Consumable authentication protocol and system

• US 6,374,354 B1
• Filed: 03/02/2000
• Issued: 04/16/2002
• Est. Priority Date: 07/15/1997
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Memjet Technology Ltd. (Memjet Limited)
• Original Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Limited
• Inventors: Lapstun, Paul, Walmsley, Simon Robert
• Primary Examiner(s): Decady, Albert
• Assistant Examiner(s): Zand, Kambiz
• Application Number:
  US09/516,869
• Time in Patent Office: 775 Days
• Field of Search: 713/189, 713/172, 713/170, 713/168, 713/159, 713/155, 713/181, 380/262
• US Class Current: 713/167
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 15/044 Cassettes or cartridges containing continuous copy material, tape, for setting into printing devices
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/01 Ink jet
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/14 Structure thereof only for on-demand ink jet heads
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/14314 Structure of ink jet print heads with electrostatically actuated membrane
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/14427 Structure of ink jet print heads with thermal bend detached actuators
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/16 Production of nozzles
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1601 Production of bubble jet print heads B41J2/1606, B41J2/162 take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1623 bonding and adhesion
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1626 etching
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1628 dry etching
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1629 wet etching
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1631 photolithography
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1632 machining
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1635 dividing the wafer into individual chips
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1637 molding
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1639 sacrificial molding
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1642 thin film formation by CVD [chemical vapor deposition]
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1643 thin film formation by plating
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1645 thin film formation by spincoating
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1646 thin film formation by sputtering
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/1648 : Production of print heads with thermal bend detached actuators
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/16585 : for paper-width or non-reciprocating print heads
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/17503 : Ink cartridges
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/17513 : Inner structure
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2/17596 : Ink pumps, ink valves
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2002/041 : Electromagnetic transducer
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2002/14491 : Electrical connection
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 2202/21 : Line printing
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 29/02 : Framework
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 29/13 : Cases or covers
• CPC Class Codes: B41J 3/00 : Typewriters or selective printing or marking mechanisms characterised by the purpose for which they are constructed
• CPC Class Codes: B82Y 30/00 : Nanotechnology for materials or surface science, e.g. nanocomposites
• CPC Class Codes: G03B 17/02 : Bodies
• CPC Class Codes: G03B 17/24 : with means for separately producing marks on the film, e.g. title, time of exposure
• CPC Class Codes: G03B 17/48 : adapted for combination with other photographic or optical apparatus
• CPC Class Codes: G03B 27/02 : Exposure apparatus for contact printing
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 1/1626 : with a single-body enclosure integrating a flat display, e.g. Personal Digital Assistants [PDAs]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/0866 : for peripheral storage systems, e.g. disk cache
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/79 : in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/86 : Secure or tamper-resistant housings
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2212/2022 : Flash memory
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2129 : Authenticate client device independently of the user
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 1/121 : by printing code marks applying code marks to labels B65C9/46; marking or coding completed packages B65B61/26
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/06 : characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/06037 : multi-dimensional coding
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/073 : Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory protection against unauthorised use of computer memory G06F12/14
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10 : by electromagnetic radiation, e.g. optical sensing; by corpuscular radiation
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10722 : Photodetector array or CCD scanning
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/14 : using light without selection of wavelength, e.g. sensing reflected white light G06K7/10831 - G06K7/1097 take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/1417 : 2D bar codes
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 : involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 : insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3829 : involving key management
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 1/20 : Processor architectures; Processor configuration, e.g. pipelining
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 3/02 : Affine transformations for image registration G06T3/147; for image mosaicing G06T3/4038
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/08 : by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means without personal verification means G07F7/02
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/086 : by passive credit-cards adapted therefor, e.g. constructive particularities to avoid counterfeiting, e.g. by inclusion of a physical or chemical security-layer for security documents G07D7/00; for the reading of record-carriers in general G06K7/00; for the design of coded credit-cards G06K19/10
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/12 : Card verification
• CPC Class Codes: G09G 2310/0281 : Arrangement of scan or data electrode driver circuits at the periphery of a panel not inherent to a split matrix structure
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 7/0033 : with cards or other card-like flat carriers, e.g. flat sheets of optical film
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 7/007 : Arrangement of the information on the record carrier, e.g. form of tracks , actual track shape, e.g. wobbled, or cross-section, e.g. v-shaped; Sequential information structures, e.g. sectoring or header formats within a track
• CPC Class Codes: G11C 11/56 : using storage elements with more than two stable states represented by steps, e.g. of voltage, current, phase, frequency
• CPC Class Codes: G11C 16/22 : Safety or protection circuits preventing unauthorised or accidental access to memory cells
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/576 : using active circuits
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/00 : Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/0002 : Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00127 : Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus, e.g. for storage, processing or transmission of still picture signals or of information associated with a still picture
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00278 : with a printing apparatus, e.g. a laser beam printer
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00326 : with a data reading, recognizing or recording apparatus, e.g. with a bar-code apparatus arrangements for the associated working of recording or reproducing apparatus with related apparatus G11B31/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00355 : Mark-sheet input sensing record carriers G06K7/00; character recognition G06V30/10; document-oriented image-based pattern recognition G06V30/40
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/0044 : for image preview or review, e.g. to help the user position a sheet
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00965 : using a plug-in memory module, e.g. memory card, memory stick
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/00968 : by scanning marks on a sheet mark-sheet input means H04N1/00355; sensing record carriers G06K7/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/2112 : using still video cameras
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/2154 : the still video camera incorporating a hardcopy reproducing device, e.g. a printer
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/2307 : Circuits or arrangements for the control thereof, e.g. using a programmed control device, according to a measured quantity H04N1/27, H04N1/29 take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/32122 : in a separate device, e.g. in a memory or on a display separate from image data
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 1/32133 : on the same paper sheet, e.g. a facsimile page header
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2101/00 : Still video cameras
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/0008 : Connection or combination of a still picture apparatus with another apparatus
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/0084 : Digital still camera
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3222 : of processing required or performed, e.g. forwarding, urgent or confidential handling
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3242 : of processing required or performed, e.g. for reproduction or before recording H04N2201/3256 and subgroups take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3261 : of multimedia information, e.g. a sound signal
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3264 : of sound signals
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3269 : of machine readable codes or marks, e.g. bar codes or glyphs
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/3276 : of a customised additional information profile, e.g. a profile specific to a user ID
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2201/328 : Processing of the additional information
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 23/00 : Cameras or camera modules comprising electronic image sensors; Control thereof
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 25/00 : Circuitry of solid-state image sensors [SSIS]; Control thereof
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 5/2628 : Alteration of picture size, shape, position or orientation, e.g. zooming, rotation, rolling, perspective, translation
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 1/14 : Structural association of two or more printed circuits providing electric connection to or between printed circuits H05K1/11, H01R12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 1/189 : characterised by the use of a flexible or folded printed circuit H05K3/326 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 10/00 : Energy efficient computing, e.g. low power processors, power management or thermal management
• CPC Class Codes: Y10S 977/839 : Mathematical algorithms, e.g. computer software, specifically adapted for modeling configurations or properties of nanostructure
• CPC Class Codes: Y10S 977/843 : Gas phase catalytic growth, i.e. chemical vapor deposition
• CPC Class Codes: Y10S 977/901 : having step or means utilizing electromagnetic property, e.g. optical, x-ray, electron beamm
• CPC Class Codes: Y10S 977/94 : in a logic circuit

