for operating said second computer to receive a communication directed from said second network to said first network, verify that said received communication is addressed to a said trusted object designated in said copy of said table of trusted objects, and forward data contained in said received communication to said first program segment in said first computer through said private control connection;

in a form enabling said first program segment to have said contained data delivered to a said secure object without exposing the respective secure object to access from said second network.