Attack-resistant implementation method

• US 6,986,054 B2
• Filed: 12/19/2001
• Issued: 01/10/2006
• Est. Priority Date: 03/30/2001
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Hitachi, Ltd.
• Original Assignee: Hitachi, Ltd.
• Inventors: Watanabe, Takashi, Endo, Takashi, Kaminaga, Masahiro
• Primary Examiner(s): Barron, Jr., Gilberto
• Assistant Examiner(s): LEMMA, SAMSON B
• Application Number:
  US10/021,042
• Publication Number:
  US 20020178371A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,483 Days
• Field of Search: 713/193, 713/194, 713/171, 380/28, 380/30, 380/44, 380/277, 380/279
• US Class Current: 713/193
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2207/7252 of operation order, e.g. starting to treat the exponent at a random place, or in a randomly chosen direction
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 7/723 Modular exponentiation G06F7/724, G06F7/727, G06F7/728 take precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 7/725 over elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/043 of tables, e.g. lookup, substitution or mapping
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/302 involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves

Abstract

The present invention makes it difficult for unauthorized parties to estimate processing and a secret key based upon the waveforms of power consumption of an IC card chip by changing a processing order in the IC card chip so that it is not estimated by the attackers. In an information processing apparatus comprising storing means having a program storing part for storing programs and a data storing part for storing data, an operation processing unit, means for inputting data to be operated on in the operation processing unit, and means for outputting operation processing results on the data by the operation processing unit, an arithmetic operation method is provided which comprises the steps of: for two integers K1 and K2, when finding a value F(K, A) of a function F satisfying F(K1+K2, A)=F(K1, A)◯F(K2, A) (◯ denotes an arithmetic operation in a communtative semigroup S. K designates an integer and A designates an element of S), decomposing the K to the sum of m integers K[0]+K[1]+ . . . K[m−1]; using T(0), T(1), . . . T(m−1) resulting from rearranging a string of the m integers 0, 1, . . . m−1 by permutation T (the result corresponds one for one to the integer string 0, 1, . . . m−1); and operating on terms F(K[T(0)], A) to F(K[T(m−1)], A) on the right side of
F(K, A)=F(K[T(0)], A)◯F(K[T(1)], A)◯ . . . F(K[T(m−1)], A) . . .   (expression 1)
in the order of F(K[T(0)], A), F(K[T(1)], A), . . . F(K[T(m−1)], A) to find F(K, A).

Claims

1. A method for countering unauthorized decryption comprising a step of scrambling at least one correlation between a data decryption processing in a hardware and at least one respective hardware operational phenomenon by randomly changing at least one arithmetic operation order in the data decryption processing, wherein the correlation is scrambled by an arithmetic operation method implemented by an information processing apparatus comprising the steps of:

for two integers K1 and K2, when finding a value F(K, A) of a function F satisfying F(K1+K2,A)=F(K1, A) ◯

F(K2, A) (◯

denotes an arithmetic operation in a communtative semigroup S. K designates an integer and A designates an element of S), decomposing the K to the sum of m integers K[0]+K[1]+. . . K[m−

1];

using T(0), T(1), . . . T(m−

1) resulted from rearranging a string of integers 0, 1, . . . m−

1 by permutation T; and

operating on terms F(K[T(0)], A) to F(K[T(m−

1)], A) on the right side of F(K, A)=F(K[T(0)], A) ◯

F(K[T(1)], A) ◯

. . . F(K[T(m−

1)], A) . . . (“

expression 1”

) in an order of F(K[T(0)], A), F(K[T(1)], A), . . . F(K[T(m−

1)], A) to find F(K, A).

2. The method according to claim 1, whereby the permutation processing, the permutation T prevents predicting any post-permutation data from pre-permutation data, or the permutation T is performed based on a dummy random number, and whereby the permutation processing is performed each time the expression 1 is performed.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the S is a commutative semigroup in which, for a set consisting of residues by an integer N (N≧

2), the arithmetic operation ◯

of a modular multiplication operation A◯

B=A*B mod N is introduced, and the F satisfies F(K, A)=A^K mod N (A^K denotes the K-th power of A).

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein the information processing apparatus is installed on an IC card, a cellular phone, or a PDA.

5. The method according to claim 3, wherein the integer K is split in a form of K[j]=u*((2^t)^j) (0≦

u≦

(2^t)−

1, t=1, 2, . . . ).

6. The method according to claim 5, whereby the permutation processing, the permutation T is performed based on an information source prevents predicting any post-permutation data from pre-permutation data, or the permutation T is performed based on a dummy random number, and whereby the permutation processing is performed each time the expression 1 is performed.

7. The method according to claim 5, wherein the integer K is split in a form of K[j]=u*((2^t)^j) (0≦

u≦

(2^t)−

1, t=1, 2, . . . ).

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the S is a Mordell-Weil group on an elliptic curve E defined on a finite field GF(p) (p is a prime number) or GF(2^n) (n is an integer equal to or greater than 1), and an expression F(K,A)=KA is satisfied, wherein the A denotes a point on the elliptic curve E, the KA denotes the arithmetic operation ◯

performed on K number of As such that the KA denotes A◯

A◯

A . . . ◯

A (K number) when the K is positive, or (−

A)◯

(−

A)◯

(−

A) . . . ◯

(−

A) (|K|number) when the K is negative, and 0 (the point at infinity) on the E when the K is 0, the ◯

denotes an addition operation in the Mordell-Weil group, and the −

A is an inverse in the Mordell-Weil group of the A.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the information processing apparatus is installed on an IC card.

