Systems and methods using cryptography to protect secure computing environments

• US 6,157,721 A
• Filed: 08/12/1996
• Issued: 12/05/2000
• Est. Priority Date: 08/12/1996
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Intertrust Technologies Corporation (Fidelio Acquisition Co LLC)
• Original Assignee: Intertrust Technologies Corporation (Fidelio Acquisition Co LLC)
• Inventors: Sibert, W. Olin, Shear, Victor H., Van Wie, David M.
• Primary Examiner(s): Buczinski, Stephen C.
• Application Number:
  US08/689,754
• Time in Patent Office: 1,576 Days
• Field of Search: 380/4, 380/23, 380/25, 380/49, 380/30, 380/255, 380/287, 380/251, 713/150-152, 713/155, 713/156, 713/164-170, 713/175-182, 713/189-191, 713/193, 713/200, 713/201, 713/194
• US Class Current: 380/255
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1483 using an access-table, e.g. matrix or list
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/10 Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material protection in video systems or pay television H04N7/16 ; Digital rights management [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/51 at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2211/007 Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/02 involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/085 involving remote charge determination or related payment systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/12 specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/24 Credit schemes, i.e. "pay after"
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3823 combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3825 Use of electronic signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/401 Transaction verification
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00086 Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy indicating unauthorised use of record carriers in general G11B23/28; scrambling for television signal recording H04N5/913; network architectures or network protocols for network security H04L63/00; cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00159 Parental control systems
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00173 wherein the origin of the content is checked, e.g. determining whether the content has originally been retrieved from a legal disc copy or another trusted source
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00188 involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised devices recording or reproducing contents to/from a record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00195 using a device identifier associated with the player or recorder, e.g. serial numbers of playback apparatuses or MAC addresses
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/0021 involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00543 wherein external data is encrypted, e.g. for secure communication with an external device or for encrypting content on a separate record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00557 wherein further management data is encrypted, e.g. sector headers, TOC or the lead-in or lead-out areas
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00688 : said measures preventing that a usable copy of recorded data can be made on another medium
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/0071 : involving a purchase action
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00768 : wherein copy control information is used, e.g. for indicating whether a content may be copied freely, no more, once, or never, by setting CGMS, SCMS, or CCI flags
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 2220/216 : Rewritable discs
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 2220/218 : Write-once discs
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 2220/2562 : DVDs [digital versatile discs]; Digital video discs; MMCDs; HDCDs
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 2220/2575 : DVD-RAMs
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 27/031 : Electronic editing of digitised analogue information signals, e.g. audio or video signals
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 27/329 : on a disc [VTOC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/40104 : Security; Encryption; Content protection cryptographic protocols H04L9/00; protocols for network security H04L63/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/40117 : Interconnection of audio or video/imaging devices home automation networks H04L12/2803; bitstream network arrangements specially adapted for distribution of digital video signals H04N7/24

Abstract

Secure computation environments are protected from bogus or rogue load modules, executables and other data elements through use of digital signatures, seals and certificates issued by a verifying authority. A verifying authority--which may be a trusted independent third party--tests the load modules or other executables to verify that their corresponding specifications are accurate and complete, and then digitally signs the load module or other executable based on tamper resistance work factor classification. Secure computation environments with different tamper resistance work factors use different verification digital signature authentication techniques (e.g., different signature algorithms and/or signature verification keys)--allowing one tamper resistance work factor environment to protect itself against load modules from another, different tamper resistance work factor environment. Several dissimilar digital signature algorithms may be used to reduce vulnerability from algorithm compromise, and subsets of multiple digital signatures may be used to reduce the scope of any specific compromise.

Claims

1. A security method comprising:

(a) digitally signing a first load module with a first digital signature designating the first load module for use by a first device class;

(b) digitally signing a second load module with a second digital signature different from the first digital signature, the second digital signature designating the second load module for use by a second device class having at least one of tamper resistance and security level different from the at least one of tamper resistance and security level of the first device class;

(c) distributing the first load module for use by at least one device in the first device class; and

(d) distributing the second load module for use by at least one device in the second device class.

