Cryptographic key management

• US 6,782,103 B1
• Filed: 10/25/2000
• Issued: 08/24/2004
• Est. Priority Date: 12/17/1999
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Fujitsu Services Limited (Fujitsu Limited)
• Original Assignee: Fujitsu Services Limited (Fujitsu Limited)
• Inventors: Robinson, Alexander James, Parker, Thomas Anthony, Arthan, Robin Denis
• Primary Examiner(s): JUNG, DAVID YIUK
• Application Number:
  US09/696,158
• Time in Patent Office: 1,399 Days
• Field of Search: 713/200-202, 713/168-170, 380/277-286, 380/44-47
• US Class Current: 380/278
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

Abstract

Business data flows from one computer system (1) to another (2) and its integrity can be protected by cryptographic means, such as digital signatures. In particular, a source system (1) may use a private key (DSPR) to sign outgoing data, and a destination system (2) may use a public key (DSPU) to verify incoming data. For security purposes all keys should be changed at scheduled times calculated using factors including key lifetime (from which is calculated the key expiry time) and key delivery time. If a key is compromised it needs to be changed at other than the scheduled time, and in general this will result in calculation of a new scheduled key change time. If a DSPR key is delivered to the source system (1) encrypted by a key encryption key (KEK), then change to the KEK key will in general also be needed upon compromise of the DSPR key. A new key changetime calculation can be avoided if another public key/private key pair is pre-generated and the public key part pre-supplied to the destination system (2), where it is stored as a spare. When the existing private key (DSPR) is compromised, the new private key corresponding to the spare is supplied to the source system (1) and can be put into use immediately. In this case the expiry time of the spare public key will be substantially the same as that of the original public key, as it will deemed to have been in use as of delivery, and recalculation of the key changetime will not be required. Preferably a public key in use at the destination system (2) is not revoked immediately upon compromise of the corresponding private key, in order to enable messages signed by that private key to be verified at the destination system, using the corresponding public key, during a predetermined time interval (message latency) after signing. A maximum value for the message latency may be set and used as another factor in the scheduled key change time calculation.

Claims

1. A cryptographic key management method for use in a computer system, wherein communications between different locations within the system are protected by cryptographic means employing at least one current key, the method including the steps:

(a) scheduling the current key to be changed at a scheduled change time;

(b) creating a spare key;

(c) scheduling the spare key to be changed at the same scheduled change time as said current key; and

(d) in the event of the current key being compromised, substituting the spare key for the current key, to allow communications to continue with minimum interruption.

2. A method according to claim 1 wherein the step of scheduling a key to be changed at a scheduled change time includes:

(a) determining a key lifetime according to the key type;

(b) calculating a key expiry time by adding said key lifetime to a current time; and

(c) calculating the scheduled change time by subtracting a predetermined time interval from said key expiry time.

3. A method according to claim 2, wherein said predetermined time interval includes a maximum key generation and delivery time.

4. A method according to claim 3, wherein said current key comprises a public key used to verify messages signed by a corresponding private key, and wherein said predetermined time interval further includes a maximum permitted time interval between signing and verification of any of said messages.

5. A method according to claim 1, wherein a said current key is delivered under encryption by a key encryption key, wherein a respective scheduled change time is calculated for the current key and for the key encryption key, and including the step of changing the current key whenever the key encryption key is changed, including unscheduled changes thereof.

6. A method as claimed in claim 5, including the step of changing the key encryption key whenever the current key undergoes a scheduled change.

7. A computer system comprising:

(a) cryptographic means employing at least one current key for protecting communications between different locations within the system;

(b) means for scheduling the current key to be changed at a scheduled change time;

(c) means for creating a spare key;

(d) means for scheduling the spare key to be changed at the same scheduled change time as said current key; and

(e) means for substituting the spare key for the current key, in the event of the current key being compromised, to allow communications to continue with minimum interruption.

8. A system according to claim 7 wherein the means for scheduling a key to be changed at a scheduled change time includes:

(a) means for determining a key lifetime according to the key type;

(b) means for calculating a key expiry time by adding said key lifetime to a current time; and

(c) means for calculating the scheduled change time by subtracting a predetermined time interval from said key expiry time.