Authentication system and process

• US 6,230,266 B1
• Filed: 02/03/1999
• Issued: 05/08/2001
• Est. Priority Date: 02/03/1999
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Sun Microsystems Incorporated (Oracle Corporation)
• Inventors: Hanna, Stephen R., Perlman, Radia Joy
• Primary Examiner(s): Swann, Tod
• Assistant Examiner(s): KABAKOFF, STEPHEN ERIC
• Application Number:
  US09/243,575
• Time in Patent Office: 825 Days
• Field of Search: 713/156-158
• US Class Current: 713/158
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]

Abstract

An authentication method and process are provided. One aspect of the process of the present invention includes authorizing a first on-line revocation server (OLRS) to provide information concerning certificates issued by a certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked. If the first OLRS is compromised, a second OLRS is authorized to provide certificate revocation information, but certificates issued by the CA remain valid unless indicated by the second OLRS to be revoked.

Claims

1. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

a first revocation server (RS) for issuing certificate revocation information;

a first certificate authority (CA) for issuing, if the first RS is compromised, a delegation certificate indicating that certificates issued by a second CA prior to issuance of said delegation certificate should be considered valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked and also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the second CA should be considered valid, the second CA also being for issuing, if the first RS is compromised, a renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of said second CA in favor of said first CA; and

a third CA for certifying respective keys of said first and second certificate authorities and being configured to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of said renunciation certificate.

70. A system according to claim 1, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorized tampering with certificate revocation status information.

2. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

a first revocation server (RS) for providing information related to certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked, said CA being for issuing, if the first RS is compromised, a delegation certificate indicating that said first RS is no longer authorized to provide said information and that certificates previously issued by said CA remain valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked, the delegation certificate also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the CA should be considered valid since the first RS is compromised, and a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and being configured to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

3. A system according to claim 2, wherein said delegation certificate also includes a RS generation number that specifies an order in which the delegation certificate was signed by said first CA relative to an earlier signed delegation certificate.

4. A system according to claim 2, further comprising a third RS also for providing certificate revocation information, and a node that is configured to compare the information provided by at least two of said revocation servers.

5. A system according to claim 4, further comprising a node configured to determine whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one RS is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

6. A system according to claim 4, further comprising an auditor for comparing respective certificate revocation information provided by each revocation server to a master certificate revocation list.

11. A system according to claim 3, further comprising another CA for issuing another certificate certifying a CA public key, said another certificate including said RS generation number.

12. A system according to claim 3, further comprising a node that is preconfigured with a CA public key and said RS generation number.

71. A system according to claim 2, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorized tampering with certificate revocation status information.

7. A computerized authentication process, comprising:

authorizing a first revocation server (RS) to provide information concerning revoked certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA);

if the first RS is compromised, authorizing a second RS to provide said information while permitting certificates issued by said CA to remain valid unless indicated by said second RS to be revoked, and permitting only said information provided by the second RS to be considered valid; and

a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and being configured to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

8. A process according to claim 7, wherein the information provided by said second RS indicates that a delegation certificate issued by said CA for said first RS has been revoked.

72. A process according to claim 7, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

9. A computerized authentication process, comprising:

authorizing a plurality of revocation servers to provide information concerning certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

comparing the information provided by at least two of said servers whereby to determine whether difference exists therebetween;

determining, based at least upon whether said difference exists, whether revocation server compromise has occurred;

if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred, permitting only certificate revocation information provided by at least one uncompromised revocation server to be considered valid; and

providing a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and configuring the second CA to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

10. A process according to claim 9, wherein if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred, said process further comprises revoking authorization of a compromised revocation server to provide the certificate revocation information.

73. A process according to claim 9, wherein said compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

13. Computer readable memory storing executable program instructions comprising instructions which when executed cause:

a first revocation server (RS) to issue certificate revocation information;

a first certificate authority (CA) to issue, if the first RS is compromised, a delegation certificate indicating that certificates issued by a second CA prior to issuance of said delegation certificate should be considered valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked and also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the second CA should be considered valid, the second CA also being for issuing, if the first RS is compromised, a renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of said second CA in favor of said first CA; and

a third CA to certify respective keys of said first and second certificate authorities and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of said renunciation certificate.

