Authentication between communicating parties in a telecommunications network

• US 6,225,888 B1
• Filed: 06/08/1999
• Issued: 05/01/2001
• Est. Priority Date: 12/08/1997
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Nokia Solutions and Networks US LLC (Nokia Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Nokia Telecommunications Oy (Nokia Corporation)
• Inventors: Juopperi, Jari
• Primary Examiner(s): Zimmerman, Brian
• Assistant Examiner(s): Dalencourt, Yves
• Application Number:
  US09/327,609
• Time in Patent Office: 693 Days
• Field of Search: 300/825.34, 380/21, 380/25, 380/30, 380/9, 379/272, 379/219, 340/5.8
• US Class Current: 340/5.8
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0407 wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for anonymous credentials or for identity based cryptographic systems H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/12 Detection or prevention of fraud
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/122 Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/75 Temporary identity

Abstract

In known telecommunications systems using multiple access the terminal equipment assumes that the network element is genuine while the network element assumes that the terminal equipment is genuine. This allows false terminal equipment, a false network element or a third party to penetrate the system. The proposed commitment protocol applies bit block commitment known from cryptography and a shared encryption key and the authentication is divided into two parts, whereby one part of it is done by the terminal equipment and the other part is done by the network. The terminal equipment (MS) sends to the network element (BTS) a pseudo identifier (AMSI) which it has formed, whereupon encryption keys (MKEY, BKEY) are exchanged. Only when the network element has revealed its true identity, will the terminal equipment send the required information (IMSI, RND₁, RND₂) encrypted with a combination of the keys. Finally, the network element authenticates the terminal equipment by using the identity information which it has revealed. Only then can operation commence.

Claims

1. Method of authentication between communicating parties in a telecommunications network, wherein a network element and terminal equipment perform authentication of each other and wherein the network element in response to an access message of the terminal equipment allocates a traffic channel on which the traffic is carried out, the method comprising:

forming in the terminal equipment a pseudo identifier by applying a one-way hash function to content elements comprising a true identifier of the terminal equipment and two random numbers;

sending the pseudo identifier and one of the random numbers in the access message;

forming in the terminal equipment a first partial key;

sending the first partial key to the network element on the traffic channel;

forming in the network element a second partial key;

sending the second partial key and the pseudo identifier to the terminal equipment on the traffic channel;

performing in the terminal equipment authentication of the network element;

forming in the terminal equipment, after successful authentication, a new message containing the true identifier non-encrypted; and

sending to the network element on the traffic channel the new message encrypted with both partial keys.

2. Method as defined in claim 1, wherein when the pseudo identifier received by the terminal equipment and the pseudo identifier which it formed earlier are identical, the terminal equipment will perform authentication of the network element.

3. Method as defined in claim 2, wherein after a successful authentication the terminal equipment will form a new message containing content elements of the hash function and will send the new message to the network element encrypted with the first and second partial keys.

4. Method as defined in claim 3, wherein the network element deciphers the encryption of the new message using the first and second partial keys and performs authentication of the content elements.

5. Method as defined in claim 4, wherein in the authentication the network element:

applies a hash function to the content elements and compares the result with that pseudo identifier which it has received earlier in the access message,

it compares to find out whether the second random number stated in the message is identical to the one which it received earlier in the access message.

6. Method as defined in claim 5, wherein when comparisons show that the pseudo identifier and the second random number are true, the network element will perform authentication of the terminal equipment.