Authentication for secure devices with limited cryptography

• US 6,161,180 A
• Filed: 08/29/1997
• Issued: 12/12/2000
• Est. Priority Date: 08/29/1997
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Smith, Sean William, Matyas, Stephen M.
• Primary Examiner(s): Barron, Jr., Gilberto
• Application Number:
  US08/921,442
• Time in Patent Office: 1,201 Days
• Field of Search: 380/25, 380/21, 380/30, 380/277, 713/172, 713/173, 713/159, 713/2, 713/191, 705/66
• US Class Current: 713/169
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3672 initialising or reloading thereof
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3273 for mutual authentication network architectures or network communication protocols for achieving mutual authentication in a packet data network H04L63/0869

Abstract

Authentication is provided for secure devices with limited cryptography, particularly for devices which do not have the capability to do public-key cryptography and generate random numbers. An initialization process is disclosed for limited-power Devices which are unable to perform public-key cryptography and generate random-numbers, as well as for full-power Devices which have the capability to do public-key cryptography and generate random numbers. A Challenge-Response procedure is also disclosed for ensuring the secure state of a device.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating a secure device of the type that are built with full cryptography and are subject to various failures that leave them with only limited cryptography, the method comprising:

a. while the secure device is in a secure state in a secure environment, an installation authority initializing the device by installing a secret value in the device;

b. transporting the device from the secure environment to an insecure environment, wherein an outside event alters the state of the device and changes the device from having full cryptography to only limited cryptography;

c. transporting the device from the insecure environment to a secure environment, and then an authenticating authority reinitializing the device by using the secret value.

2. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the device is initialized by:

a. installing the secret value, including a challenge secret and a response secret, as part of initialization, and storing at the device a secret key authentication certificate, comprised of said secret values encrypted with a public key, along with identifying information and other parameters, all signed with a private key;

b. the authenticating authority must successfully know the challenge secret in order to re-initialize the device.

3. A method as claimed in claim 2, including:

a. store the secret value inside a microcontroller chip;

b. a microcontroller firmware does not release the response unless the firmware is first presented with the correct challenge.

4. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein:

a. the installation authority learns the identity and the public key of the authenticating authority, and then the installation authority initializes the device;

b. the authenticating authority learns the identity and the public key of the installation authority and then performs mutual authentication with the device.

5. A method according to claim 1, wherein the initializing step includes the step of using the full cryptography of the device to initialize the device.

6. A method according to claim 1, wherein the installation authority does not retain the secret value.

7. A method according to claim 1, wherein the messages include sequence number, nonces, direction, a MAC calculated with a shared secret key, and then are encrypted with a shared secret key.

8. A method for authenticating a secure device of the type that are built with full cryptography and are subject to various failures that leave them with only limited cryptography, the method comprising:

a. while the secure device is in a secure state in a secure environment, an installation authority initializing the device by installing a secret value in the device;

b. transporting the device from the secure environment to an insecure environment, wherein an outside event alters the state of the device;

c. transporting the device from the insecure environment to a secure environment, and then an authenticating authority reinitializes the device by using the secret value;

wherein the state change is the loss of full cryptography, the initializing step includes the step of using the full cryptography of the device to initialize the device, the installation authority does not retain the secret value, and the messages include sequence number, nonces, direction, a MAC calculated with a shared secret key, and then are encrypted with a shared secret key.

9. A method for protecting a device of the type that are built with full cryptography and that are subject to various failures that leave them with only limited cryptography, and which possesses secret data, including a primary secret key authentication key, in nonvolatile EEPROM, the method comprising:

a. including in the secret data a challenge secret and a response secret;

b. storing the secret data inside a microcontoller chip;

c. providing a microcontroller firmware that does not release the response secret unless the firmware is first presented with the correct challenge secret.

10. A method as claimed in claim 9, wherein:

a. installing the challenge secret and response secret as part of initialization and stored within a secret key authentication certificate;

b. an authenticating authority must successfully know the real challenge secret in order to re-initialize the secret data.

11. A method as claimed in claim 10, wherein,

a. the authenticating authority establishes an authenticated communication channel with the device, and transmits the challenge secret to the device;

b. the device forwards the challenge secret to its microcontroller, and if correct, the response secret is released;

c. the device forwards the response secret to the authenticating authority, which verifies that the response secret is correct.