On-board apparatus for avoiding restricted air space in non-overriding mode

• US 6,675,095 B1
• Filed: 12/15/2001
• Issued: 01/06/2004
• Est. Priority Date: 12/15/2001
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Trimble Navigation Limited (Trimble Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Trimble Navigation Limited (Trimble Inc.)
• Inventors: Janky, James M., Bird, David Glenn
• Primary Examiner(s): Black, Thomas G.
• Assistant Examiner(s): MANCHO, RONNIE M
• Application Number:
  US10/016,914
• Time in Patent Office: 752 Days
• Field of Search: 701/4, 701/3, 701/7, 701/9, 701/11, 701/14, 701/211, 701/213, 701/200, 701/207, 701/208, 701/214, 701/301, 701/1, 342/29, 342/36, 342/357.13, 342/357.17, 342/357.03, 342/357.1, 340/436, 340/961, 345/3.1, 375/220, 375/130
• US Class Current: 701/301
• CPC Class Codes: B64D 45/0031 means for overriding or restricting access to flight controls
• CPC Class Codes: B64D 45/0059 by communicating emergency situations to ground control or between crew members
• CPC Class Codes: G05D 1/0061 for transition from automatic pilot to manual pilot and vice versa

Abstract

A tamper-resistant apparatus located on board of an aircraft for avoiding a restricted air space (RAS) comprising: (a) a tamper-resistant restricted air space (TAP-RAS) database configured to include a set of coordinates that determines the RAS; and (b) a navigational processor configured to navigate the aircraft around the RAS, if a valid overriding command is not generated. The navigational processor includes: a Satellite Positioning System (SATPS) configured to substantially continuously obtain a set of real time position coordinates of the aircraft; a restricted airspace controller configured to receive a set of real time data including the set of coordinates that determines the RAS, the set of real time position coordinates; and configured to analyze the set of real time data in order to substantially continuously generate a set of real time commands; and an aircraft controller configured to navigate the aircraft utilizing the real time set of commands around the RAS. The navigational processor is configured to navigate the aircraft in an overriding mode, if the valid overriding command is generated.

Claims

1. A method for navigating an aircraft comprising the steps of:

(A) substantially continuously performing an authentication process to verify the identity of a pilot;

(B) if authentication process fails, undertaking emergency action;

(C) if authentication of the pilot'"'"'s identity is confirmed, checking whether a valid overriding command is generated by an overriding processor;

(D) if said valid overriding command is not generated, navigating said aircraft around a restricted air space (RAS) in a restricted air space mode (RAS-mode);

(E) if said valid overriding command is generated, navigating said aircraft in an overriding mode (RAS-override-mode); and

(F) repeating said steps (A-E).

2. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of performing said authentication process to verify the identity of said pilot further includes the steps of:

verifying the authenticity of biometrical data selected form the group consisting of;

a voice of said pilot, and a retinal or an iris scan of said pilot.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of navigating said aircraft around said RAS in said RAS-mode further includes the steps of:

substantially continuously obtaining a set of coordinates that defines said RAS;

substantially continuously obtaining a set of real time position coordinates of said aircraft; and

analyzing a set of real time data including said set of coordinates that determines said RAS, and said set of real time position coordinates of said aircraft in order to substantially continuously generate a real time set of commands.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein said step of analyzing said set of real time data including said set of coordinates that determines said RAS, and said set of real time position coordinates of said aircraft further includes the steps of:

(A) substantially continuously generating a likelihood of penetration of said RAS;

(B) estimating whether said likelihood of penetration of said RAS exceeds a first predetermined likelihood threshold;

(C) if said likelihood of penetration of said RAS exceeds said first predetermined threshold, generating a set of real time commands for executing a set of evasive maneuvers to avoid said RAS; and

(D) repeating said steps (A-C).

5. The method of claim 4, wherein said step (C) of generating said set of real time commands for executing said set of evasive maneuvers to avoid said RAS further includes the steps of:

(C1) calculating a penetration vector using a flight path of said aircraft;

(C2) estimating a likelihood of interception a surface of said RAS by said penetration vector;

(C3) if said likelihood of penetration of said surface of said RAS by said penetration vector exceeds a second predetermined threshold, generating an emergency warning command and calculating a set of evasive parameters; and

(C4) repeating said steps (C1-C3).

6. The method of claim 5, wherein said step (C3) further includes the step of:

presenting said warning commands audibly and/or visually to said pilot;

determining the amount of time necessary to take evasive maneuvers in order to avoid penetration of said RAS; and

calculating the amount of time remaining before said set of evasive maneuvers is executed.

7. The method of claim 3, wherein said step of substantially continuously obtaining said set of coordinates that defines said RAS further includes the step of:

downloading said set of coordinates that defines said RAS further from a tamper-resistant RAS (TAP-RAS) database located on board of said aircraft.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein said wherein said TAP-RAS database further includes a set of reference points, and wherein said aircraft includes at least one reference point, said step of downloading said set of coordinates that defines said RAS further from said tamper-resistant RAS (TAP-RAS) database located on board of said aircraft further includes the step of:

substantially continuously measuring a set of real time distance vectors by using a sensor located on board of said aircraft;

wherein each said real-time distance vector includes a real-time distance vector between at least one said reference point in said TAP-RAS database and said at least one reference point of said aircraft.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein said step of substantially continuously measuring said set of real time distance vectors by using said sensor located on board of said aircraft further includes the step of:

using a laser sensor.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of navigating said aircraft around said RAS in said RAS-mode further includes the step of:

navigating said aircraft around said RAS in said RAS-mode using a tamper-resistant on-board apparatus.

11. The method of claim 10, further including the steps of:

continuously monitoring whether said tamper-resistant on-board apparatus was tampered with; and

if said tamper-resistant apparatus on-board was tampered with, sending a set of monitoring data to a ground controller using an aircraft-ground link;

wherein said set of monitoring data is selected from the group consisting of;

a flight information, an aircraft ID number, a time coordinate when said tampering event occurred, a set of position coordinates of said aircraft at said time coordinate when said tampering event occurred, and a speed vector of said aircraft at said time coordinate when said tampering event occurred.

12. The method of claim 3, wherein said step of substantially continuously obtaining said set of coordinates that defines said RAS further includes the step of:

receiving a set of coordinates that defines said RAS from a secure pseudolite.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein said step of receiving said set of coordinates that defines said RAS further includes the step of:

receiving said set of coordinates that defines said RAS from at least one anti-spoof and anti-jam split-spectrum pseudolite;

said one anti-spoof and anti-jam split-spectrum pseudolite located in said RAS and configured to substantially continuously transmit a set of real time split-spectrum pseudolite signals including the position coordinates of said pseudolite and a buffer range around said RAS; and

wherein said set of split-spectrum signals is configured to minimize interference with the reception of satellite signals.

14. The method of claim 1, wherein said step of navigating said aircraft in said overriding mode (RAS-override-mode) further includes the step of:

generating said valid overriding command by using said overriding processor.