Authentication chip for authenticating an untrusted chip

• US 7,401,223 B2
• Filed: 08/02/2004
• Issued: 07/15/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 07/10/1998
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Memjet Technology Ltd. (Memjet Limited)
• Original Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Limited
• Inventors: Walmsley, Simon Robert
• Primary Examiner(s): Zand; Kambiz
• Assistant Examiner(s): POLTORAK, PIOTR
• Application Number:
  US10/902,883
• Publication Number:
  US 20050066168A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,443 Days
• Field of Search: 713/169, 713/155, 713/159, 713168-167, 713/170, 713/172, 713/176, 713/181, 713/189, 380/46, 380259-260, 380/262
• US Class Current: 713/169
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/31 User authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/77 in smart cards
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2103 Challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2129 Authenticate client device independently of the user
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2143 Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/043 of tables, e.g. lookup, substitution or mapping
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/08 Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3218 using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

A trusted authentication chip for use in authenticating an untrusted authentication chip; the trusted authentication chip including a random number generator, a symmetric encryption function and two secret keys for the function, a signature function and a test function; wherein the trusted authentication chip generates test data including a random number and its signature, encrypted using a first of said secret keys and transmits the test data to the untrusted authentication chip, wherein the trusted authentication chip receives a data message and an encrypted version of the data message in combination with the random number from the untrusted authentication chip, the data message being encrypted using a second of said secret keys, wherein the test function operates to encrypt the random number together with the data message by the symmetric encryption function using the second secret key, compare the two versions of the random number encrypted together with the data message using the second key, and in the event that the two versions match, considers the untrusted authentication chip and the data message to be valid, otherwise, it considers the untrusted authentication chip and the data message to be invalid.

Claims

1. A trusted integrated circuit for use in authenticating an untrusted integrated circuit;

the trusted integrated circuit including a random number generator, a symmetric encryption function and two secret keys for the function, a signature function and a test function;

wherein the trusted integrated circuit chip generates test data including a random number and its signature, encrypted using a first of said secret keys and transmits the test data to the untrusted integrated circuit, wherein the trusted integrated circuit receives a data message and an encrypted version of the data message in combination with the random number from the untrusted integrated circuit, the data message being encrypted using a second of said secret keys, wherein the test function operates to encrypt the random number together with the data message by the symmetric encryption function using the second secret key, compare the two versions of the random number encrypted together with the data message using the second key, and in the event that the two versions match, considers the untrusted integrated circuit and the data message to be valid, otherwise, it considers the untrusted integrated circuit and the data message to be invalid.

2. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the two secret keys are kept secret.

3. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the random number is generated by the random number generator from an initial seed value only in the trusted chip, and the seed value for generating a new random number is changed only after each successful validation.

4. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the data message is a memory vector of the integrated circuit.

5. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 4, where part of the vector space is different for each chip, part of it is constant (read only) for each consumable, and part of it is decrement only.

6. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the signature function operates to create digital signatures between 128 bits and 160 bits long.

7. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the test function advances the random number in the event of a match.

8. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the time taken for the test function to return an indication that the untrusted chip is invalid is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return an indication that the untrusted chip is valid is identical for all good inputs.

9. A trusted integrated circuit according to claim 1, where the time taken for the read function to return the invalid indication is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to make a return for a good input is the same for all good inputs.