Key management method

• US 6,658,114 B1
• Filed: 08/11/1999
• Issued: 12/02/2003
• Est. Priority Date: 05/31/1999
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: A10 Networks Incorporated
• Original Assignee: Industrial Technology Research Institute
• Inventors: Chao, Cheng-Tsung, Hsu, Chi-Kuo, Farn, Kwo-Jean, Song, Chen-Hwa
• Primary Examiner(s): Peeso, Thomas R.
• Application Number:
  US09/373,081
• Time in Patent Office: 1,574 Days
• Field of Search: 380/277, 380/278, 380/283, 713/156, 713/168, 713/169, 713/171
• US Class Current: 380/277
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1475 Passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0833 involving conference or group key network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065

Abstract

A key management method to prevent illegal eavesdropping in a network system. Keys of the network system are divided into several family subkeys and several communication subkeys. A plurality of trusted-key centers are provided for respectively preserving a part of the family subkeys and one of the communication subkeys, and generating a one-way hash value involving the preserved communication subkey and an open information. Each of the trusted-key centers passes the hash value to an eavesdropper according to an authority certificate. Each of the trusted-key centers interchanges the preserved family subkeys according to the authority certificate to obtain a session key which is passed to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper combines all the hash values from the trusted-key centers to obtain a corresponding communication key which is accompanied by the session key to eavesdrop an authorized communication.

Claims

1. A key management method to prevent illegal eavesdropping in a network system, comprising:

dividing session keys of the network system into a plurality of family subkeys and a plurality of communication subkeys;

providing a plurality of trusted-key centers for respectively preserving a part of the family subkeys and one of the communication subkeys, and generating a one-way hash value involving the preserved communication subkey and an open information;

each of the trusted-key centers passing the hash value to an eavesdropper according to an authority certificate;

each of the trusted-key centers interchanging the preserved family subkeys according to the authority certificate to obtain a session key which is passed to the eavesdropper; and

the eavesdropper combining all the hash values from the trusted-key centers to obtain a communication key which is accompanied with the session key to eavesdrop an authorized communication.

2. The key management method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the open information is a current time.

3. The key management method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the hash value is obtained by calculating a one-way hash function being a sum of the preserved communication subkey and the current time.

4. The key management method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the communication key is combined by adding all the hash values from the trusted-key centers.

5. A method of encrypting a communication comprising the steps of:

encrypting an origination communication message using a session key to obtain a first encryption of the message;

encrypting the first encryption using a communication key to obtain a second encryption of the first encryption;

transferring the second encryption to a receiving end;

reversing the second and first encryption steps to obtain the origination communication message; and

providing a plurality of trusted-key centers, wherein each of said plurality of trusted-key centers maintains a distinct part of at least the session key, a network key or the communication key.

6. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 5, further including the steps of,

encrypting the second encryption using the network key to obtain a third encryption of the second encryption,

transferring the second encryption to the receiving end, and

reversing the third, second and first encryption steps to obtain the origination communication message.

7. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 6, further including the step of allowing an eavesdropper to obtain the origination communication message.

8. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 7, wherein the step of allowing an eavesdropper to obtain the origination commination message includes the step of decrypting any one of at least the first, second or third encryption.

9. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 5, further including the step of allowing an eavesdropper to obtain the origination communication message.

10. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 9, further including the step limiting the eavesdropper access to the origination communication messaged based on a duration of time.

11. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 9, further including the step of allowing encryption of a plurality of origination messages using at least one of the session, network or communication keys.

12. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 11, further including the step of eavesdropping at least one of the plurality of messages.

13. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 12, wherein the step of eavesdropping allows eavesdropping of at least one of the plurality of messages, or a number of the plurality of messages for a predetermined time duration.

14. The method of encrypting a communication according to claim 6, wherein the step of reversing includes the steps of,

decrypting the third encryption using the network key to obtain the second encryption,

decrypting the second encryption using the communication key to obtain the first encryption, and

decrypting the first encryption using the session key to obtain the origination message.