Method and system for producing wise cards
First Claim
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1. A method of preventing counterfeiting of a smart card, comprising:
- providing a smart card with a cryptographic structure for authorizing the smart card which cannot be accessed completely by a predetermined small number of readings,wherein said cryptographic structure can be built only by whoever emits the card or an agent thereof;
providing a reader for reading said smart card and including a database holding information related to unauthorized smart cards, said reader being on-line, such that said reader is operatively connected to a network, only when said database of said reader is being updated by said network,wherein said reader includes a random number generator, which, when a card is read, chooses a pair (a, b) of distinct numbers with a<
b between l and N,wherein said smart card carries thereon predetermined N channels as C1, C2, . . . , CN, where N is an integer,wherein each channel Ci, with i equal to 1, 2, . . . , N, carries a pair of numbers (hi, li), andwherein hi is the ith high number and li is the ith low number,wherein said reader obtains a content of only two of said channels, and periodically communicating, by said reader of said smart card, with a database where a predetermined characteristic of the card is checked.
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Abstract
A method (and system) for preventing counterfeiting and cloning of smart cards, includes providing a smart card with a cryptographic structure for authorizing the smart card which can not be accessed completely by a predetermined small number of readings. The cryptographic structure can be built only by whoever emits the card or an agent thereof.
13 Citations
25 Claims
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1. A method of preventing counterfeiting of a smart card, comprising:
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providing a smart card with a cryptographic structure for authorizing the smart card which cannot be accessed completely by a predetermined small number of readings, wherein said cryptographic structure can be built only by whoever emits the card or an agent thereof; providing a reader for reading said smart card and including a database holding information related to unauthorized smart cards, said reader being on-line, such that said reader is operatively connected to a network, only when said database of said reader is being updated by said network, wherein said reader includes a random number generator, which, when a card is read, chooses a pair (a, b) of distinct numbers with a<
b between l and N,wherein said smart card carries thereon predetermined N channels as C1, C2, . . . , CN, where N is an integer, wherein each channel Ci, with i equal to 1, 2, . . . , N, carries a pair of numbers (hi, li), and wherein hi is the ith high number and li is the ith low number, wherein said reader obtains a content of only two of said channels, and periodically communicating, by said reader of said smart card, with a database where a predetermined characteristic of the card is checked. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21)
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22. A method of preventing counterfeiting of a smart card, comprising:
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providing a smart card such that none of confidential information and a cryptographic key for authorizing the smart card, is carried on the smart card; reading said card by a reader such that in each reading, said reader reads only a predetermined small amount of information which makes the card unique, wherein said reader includes a random number generator, which, when a card is read, chooses a pair (a, b) of distinct numbers with a<
b between 1 and N,wherein before processing the smart card, the reader obtains the pair (ha, la) and hb; using the public keys Va−
1 and Vb−
1, checking by the reader whether the pairs (ha, la) and (hb, la) are compatible, and, consequently, that the numbers ha, la, and hb belong to a same legitimate card,wherein said pairs (hi, li) to be contained on the smart card are generated by; choosing a prefix of ll once for all transactions, or changed whenever needed, wherein said prefix is publicly known; providing a sequence, such that the sequence is generated so that a same number is not chosen twice, and so that corresponding other li'"'"'s are not chosen as new lls; concatenating the prefix and the sequence to form ll; choosing a function f which is invertible and is publicly known, to construct 12−
l(11), 13−
l(12), and so forth, wherein the function f is chosen to be the identity map, in which case 11−
12−
13= . . . =lN; andchoosing for a number N, N public key-private key pairs, such that a first private key V1 is for computing h1−
Vl(11), a second private key V2 is for computing h2=V2(12), and so on. - View Dependent Claims (23)
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24. A system for preventing cloning of a smart card, comprising:
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a smart card such that a cryptographic structure for authorizing the smart card is not carried on the smart card; and a reader for reading the smart card and including a database for linking to a network and being updated periodically with a list of unauthorized smart cards, wherein said reader includes a random number generator, which, when a card is read, chooses a pair (a, b) of distinct numbers with a<
b between 1 and N,wherein before processing the smart card, the reader obtains the pair (ha, la) and hb; using the public keys Va−
1 and Vb−
1, checking by the reader whether the pairs (ha, la) and (hb, lb) are compatible, and, consequently, that the numbers ha, la, and hb belong to a same legitimate card, andwherein said cryptographic structure is kept secret by whoever emits the card or an agent thereof, wherein said pairs (hi, li) to be contained on the smart card are generated by; choosing a prefix of ll once for all transactions, or changed whenever needed, wherein said prefix is publicly known; providing a sequence, such that the sequence is generated so that a same number is not chosen twice, and so that corresponding other li'"'"'s are not chosen as new lls; concatenating the prefix and the sequence to form ll; choosing a function f which is invertible and is publicly known, to construct 12=f(11), 13=f(12), and so forth, wherein the function f is chosen to be the identity map, in which case 11=12=13= . . . =lN; and choosing, for a number N, N public key-private key pairs, such that a first private key V1 is for computing h1=V1(11), a second private key V2 is for computing h2=V2(12), and so on.
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25. A computer-readable medium tangibly embodying a program of recordable, machine-readable instructions executable by a digital processing apparatus to perform a method for preventing counterfeiting and cloning of smart cards, comprising:
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providing a smart card with a cryptographic structure for authorizing the smart card which cannot be accessed completely by a predetermined number of readings, reading said card by a reader such that in each reading, said reader reads only a predetermined small amount of information which makes the card unique, wherein said reader includes a random number generator, which, when a card is read, chooses a pair (a, b) of distinct numbers with a<
b between 1 and N,wherein before processing the smart card, the reader obtains the pair (ha, la) and hb; using the public keys Va−
1 and Vb−
1, checking by the reader whether the pairs (ha, la) and (hb, lb) are compatible, and, consequently, that the numbers ha, la, and hb belong to a same legitimate card, andwherein said cryptographic structure can be built only by whoever emits the card of an agent thereof, wherein said pairs (hi, li) to be contained on the smart card are generated by; choosing a prefix of ll once for all transactions, or changed whenever needed, wherein said prefix is publicly known; providing a sequence, such that the sequence is generated so that a same number is not chosen twice, and so that corresponding other li'"'"'s are not chosen as new lls; concatenating the prefix and the sequence to form ll; choosing a function f which is invertible and is publicly known, to construct 12=f(11), 13−
f(12), and so forth, wherein the function f is chosen to be the identity map, in which case 11=12=13= . . . =lN; andchoosing, for a number N, N public key-private key pairs, such that a first private key V1 is for computing h1=V1(11), a second private key V2 is for computing h2=V2(12), and so on.
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Specification