Method for validating an authentication chip

• US 7,210,038 B2
• Filed: 08/02/2004
• Issued: 04/24/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 07/10/1998
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Memjet Technology Ltd. (Memjet Limited)
• Original Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Limited
• Inventors: Walmsley, Simon Robert
• Primary Examiner(s): Zand; Kambiz
• Application Number:
  US10/902,889
• Publication Number:
  US 20050010778A1
• Time in Patent Office: 995 Days
• Field of Search: 713/176
• US Class Current: 713/176
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/31 User authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/77 in smart cards
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2103 Challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2129 Authenticate client device independently of the user
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2143 Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/043 of tables, e.g. lookup, substitution or mapping
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/08 Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3218 using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

A method for validating untrusted authentication chip, the method includes the steps of: generating a secret random number and calculating a signature for the random number using a signature function, in a trusted authentication chip; encrypting the random number and the signature using a symmetric encryption function using a first secret key, in the trusted authentication chip; passing the encrypted random number and signature from the trusted authentication chip to an untrusted authentication chip; decrypting the encrypted random number and signature with a symmetric decryption function using the first secret key, in the untrusted authentication chip; calculating a signature for the decrypted random number using the signature function in the untrusted authentication chip; comparing the signature calculated in the untrusted authentication chip with the signature decrypted; in the event that the two signatures match, encrypting the decrypted random number together with a data message read from the untrusted chip by the symmetric encryption function using a second secret key and returning it together with the data message to the trusted authentication chip; encrypting the random number together with the data message by the symmetric encryption function using the second secret key, in the trusted authentication chip; comparing the two versions of the random number encrypted together with the data message using the second key, in the trusted authentication chip; in the event that the two versions match, considering the untrusted authentication chip and the data message to be valid; otherwise, considering the untrusted authentication chip and the data message to be invalid.

Claims

1. A method for validating the untrusted integrated circuit, the method includes the steps of:

generating a secret random number and calculating a signature for the random number using a signature function, in a trusted integrated circuit;

encrypting the random number and the signature using a symmetric encryption function using a first secret key, in the trusted integrated circuit;

passing the encrypted random number and signature from the trusted integrated circuit to an untrusted integrated circuit;

decrypting the encrypted random number and signature with a symmetric decryption function using the first secret key, in the untrusted integrated circuit;

calculating a signature for the decrypted random number using the signature function in the untrusted integrated circuit;

comparing the signature calculated in the untrusted integrated circuit with the signature decrypted;

in the event that the two signatures match, encrypting the decrypted random number together with a data message read from the untrusted chip by the symmetric encryption function using a second secret key and returning it together with the data message to the trusted integrated circuit;

encrypting the random number together with the data message by the symmetric encryption function using the second secret key, in the trusted integrated circuit;

comparing the two versions of the random number encrypted together with the data message using the second key, in the trusted integrated circuit;

in the event that the two versions match, considering the untrusted integrated circuit and the data message to be valid;

otherwise, considering the untrusted integrated circuit and the data message to be invalid.

2. A method according to claim 1, where the two secret keys are held in both the trusted and untrusted chips and are kept secret.

3. A method according to claim 1, where the random number is generated from an initial seed value only in the trusted chip, and the seed value is changed for generating a new random number only after each successful validation.

4. A method according to claim 1, where the data message is a memory vector of the integrated circuit.

5. A method according to claim 4, where part of the vector space is different for each chip, part of it is constant (read only) for each consumable, and part of it is decrement only.

6. A method according to claim 1, where the encryption function is held in both chips.

7. A method according to claim 1, where the decryption function is held only in the untrusted chip.

8. A method according to claim 1, where the signature function is held in both chips to generate digital signatures.

9. A method according to claim 8, where the digital signature is between 128 bits and 160 bits long, inclusive.

10. A method according to claim 1, where a test function is held only in the trusted chip to return an indication that the untrusted chip is valid and advance the random number, if the untrusted chip is valid;

otherwise it returns an indication that the untrusted chip is invalid.

11. A method according to claim 10, where the time taken to return an indication that the untrusted chip is invalid is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return an indication that the untrusted chip is valid is identical for all good inputs.

12. A method according to claim 1, where a read function in the untrusted chip decrypts the random number and signature, calculates its own signature for the decrypted random number and compares the two signatures, then it returns the data message and a reencrypted random number in combination with the data message if the locally generated signature is the same as the decrypted signature;

otherwise it returns an indication that the untrusted chip is invalid.

13. A method according to claim 12, where the time taken to return the invalid indication is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to make a return for a good input is the same for all good inputs.