Method and apparatus for providing peer authentication for a transport layer session

• US 7,246,236 B2
• Filed: 04/18/2002
• Issued: 07/17/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 04/18/2002
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Nokia Corporation
• Original Assignee: Nokia Corporation
• Inventors: Stirbu, Vlad Alexandru
• Primary Examiner(s): Barron, Jr.; Gilberto
• Assistant Examiner(s): LASHLEY, LAUREL L
• Application Number:
  US10/127,339
• Publication Number:
  US 20030200431A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,916 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0869 for achieving mutual authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for mutual authentication H04L9/3273
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys

Abstract

A handshake protocol, for encapsulation by the so-called TLS Record Protocol, for use by a client (11) and a server (12) in authenticating each other. The handshake protocol is based on the TLS Handshake Protocol, but replaces the PKI trust infrastructure of that protocol with the IMS AKA trust infrastructure, which is based on a private key stored on a so-called smart card (11a) in the client terminal (11), and also stored (usually) in a Home Subscriber Server (14) serving as a trusted third party (but instead sometimes in the server (12) being authenticated), the third party providing information to the server (12) sufficient for the server (12) to authenticate the client (11) and also sufficient for the server (12) to provide to the client (11) information sufficient for the client (11) to authenticate the server (12).

Claims

1. A method, comprising:

a client sending a message to a server, wherein the message claims an identity associated with a shared secret key; and

the server performing authentication of the client and conversely, based on information derived from the shared secret key but not revealing the shared secret key;

wherein the shared secret key and the identity are provided out-of-band to both the client and at least one other entity so as to associate the identity with the shared secret key; and

wherein the sending of the message and authentication are according to a predetermined transport layer session handshake protocol providing authentication for a transport layer session communication using a predetermined authentication and key agreement not making use of a public key infrastructure.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein in the authentication, the information derived from, but not revealing, the shared secret key is determined by the client using the shared secret key but is provided to the server by a third-party server distinct from the server and trusted by the server.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the authentication includes:

the server, in response to a message flow from the client and also in response to an authentication field and a random number field provided by the third-party server, providing the authentication field and the random number field to the client; and

the client, in response to the authentication field and the random number field, testing whether the server is authentic based on information conveyed by the authentication field and also based on the random number field.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the authentication also includes:

the third-party server deriving the authentication field from the shared secret.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein the authentication also includes:

the third-party server sending to the server a message including an expected result field; and

the server using the result field to test whether the client is authentic by comparing a result field received from the client with the expected result field.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the authentication also includes:

if the client determines the server to be authentic, then the client calculating a result field based on the shared secret key and the random number field.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein in the authentication, the information derived from, but not revealing, the shared secret key is determined by the client using the secret key and also by the server using the shared secret key.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein a shared secret is obtained based on information derived from, but not revealing, the shared secret key.

9. A client apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the client.

10. A server apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the server.

11. A server apparatus, operative according to the method of claim 2 in respect to the server.

12. A digital communication system including a client apparatus, a server apparatus, and a third-party server apparatus, wherein the client apparatus, the server apparatus and the third-party server apparatus are operative according to the method of claim 2 in respect to the client, the server, and the third-party serve respectively.

13. A digital communication system including a client apparatus and a server apparatus, wherein the client apparatus and the server apparatus are operative according to the method of claim 1 in respect to the client and the server respectively.

14. A method as in claim 1, wherein the information is also derived from a random number and a sequence number using a predetermined set of functions.