Abstract

This invention concerns a consumable authentication protocol for validating the existence of an untrusted authentication chip, as well as ensuring that the Authentication Chip lasts only as long as the consumable. In a further aspect it concerns a consumable authentication system for the protocol. In this invention we are concerned not only with validating that an authentication chip is present, but writes and reads of the authentication chip'"'"'s memory space must be authenticated as well. A random number and an encrypted version of it are produced in a trusted authentication chip and passed to an untrusted authentication chip. The untrusted chip encrypts the random number to determine whether it gets the same result as the trusted chip. If so then it re-encrypts the random number together with a data message using a second key and sends it back with the data message. The trusted chip then encrypts the data message and random number with the second key for comparison.

Claims

1. A consumable authentication protocol for validating the authenticity of an untrusted authentication chip, the protocol includes the steps of:

generating a random number and applying a keyed one-way function to the random number using a first secret key to produce a first outcome, in a trusted authentication chip;

passing the random number and the first outcome to the untrusted authentication chip;

applying the keyed one-way function to the random number using the first secret key to produce a second outcome, in the untrusted authentication chip, and then comparing the first and second outcomes;

in the event that the first and second outcomes match, applying the keyed one-way function to the random number together with a data message read from the untrusted chip using a second secret key to produce a third outcome, in the untrusted chip;

passing the third outcome together with the data message to the trusted chip;

applying the keyed one-way function to the random number together with a data message read from the untrusted chip using the second secret key to produce a fourth outcome, in the trusted chip;

comparing the third and fourth outcomes in the trusted chip, and in the event of a match, considering the untrusted chip and the data message to be valid;

otherwise considering the untrusted chip and the data message to be invalid.

2. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, for validating the authenticity of an untrusted authentication chip and for ensuring that the untrusted authentication chip lasts only as long as the consumable comprising the untrusted authentication chip, the authentication of writing new data to an untrusted chip including the step of writing new data to the untrusted chip, followed by performing each step specified in claim 1, wherein the data message read step in claim 1 includes reading the new data, and in the event that the chip is found to be authentic and the new data is the same as the data message read from the untrusted chip, the step of writing new data to the untrusted chip is validated.

3. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the two secret keys are held by both the trusted and untrusted chips and must be kept secret.

4. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1 where the trusted authentication chip contains a random function to produce numbers from a seed, and the function advances after every random number is produced so that the next random number will be produced from a new seed.

5. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the random number is generated by a random function seeded with a different value each time and where for a group of authentication chips the initial value of the seed for each chip is different from the initial value for the other chips in the group.

6. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the data message is a memory vector of the authentication chip.

7. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 6, where a part of the memory vector may contain different values for each instance of the authentication chip, and be designated read only (constant) for a lifetime of the consumable, and where part of the memory vector nay be designated decrement only for the lifetime of the consumable, and where part of the memory vector may be designated read-writeable for the lifetime of the consumable.

8. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the trusted chip contains a test function to return a value indicating validity, and advance the random number if the untrusted chip is valid;

otherwise it returns a value indicating invalidity.

9. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where a time taken to return a value indicating invalidity is the same for all bad inputs.

10. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the untrusted chip contains a read function to read a first and second value and apply the one-way function to the first value to produce an outcome;

if the outcome is the same as the second value it returns a data message and another output, from applying the one-way function to the first value and the data message;

otherwise it returns a value indicating failure of the function.

11. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 10, where a time taken to return the value indicating failure is the same for all bad inputs.

12. A consumable authentication protocol according to claim 1, where the untrusted chip also contains a write function to write new data over those parts of the data message that can legitimately be written over.

13. A consumable authentication system for performing the method according to claim 1;

where the system includes;

a trusted authentication chip and an untrusted authentication chip;

the trusted authentication chip includes a random number generator and a one-way function and first and second secret keys for the function, and a test function;

the one-way function operates to generate a random number and an encrypted version of it as a first outcome;

the untrusted authentication chip includes the one-way function and the first and second keys, and a read function;

the read function operates to apply the keyed one-way function to the random number using the first secret key to produce a second outcome, and then compare the first and second outcomes;

in the event that the first and second outcomes match, the read function then applies the keyed one-way function to the random number together with a data message read from the untrusted chip using the second secret key to produce a third outcome, and pass the third outcome together with the data message to the trusted chip;

the test function in the trusted chip applies the keyed one-way function to the random number together with the data message passed from the untrusted chip using the second secret key to produce a fourth outcome which it compares with the third outcome;

In the event of a match, the untrusted chip and the data message are considered to be valid.

14. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where new data written to the untrusted chip is considered valid in the event that the chip is found to be authentic and the new data is the same as the data message read from the untrusted chip.

15. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the two secret keys awe held by both the trusted and untrusted chips and must be kept secret.

16. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the random number is generated by a random function seeded with a different value each time.

17. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the data message is a memory vector of the authentication chip.

18. A consumable authentication system according to claim 17, where part of the memory vector space is different for each chip, par of it may be constant (read only) for each consumable, and part of it is decrement only.

19. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the trusted chip contains a test function to return a value indicating validity, and advances the random number if the untrusted chip is valid, otherwise it returns a value indicating invalidity.

20. A consumable authentication system according to claim 19, where a time taken to return the value indicating invalidity is the same for all bad inputs.

21. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the untrusted chip contains a read function to read a first and second value and apply the one-way function to the first value to produce an outcome;

if the outcome is the same as the second value it returns a data message and another output, from applying the oneway function to the first value and the data message;

otherwise it returns a value indicating failure of the function.

22. A consumable authentication system according to claim 21, where a time taken to return the value indicating failure is die same for all bad inputs.

23. A consumable authentication system according to claim 13, where the untrusted chip also contains a write function to write new data over those parts of the data message that can legitimately be written over.