10. The method according to claim 8, wherein the integer K is split in a form of K[j]=u*((2^t)^j) (0≦

u≦

(2^t)−

1, t=1, 2, . . . ).

11. The method according to claim 10, wherein the information processing apparatus is installed on an IC card.

12. A method for calculating a value F(K, A) of a function F satisfying F(K1+K2, A)=F(K1, A) ◯

F(K2, A) for two integers K1 and K2 in an encryption or decryption process of a cryptosystem by means of an information processing device which comprises a processing unit and a memory device, wherein ◯

denotes an arithmetic operation in a commutative semigroup S, K designates an integer, and A designates an element of S, the method comprising;

decomposing the value K in the processing unit to m integers K[0], K[1], . . . , K[m−

1] each of which is a value of a n-bit unit of a binary representation of the value K, wherein the binary representation of the value K is w bit, m*n equals w; and

calculating F(K[T(0)]*(2^n)^(m−

1T[0]), A) ◯

F(K[T(1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[1]), A) ◯

, . . . F(K[T(m−

1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[m−

1]), A) in the processing unit in an order of F(K[T(0])*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[0]), A), F(K[T(1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[1]), A), . . . F(K[T(m−

1)*(2^n)^(m−

1T[m−

1]), A) defined by a string of integers T(0), T(1), . . . T(m−

1) which is a random permutation of a string of integers 0, 1, . . . m−

1.

13. The method according to claim 12, the permutation being performed based on a dummy random number each time the F(K[T(0)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[0]), A) ◯

F(K[T(1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[1]), A) ◯

, . . . F(K[T(m−

1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[m−

1]), A) is calculated.

14. The method according to claim 12,

wherein the commutative semigroup S is a Mordell-Weil group on an elliptic curve E defined on a finite field GF(p) or GF(2^n),

wherein p is a prime number, n is an integer equal to or greater than 1, and an expression F(K,A)=KA is satisfied, and

wherein the value A denotes a point on the elliptic curve E, the value KA denotes the arithmetic operation ◯

performed on K number of As such that the value KA denotes A◯

A◯

A . . . ◯

A when the value K is positive, or (−

A)◯

(−

A)◯

(−

A) . . . ◯

(−

A) when the value K is negative, or 0 on the elliptic curve E when the value K is 0, the symbol ◯

denotes an addition operation in the Mordell-Weil group, and the value (−

A) is an inverse in the Mordell-Weil group of the value A.

15. The method according to claim 12, wherein the information processing device is an IC card.

16. An information processing device for calculating a value F(K,A) of a function F satisfying F(K1+K2, A)=F(K1, A) ◯

F(K2, A) for two integers K 1 and K2 in an encryption or decryption process of a cryptosystem, wherein ◯

denotes an arithmetic operation in a commutative semigroup S, K designates an integer, and A designates an element of S, the information processing device comprising;

a processing unit; and

a memory device,

wherein the processing unit is adapted to decompose the value K to m integers K(0], K[1], . . . , K[m−

1], each of which is a value of a n-bit unit of a binary representation of the value K, wherein the binary representation of the value K is w bit, m*n equals w, and

the processing unit is further adapted to calculate F(K[T(0)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[0]), A) ◯

F(K[T(1)*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[1]), A) ◯

, . . . F(K[T(m−

1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[m−

1]), A) in an order of F(K[T(0))*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[0]), A), F(K[T(1)1*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T)[1], A), . . . F(K[T(m−

1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[m−

1]), A) defined by a string of integers T(0), T(1), . . . T(m−

1) which is a random permutation of a string of integers 0, 1, . . . m−

1.

17. The information processing device according to claim 16, wherein the processing unit is adapted to perform the to permutation based on a dummy random number each time the F(K[T(0)]*(2^n)^(m−

1T[0]), A) ◯

F(K[T(1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[1]), A) ◯

, . . . F(K[T(m−

1)]*(2^n)^(m−

1−

T[m−

1]), A) is calculated.

18. The information processing device according to claim 16,

wherein the commutative semigroup S is a Mordell-Weil group on an elliptic curve E defined on a finite field GF(p) or GF(2^n),

wherein p is a prime number and n is an integer equal to or greater than 1, and an expression F(K,A)=KA is satisfied, and p1 wherein the value A denotes a point on the elliptic curve E, the value KA denotes the arithmetic operation ◯

performed on K number of As such that the value KA denotes A◯

A◯

A . . . ◯

A when the value K is positive, or (−

A) ◯

(−

A)◯

(−

A) . . . ◯

(−

A) when the value K is negative, or 0 on the elliptic curve E when the value K is 0, the symbol ◯

denotes an addition operation in the Mordell-Weil group, and the value (−

A) is an inverse in the Mordell-Weil 25 group of the value A.

19. The information processing device according to claim 16, wherein the information processing device is an IC card.