Secured centralized public key infrastructure

• US 7,392,377 B2
• Filed: 02/26/2002
• Issued: 06/24/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 10/18/1999
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Auctane LLC (Stamps.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Stamps.com, Inc.
• Inventors: Ogg, Craig L., Chow, William W.
• Primary Examiner(s): Heneghan; Matthew
• Assistant Examiner(s): Homayounmehr; Farid
• Application Number:
  US10/083,236
• Publication Number:
  US 20020178354A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,310 Days
• Field of Search: 705/35, 713/153
• US Class Current: 713/153
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/02 Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 50/188 Electronic negotiation
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/0008 Communication details outside or between apparatus coin-freed apparatus for franking per se G07F17/26
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00733 Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00056 Client-server
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00064 Virtual meter, online stamp; PSD functions or indicia creation not at user's location
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00145 via the Internet
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00201 Open franking system, i.e. the printer is not dedicated to franking only, e.g. PC (Personal Computer)
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00887 using look-up tables, also called master tables with pointers
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00967 PSD [Postal Security Device] as defined by the USPS [US Postal Service]

Abstract

An on-line value bearing item (VBI) printing system that includes one or more cryptographic modules and a central database is disclosed. The cryptographic modules are capable of implementing the USPS Information Based Indicia Program Postal Security Device Performance Criteria and other required VBI standards. The modules encipher the information stored in the central database for all of the on-line VBI system customers and are capable of preventing access to the database by unauthorized users. Additionally, the cryptographic module is capable of preventing unauthorized and undetected modification, including the unauthorized modification, substitution, insertion, and deletion of VBI related data and cryptographically critical security parameters.

Claims

1. A system for providing public key infrastructure security in a computer network comprising:

a user terminal coupled to the computer network;

a user transaction data record assigned to the user, wherein the user transaction data record includes a raw state, an unleased state, an assigned state and a leased state, and a data element indicating a present operational state of the user transaction data record including one of the raw state, the unleased state, the assigned state and the leased state, wherein only a predetermined type of commands are allowed to be executed on the user transaction data record for each operational state;

a private key, and a public key assigned to a user for encrypting and decrypting the user transaction data record;

a database remote from the user terminal for securely storing the encrypted user transaction data record, and the private key and the public key; and

a cryptographic device remote from the user terminal and coupled to the computer network including a computer executable code to encrypt and decrypt the data in the user transaction data record utilizing the stored private key and the public key in the database, and to execute one or more of the commands that are allowed for the present state of the user transaction data record.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the private key is encrypted when it is stored in the database.

3. The system of claim 1, wherein a respective security device transaction data related to a user is loaded into the cryptographic device when the user requests a service.

4. The system of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic device is configured to authenticate the identity of the user and verify that the identified user is authorized to assume a role and perform a corresponding operation.

5. The system of claim 4, wherein the assumed role is a security officer role to initiate a key management function.

6. The system of claim 4, wherein the assumed role is an administrator role to manage a user access control database.

7. The system of claim 4, wherein the assumed role is a provider role to withdraw from a user account.

8. The system of claim 4, wherein the assumed role is a user role to operate on a value bearing item.

9. The system of claim 4, wherein the assumed role is a certificate authority role to allow a public key certificate to be loaded and verified.

10. The system of claim 4, wherein the cryptographic device includes a computer executable code for supporting multiple concurrent users and maintaining a separation of roles and operations performed by each user.

11. The system of claim 4, wherein the cryptographic device stores information about a number of last transactions in a respective internal register.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the database stores a table including the respective information about a last transaction, a verification module to compare the information saved in the device with the information saved in the database.

13. The system of claim 1, further comprising a digital certificate stored in the database and assigned to a user when the user registers with the system.

14. The system of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic device is configured for digitally signing a certificate.

15. The system of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic device is configured for encrypting data.

16. The system of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic device is configured for decrypting data.

17. The system of claim 1, wherein the database includes a user profile for the user.

18. The system of claim 17, wherein the user profile includes username, user role, password, logon failure count, logon failure limit, logon time-out limit, account expiration, password expiration, and password period.

19. The system of claim 4, wherein the cryptographic device is capable of performing one or more of Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) public key encryption, DES, Triple-DES, DSA signature, SHA-1, and Pseudo-random number generation algorithms.

20. The system of claim 4, wherein the cryptographic device stores information about a number of last transactions in an internal register and compares the information saved in the register with the information saved in a memory before loading a new transaction data.

29. The method of claim 3, further comprising the steps of:

storing information about a number of last transactions in a respective internal register of each of the one or more cryptographic devices;

storing a table including the information about a last transaction in the database;

comparing the information saved in the respective device with the respective information saved in the database; and

loading a new transaction data if the respective information stored in the device compares with the respective information stored in the database.

21. A method for providing public key infrastructure security in a computer network comprising the steps of:

assigning a private key and a public key to a user for authenticating a user transaction data record, wherein the user transaction data record includes a raw state, an unleased state, an assigned state and a leased state, and a data element indicating a present operational state of the user transaction data record including one of the raw state, the unleased state, the assigned state and the leased state, wherein only a predetermined type of commands are allowed to be executed on the user transaction data record for each state;

storing the private key, the public key and the user transaction data record in a database remote from the user terminal;

encrypting the data in the user transaction data record assigned to the user utilizing the stored private key and the public key in the database; and

controlling the user transaction data record to execute one or more of the commands that are allowed for the present state of the user transaction data record.

22. The method of claim 21, further comprising the step of storing a digital certificate and assigning the stored digital certificate to a user when the user registers with the system.

23. The method of claim 21, further comprising the step of loading the user transaction data related to a user into a cryptographic device when the user requests to operate on a value bearing item.

24. The method of claim 23, further comprising the step of verifying that the requesting user is authorized to assume a role and to perform a corresponding operation.

25. The method of claim 24, wherein the assumed role is an administrator role to manage a user access control.

26. The method of claim 24, wherein the assumed role is a user role to perform expected IBIP postal meter operations.

27. The method of claim 24, wherein the assumed role is a certificate authority role to allow a public key certificate to be loaded and verified.

28. The method of claim 24, further comprising the steps of supporting multiple concurrent operators and maintaining a separation of roles and operations performed by each operator.

30. The method of claim 21, further comprising digitally signing a certificate.

31. The method of claim 21, further comprising encrypting data.

32. The method of claim 21, further comprising decrypting data.

33. The method of claim 21, further comprising the step of storing a user profile for a plurality of users.

34. The method of claim 33, wherein the user profile includes username, user role, password, logon failure count, logon failure limit, logon time-out limit, account expiration, password expiration, and password period.

35. The method of claim 21, wherein the cryptographic function is one or more of Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) public key encryption, DES, Triple-DES, DSA signature,SHA-1, and Pseudo-random number generation algorithms.