74. A memory according to claim 13, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

14. Computer readable memory storing executable program instructions comprising instructions which when executed cause:

a first revocation server (RS) to provide information related to certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

said CA to issue, if the first RS is compromised, a delegation certificate indicating that said first RS is no longer authorized to provide said information and that certificates previously issued by said CA remain valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked, the delegation certificate also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the CA should be considered valid since the first RS is compromised, and a second CA to certify a key of the first CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

75. A memory according to claim 14, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

15. A computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave and representing executable instructions comprising instructions for:

authorizing a first revocation server (RS) to provide information concerning revoked certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA);

if the first RS is compromised, authorizing a second RS to provide said information while permitting certificates issued by said CA to remain valid unless indicated by said second RS to be revoked, and permitting only said information provided by the second RS to be considered valid; and

causing a second CA to certify a key of the first CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

76. A signal according to claim 15, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

16. A computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave and representing executable instructions comprising instructions for:

authorizing a plurality of revocation servers to provide information concerning certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

comparing the information provided by at least two of said servers whereby to determine whether difference exists therebetween;

determining, based at least upon whether said difference exists, whether revocation server compromise has occurred;

if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred, permitting only certificate revocation information provided by at least one uncompromised revocation server to be considered valid; and

providing a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and configuring the second CA to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

19. A computer data signal according to claim 16, wherein the executable instructions further comprise instructions for revoking authorization, if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred, of a compromised revocation server to provide the certificate revocation information.

77. A signal according to claim 16, wherein said compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

17. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

means for authorizing a first revocation server (RS) to provide information concerning revoked certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA);

means for authorizing, if the first RS is compromised, a second RS to provide said information while permitting certificates issued by said CA to remain valid unless indicated by said second RS to be revoked, and means for permitting only said information provided by the second RS to be considered valid; and

means for causing a second CA to certify a key of the first CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

78. A system according to claim 17, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

18. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

means for authorizing a plurality of revocation servers to provide information concerning certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

means for comparing the information provided by at least two of said servers whereby to determine whether difference exists therebetween;

means for determining, based at least upon whether said difference exists, whether revocation server compromise has occurred;

means for, if said server compromise is determined to have occurred, permitting only certificate revocation information provided by at least one uncompromised revocation server to be considered valid; and

means for causing a second CA to certify a key of the first CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

79. A system according to claim 18, wherein the compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

20. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

a first revocation server (RS) for being authorized to provide information concerning revoked certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA);

a second revocation server (RS) for being authorized, if the first RS is compromised, to provide said information while permitting certificates issued by said CA to remain valid unless indicated by said second RS to be revoked, only the information being provided by the second RS being permitted to be considered valid, and

a second CA to certify a key of the first CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

21. A system according to claim 20, wherein the information provided by said second RS indicates that a delegation certificate issued by said CA for said first RS has been revoked.

80. A system according to claim 20, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

22. A computerized system, comprising:

an auditor for comparing information provided by one or more servers whereby to determine whether possible compromise of said one or more servers exists;

wherein if the auditor determines that the possible compromise exists, only the information provided by at least one uncompromised server is permitted to be considered valid and authorized; and

a first certificate authority (CA) to certify a key of a second CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the second CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the second CA in favor of a third CA.

23. A system according to claim 22, wherein said auditor compares respective information provided by two servers for differences whereby to determine whether said possible compromise exists.

24. A system according to claim 22, wherein said auditor is configured to mask identity of said auditor.

25. A system according to claim 22, wherein said one or more servers comprises one or more revocation servers.

26. A system according to claim 22, wherein said information comprises information concerning certificates that have been revoked.

27. A system according to claim 22, wherein said one or more servers comprises at least three servers for providing certificate revocation information, and said auditor is configured to compare the certificate revocation information provided by at least two of said at least three servers.

