Interlocking for a railway system

• US 6,308,117 B1
• Filed: 03/17/2000
• Issued: 10/23/2001
• Est. Priority Date: 03/17/1999
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Siemens Rail Automation Holdings Ltd (Siemens AG)
• Original Assignee: Westinghouse Brake & Signal Holdings Limited (Siemens AG)
• Inventors: Tremlett, Mark, Molloy, Timothy John, Ryland, Henry Archer
• Primary Examiner(s): NGUYEN, TAN QUANG
• Application Number:
  US09/528,121
• Time in Patent Office: 585 Days
• Field of Search: 701/117, 701/19, 701/20, 246/131
• US Class Current: 701/19
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 19/06 Interlocking devices having electrical operation
• CPC Class Codes: B61L 21/04 Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks

Abstract

An interlocking for a railway system, comprises first, control computing means (2) which commands route settings in the system and second, protection computing means (3) coupled with the first computing means (2) and which allows commands from the first computing means (2) to be brought into effect or otherwise in dependence on the state of the railway system.

Claims

1. An interlocking for a railway system, comprising:

functional computing means which commands route settings in the system in response to route setting requests; and

assurance computing means coupled with the functional computing means, wherein the assurance computing means contains information concerning the signalling principles of the railway system and receives information concerning the state of the railway system and information concerning commands from the functional computing means and only allows a command from the functional computing means to be brought into effect if the current state of the railway system is such that it would be safe to do so.

2. An interlocking according to claim 1, including interface means, which interfaces with trackside equipment of the system, and a communication path between the interface means and the functional and assurance computing means.

3. An interlocking according to claim 1, wherein the functional and assurance computing means have different designs to reduce the risk of common mode failures.

4. An interlocking according to claim 1, wherein if a command is not allowed to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means causes the railway system to be put into a safe or more restrictive state.

5. An interlocking according to claim 1, wherein the assurance computing means issues a complementary command to allow a command from the functional computing means to be brought into effect if it is safe to do so.

6. An interlocking according to claim 1, wherein if a command from the functional computing means is not to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means issues a negating command for that purpose.

7. An interlocking according to claim 6, wherein the functional computing means issues each command in first and second complementary versions.

8. An interlocking according to claim l, wherein there is at least one additional functional computing means, the additional functional computing means being coupled with a respective additional assurance computing means and means for switching operation from one of the functional and assurance computing means to the additional functional and additional assurance computing means.