2. A method as in claim 1 further including the step of using the first and second digital signatures to prevent the tamper resistances or security levels of the first and second device classes from becoming equal.

3. A method as in claim 1 further including the step of conditionally executing, based at least in part on authenticating the first digital signature, the first load module with a first electronic appliance within the first device class.

4. A method as in claim 3 further including the step of conditionally executing, based at least in part on authenticating the second digital signature, the second load module with a second electronic appliance different from the first electronic appliance, the second electronic appliance being within the second device class.

5. A software verifying method comprising:

(a) testing a load module having at least one specification associated therewith, the specification describing one or more functions performed by the load module;

(b) verifying that the load module satisfies the specification; and

(c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step.

6. A method of authenticating a load module comprising:

(a) authenticating a first digital signature associated with some or all of the load module, including the step of employing a first one-way hash algorithm, a first decryption algorithm, and a first public key key, the first public key secured behind a tamper resistant barrier and therefore hidden from the user; and

(b) authenticating a second digital signature associated with the same portion of the load module as the first digital signature is associated with, including the step of employing at least one of;

(i) a second one-way hash algorithm that is different from the first one-way hash algorithm,

(ii) a second decryption algorithm that is different from the first decryption algorithm, and

(iii) a second public key that is different from the first public key.

7. A method as in claim 6 further including the step of randomly selecting one of step (a) and step (b) prior to executing the load module.

8. A method as in claim 6 wherein:

(i) step (a) is performed by a first electronic appliance, and

(ii) step (b) is performed by a second electronic appliance different from the first electronic appliance.

9. A method of distinguishing between trusted and untrusted load modules comprising:

(a) receiving a load module,

(b) determining whether the load module has an associated digital signature,

(c) if the load module has an associated digital signature, authenticating the digital signature using at least one public key secured behind a tamper resistant barrier and therefore hidden from the user; and

(d) conditionally executing the load module based at least in part on the results of authenticating step (c).

10. A method of increasing the security of a virtual distribution environment comprising plural interoperable protected processing environments having different security levels, the method comprising:

(a) classifying the plural protected processing environments based on security level,

(b) distributing different verification public keys to different protected processing environments having different security level classifications, and

(c) using the distributed verification public keys to authenticate load modules, including the step of preventing protected processing environments having different security level classifications from executing the same load module.

11. A method as in claim 10 further including the step of maintaining the distributed verification public keys within tamper resistant barriers.

12. A method as in claim 10 further including the step of digitally signing each load module with at least two different, independent techniques.

13. A method as in claim 10 further including the step of testing whether the load module satisfies at least one specification describing one or more functions of the load module, and digitally signing the load module and the associated specification if the testing step reveals the specification is satisfied.

14. A first protected processing environment comprising:

a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, and

at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first protected processing environment from executing the same load module accessed by a second protected processing environment having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.

15. A protected processing environment as in claim 14 wherein the preventing arrangement includes a digital signature authenticating circuit.

16. A protected processing environment as in claim 14 wherein the preventing arrangement includes first and second digital signature authenticating circuits applying different digital signature authenticating techniques.

17. A protected processing environment as in claim 14 wherein the preventing arrangement comprises means for randomly selecting between first and second, different digital signature authentication techniques.

18. A method for protecting a first computing arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, the method including:

preventing the first computing arrangement from using the same software module accessible by a second computing arrangement having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.

19. A method as in claim 19 wherein the preventing step comprises:

authenticating at least one digital signature associated with the first computing arrangement as corresponding to the first security level.

20. A method of protecting computing arrangements comprising:

(a) associating plural digital signatures with a load module;

(b) authenticating a first subset of the plural digital signatures with a first tamper resistant computing arrangement; and

(c) authenticating a second subset of the plural digital signatures with a second tamper resistant computing arrangement different from the first computing arrangement.