28. A system according to claim 26, wherein said auditor is also configured to determine whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one revocation server (RS) is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

29. A system according to claim 26, wherein said auditor is also configured to compare respective certificate revocation information provided by each server to a master certificate revocation list.

30. A system according to claim 22, wherein said auditor comprises a computer network node that is not comprised in said one or more servers.

81. A system according to claim 22, wherein the possible compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

31. A computerized process, comprising:

comparing information provided by one or more servers whereby to audit said one or more servers to determine whether possible compromise of said one or more servers exists;

if the possible compromise is determined to exist, permitting only the information provided by at least one uncompromised server to be considered valid and authorized; and

providing a first certificate authority (CA) to certify a key of a second CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the second CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the second CA in favor of a third CA.

32. A process according to claim 31, wherein the step of comparing comprises comparing respective information provided by two servers for differences whereby to determine whether said possible compromise exists.

33. A process according to claim 31, wherein an auditor is used to carry out the step of comparing, and said process further comprises masking identity of said auditor.

34. A process according to claim 31, wherein said one or more servers comprises one or more revocation servers.

35. A process according to claim 31, wherein said information comprises information concerning certificates that have been revoked.

36. A process according to claim 31, wherein said one or more servers comprises at least three servers for providing certificate revocation information, and an auditor is provided that is configured to compare the certificate revocation information provided by at least two of said at least three servers.

37. A process according to claim 35, further comprising determining whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one revocation server (RS) is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

38. A process according to claim 35, further comprising comparing respective certificate revocation information provided by each server to a master certificate revocation list.

39. A process according to claim 31, wherein the step of comparing is carried out by a computer network node that is not comprised in said one or more servers.

82. A process according to claim 31, wherein the possible compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

40. A computerized system, comprising:

means for comparing information provided by one or more servers whereby to audit said one or more servers to determine whether possible compromise of said one or more servers exists;

means for, if the possible compromise is determined to exist, permitting only the information provided by at least one uncompromised server to be considered valid and authorized; and

means for causing a first certificate authority (CA) to certify a key of a second CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the second CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the second CA in favor of a third CA.

41. A system according to claim 40, wherein the comparing means compares respective information provided by two servers for differences whereby to determine whether said possible compromise exists.

42. A system according to claim 40, further comprising means for masking identity of said means for comparing.

43. A system according to claim 40, wherein said one or more servers comprises one or more revocation servers.

44. A system according to claim 40, wherein said information comprises information concerning certificates that have been revoked.

45. A system according to claim 40, wherein said one or more servers comprises at least three servers for providing certificate revocation information, and said means for comparing is configured to compare the certificate revocation information provided by at least two of said at least three servers.

46. A system according to claim 44, further comprising means for determining whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one revocation server (RS) is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

47. A system according to claim 44, further comprising means for comparing respective certificate revocation information provided by each server to a master certificate revocation list.

48. A system according to claim 40, wherein the means for comparing comprises a computer network node that is not comprised in said one or more servers.

83. A system according to claim 40, wherein the possible compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

49. Computer readable memory storing executable program instructions comprising instructions which when executed cause:

comparison of information provided by one or more servers whereby to audit said one or more servers to determine whether possible compromise of said one or more servers exists;

if the possible compromise is determined to exist, permitting only the information provided by at least one uncompromised server to be considered valid and authorized; and

causing a first certificate authority (CA) to certify a key of a second CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the second CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the second CA in favor of a third CA.

50. A memory according to claim 49, wherein said comparison comprises comparing respective information provided by two servers for differences whereby to determine whether said possible compromise exists.

51. A memory according to claim 49, further comprising instructions which when executed cause masking of an identity of a node used to carry out said comparison.

84. A memory according to claim 49, wherein the possible compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

52. A computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave and representing executable program instructions comprising instructions for:

comparing information provided by one or more servers whereby to audit said one or more servers to determine whether possible compromise of said one or more servers exists;

if the possible compromise is determined to exist, permitting only the information provided by at least one uncompromised server to be considered valid and authorize; and

causing a first certificate authority (CA) to certify a key of a second CA and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the second CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the second CA in favor of a third CA.

