Method of securely loading commands in a smart card

• US 6,073,238 A
• Filed: 03/28/1997
• Issued: 06/06/2000
• Est. Priority Date: 03/29/1996
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Koninklijke KPN NV
• Original Assignee: Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V. (Royal KPN NV)
• Inventors: Drupsteen, Michel Marco Paul
• Primary Examiner(s): Wright, Norman M.
• Application Number:
  US08/828,350
• Time in Patent Office: 1,166 Days
• Field of Search: 711/163, 711/164, 395/186, 395/187.01, 395/188.01, 380/3, 380/4, 380/21, 380/22, 380/24, 380/43, 380/45, 235/350, 235/387.5, 714/38, 713/200, 713/201, 713/202
• US Class Current: 726/20
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/572 Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3552 Downloading or loading of personalisation data
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/082 Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system

Abstract

A method of securely loading and validating commands (COM) in a smart card (SC) is disclosed. Especially in the case where application-specific commands are loaded by an application provider (AP), that is off-line with respect to the card issuer (CI), it must be ensured that the commands are valid. The invention provides a method involving the protection of the commands (COM) by means of authentication codes, these codes (MAC1, MAC2) being produced using two different keys: one key (K1) is stored by the card issuer (CI), the other (K2) by a trusted third party (TTP). A further authentication code (MAC3), produced using a key from a set of keys (K3*), may be utilized to selectively validate commands for individual applications (e.g. AP1, AP2).

Claims

1. A method of securely loading a command or commands in a smart card by a first party, the smart card being issued by a second party, the method comprising the steps of:

the second party producing a first authentication code using a first key,

a third party producing a second authentication code using a second key,

the first party obtaining the first and second authentication codes from the second party and the third party, respectively,

the first party transferring command modifications with the obtained first and second authentication codes to the smart card,

the smart card validating the command modifications by obtaining a replica of the first and second authentication codes using stored versions of the first and second key, respectively, and comparing the replica of the first and second authentication codes with the obtained first and second authentication codes transferred with the command modifications from the first party to the smart card.

2. A method according to claim 1, further comprising repeating the transferring and the subsequent validating steps when the validating comparison fails, the use of any loaded command being blocked until the validating comparison succeeds.

3. A method according to claim 2, further comprising permanently disabling the loaded command if the validating comparison fails a predetermined number of times, the predetermined number being less than ten.

4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the permanently disabling step is performed by the card changing the first key stored in the card.

5. A method according to claim 1, wherein the command is an application-specific command.

6. A method according to claim 1, wherein the first and/or second authentication codes are message authentication codes produced according to a particular standard.

7. A method according to claim 1, wherein the card contains several applications, each application being provided with an individual third key for validating a command provided with a third authentication code, said third authentication code being produced using the individual third key.

8. A method according to claim 1, further comprising the second party producing a fourth authentication code of, said fourth authentication code not involving the first or second key.

9. A method according to claim 1, further comprising providing the card with a flag register, each flag of the flag register corresponding with a command of a smart card processor, the execution of a command being inhibited if the corresponding flag is set.

10. A smart card, comprising a substrate and an integrated circuit having a processor and a memory, the memory containing at least two keys the integrated circuit being arranged to regenerate, using the at least two keys at least two authentication codes relative to a received command modification request including at least two corresponding request authentication codes and to compare the at least two regenerated authentication codes with the received at least two corresponding request authentication codes to verify an approved modification to commands is being received.

11. A smart card according to claim 10, wherein the memory comprising a data structure having individual applications, each application containing an individual key (e.g. K3-1, K3-2) for regenerating authentication codes and selectively loading commands associated with the authentication codes when the approved modification is verified.

12. A card according to claim 10, wherein the memory includes a flag register, each flag of the flag register corresponding with a command of the processor, the execution of a command being inhibited if the corresponding flag is set.