21. A computer security method comprising:

digitally signing, using a first digital signing technique, a first executable designating the first executable for use by a first device class; and

digitally signing, using a second digital signing technique different from the first digital signing technique, a second executable designating the second executable for use by a second device class having at least one of tamper resistance and security level different from the at least one tamper resistance and security level of the first device class.

22. A method as in claim 21 further including the step of using the first and second digital signatures to prevent the tamper resistances or security levels of the first and second device classes from collapsing into one another.

23. A method as in claim 21 further including the step of conditionally executing the first executable based at least in part on authenticating the first executable with a first electronic appliance within the first device class.

24. A method as in claim 23 further including the step of conditionally executing the second executable with a second electronic appliance different from the first electronic appliance, the second electronic appliance being within the second device class.

25. A software verifying method comprising:

testing an executable having at least one specification associated therewith, the specification describing one or more functions of the load module;

verifying that the executable satisfies the specification; and

issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step.

26. A method of authenticating an executable comprising:

(a) authenticating a first digital signature associated with some or all of the executable, including the step of employing a first one-way hash algorithm, a first decryption algorithm, and a first public key, the first public key secured behind a tamper resistant barrier and therefore hidden from the user; and

(b) authenticating a second digital signature associated with the same portion of the executable as the first digital signature is associated with, including the step of employing at least one of;

(i) a second one-way hash algorithm that is different from the first one-way hash algorithm,

(ii) a second decryption algorithm that is different from the first decryption algorithm, and

(iii) a second public key that is different from the first public key.

27. A method as in claim 26 further including the step of randomly selecting one of step (a) and step (b) prior to executing the executable.

28. A method as in claim 26 wherein:

(i) step (a) is performed by a first electronic appliance, and

(ii) step (b) is performed by a second electronic appliance different from the first electronic appliance.

29. A method of distinguishing between trusted and untrusted executables comprising:

(a) receiving a executable,

(b) determining whether the executable has an associated digital signature,

(c) if the executable has an associated digital signature, authenticating the digital signature using at least one public key secured behind a tamper resistant barrier and therefore hidden from the user; and

(d) conditionally executing the executable based at least in part on the results of authenticating step (c).

30. A method of increasing the security of plural interoperable secure execution spaces having different security levels, the method comprising:

(a) classifying the plural secure execution spaces based on security level,

(b) distributing different verification public keys to different secure execution spaces having different security level classifications, and

(c) using the distributed verification public keys to authenticate executables, including the step of preventing secure execution spaces having different security level classifications from executing the same executable.

31. A method as in claim 30 further including the step of maintaining the distributed verification public keys within tamper resistant enclosures.

32. A method as in claim 30 further including the step of digitally signing each executable with at least two different, independent techniques or by different verifying authorities.

33. A method as in claim 30 further including the step of testing whether the executable satisfies at least one specification at least in part describing the executable operation, and digitally signing the executable and associated specification if the testing step reveals the executable satisfies the specification.

34. A protected processing environment comprising:

a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,

a first secure execution space, and

at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure execution space from executing the same executable accessed by a second secure execution space having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.

35. A secure execution space as in claim 34 wherein the preventing arrangement includes a digital signature authenticating circuit.

36. A secure execution space as in claim 35 wherein the preventing arrangement includes first and second digital signature authenticating circuits applying different digital signature authenticating techniques.

37. A secure execution space as in claim 34 wherein the preventing arrangement comprises means for randomly selecting between first and second, different digital signature authentication techniques.

38. A method for protecting a first computing arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, the method including:

preventing the first computing arrangement from using the same software module accessed by a second computing arrangement having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.

39. A method as in claim 38 wherein the preventing step comprises authenticating at least one digital signature associated with the first computing arrangement as corresponding to the first security level.

40. A method of protecting computing arrangements comprising:

(a) associating plural digital signatures with an executable;

(b) authenticating a first subset of the plural digital signatures with a first tamper resistant computing arrangement; and

(c) authenticating a second subset of the plural digital signatures with a second tamper resistant computing arrangement different from the first environment.

41. A method as in claim 40 wherein the associating step (a) comprises digitally signing the executable with first and second, different verifying authorities within a web of trust.