53. A signal according to claim 52, wherein the instructions comprised in the program instructions are also for comparing respective information provided by two servers for differences whereby to determine whether said possible compromise exists.

54. A signal according to claim 52, wherein the instructions comprised in the program instructions are also for masking of an identity of a node used to carry out comparison of the information provided by the one or more servers.

85. A signal according to claim 52, wherein the possible compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

55. A computerized authentication process, comprising:

issuing certificate revocation information from a first revocation server (RS);

if the first RS is compromised, issuing from a first certificate authority (CA) a delegation certificate indicating that certificates issued by a second CA prior to issuance of said delegation certificate should be considered valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked and also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the second CA should be considered valid;

issuing from the second CA, if the first RS is compromised, a renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of said second CA in favor of said first CA; and

providing a third CA to certify respective keys of said first and second certificate authorities and to issue an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of said renunciation certificate.

56. A process according to claim 55, also comprising, if the first RS is compromised, issuing from the second CA a renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of said second CA in favor of said first CA.

57. A process according to claim 55, wherein said delegation certificate also includes a RS generation number that specifies an order in which the delegation certificate was signed relative to an earlier signed delegation certificate.

58. A process according to claim 55, also comprising providing a third RS for providing certificate revocation information, and also providing a node that is configured to compare the information provided by at least two of said revocation servers.

59. A process according to claim 58, also comprising providing a node configured to determine whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one RS is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

60. A process according to claim 58, further comprising providing an auditor for comparing respective certificate revocation information provided by each revocation server to a master revocation list.

68. A process according to claim 57, further comprising providing another CA for issuing another certificate certifying a CA public key, said another certificate including said RS generation number.

69. A process according to claim 57, further comprising providing a node that is preconfigured with a CA public key and said RS generation number.

61. A computerized authentication process, comprising:

providing a first revocation server (RS) for providing information related to certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

if said first RS is compromised, issuing from said CA a delegation certificate indicating that said first RS is no longer authorized to provide said information and that certificates previously issued by said CA remain valid unless indicated by a second RS to be revoked, the delegation certificate also indicating that only information provided by the second RS concerning revocation status of the certificates issued by the CA should be considered valid since the first RS is compromised; and

providing a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and for issuing an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

62. A process according to claim 61, wherein said delegation certificate also includes a RS generation number that specifies an order in which the delegation certificate was signed by said first CA relative to an earlier signed delegation certificate.

63. A process according to claim 61, further comprising providing a third RS for providing certificate revocation information, and also providing a node configured to compare the information provided by at least two of said revocation servers.

64. A process according to claim 63, further comprising providing a node configured to determine whether respective certificate revocation information provided by one RS is valid based upon comparison of the respective certificate revocation information to other respective certificate revocation information from another RS.

65. A process according to claim 63, further comprising providing an auditor for comparing respective certificate revocation information provided by each revocation server to a master certificate revocation list.

86. A process according to claim 61, wherein compromise of the first RS comprises at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key of the first RS, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.

66. A computerized authentication system, comprising:

a plurality of revocation servers authorized to provide information concerning certificates issued by a first certificate authority (CA) that have been revoked;

a comparison mechanism for comparing the information provided by at least two of said servers whereby to determine whether difference exists therebetween;

a determination mechanism for determining, based at least upon whether said difference exists, whether revocation server compromise has occurred;

if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred, permitting only certificate revocation information provided by at least one uncompromised revocation server to considered valid; and

a second CA for certifying a key of the first CA and for issuing an acknowledgement message in response to receipt of a renunciation certificate from the first CA, the renunciation certificate indicating renouncement of certification authority of the first CA in favor of a third CA.

67. A system according to claim 66, further comprising a mechanism for revoking authorization of a compromised revocation server to provide certificate revocation information if said revocation server compromise is determined to have occurred.

87. A system according to claim 66, wherein compromise results from at least one of unauthorized access to a cryptographic key, unauthorized tampering with the key, unauthorized access to certificate revocation status information, and unauthorize tampering with certificate revocation status information.