Methods, system, and computer-readable medium for recommending an auction structure

• US 7,433,843 B2
• Filed: 04/23/2004
• Issued: 10/07/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 04/23/2004
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Bellsouth Intellectual Property Corporation (AT&T, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: AT&T Intellectual Property I LP (AT&T, Inc.)
• Inventors: Brightbill, Paul Luther
• Primary Examiner(s): Smith; Jeffrey A.
• Assistant Examiner(s): Levine; Adam
• Application Number:
  US10/831,518
• Publication Number:
  US 20050240505A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,628 Days
• Field of Search: 705/26, 705/27, 705/37
• US Class Current: 705/37
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/08 Auctions
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/04 Trading; Exchange, e.g. stocks, commodities, derivatives or currency exchange

Abstract

Methods, systems, and products are disclosed for recommending a structure for an online auction. One method prompts a user to input details of the auction and suggests a reverse auction for sourcing goods and services in a telecommunications environment. If the market price for the auctioned goods/services is stable, then the method establishes a reserve price less than or equal to a contract price. A rank-only Vickery structure may be suggested in which each bidder is only informed of the ranking of the bidder'"'"'s bid. Each bidder is not informed of a monetary value of the winning bid.

Claims

1. A method of recommending a structure for an auction, comprising:

causing display of an interactive graphical user interface having data fields for specifying the structure of the auction;

prompting a user to input details of the auction into the data fields;

presenting an annotation in the graphical user interface that a minimum number of bidding suppliers should be four or more;

receiving, in the data fields, the input details describing an auction name, an auction date, a market price, a current price, and a number of bidding suppliers that will submit bids in the auction;

causing display of annotations in the graphical user interface that educate the user of an impact of the input details on the auction;

if the number of bidding suppliers is less than three, then presenting a message in the graphical user interface advising that a reverse auction structure is not recommended;

if the number of bidding suppliers is three, then presenting a message in the graphical user interface advising that the bidding suppliers should be competitive and non-collusive;

if the number of bidding suppliers is four, then presenting another message in the graphical user interface that more bidding suppliers should be obtained;

if the number of bidding suppliers is greater than four but less than thirty, causing display of a market price prompt within the graphical user interface, the market price prompt requesting whether the market price is increasing or decreasing from the current price;

receiving a selection within the graphical user interface of whether the market price is stable, increasing or declining from the current price;

if the market price is stable or declining, then

a computer establishing a reserve price that is less than or equal to the contract price, and

establishing a target price below the current contract price;

if, however, the market price is increasing, then

the computer setting the reserve price approximately equal to the contract price, and

when the market price is above the contract price, then setting the target price equal to the current contract price;

if the number of bidding suppliers is between five and thirty, then causing display in the graphical user interface of a recommendation for a reverse Vickrey auction structure for sourcing goods and services based on the input details, such that suppliers compete against each other to supply the goods and services to the user; and

if, however, the user declines the reverse Vickrey auction, then causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion for a rank-only visibility structure for the auction, such that each bidder to the auction is only informed of a ranking of the bidder'"'"'s bid, and each bidder is not informed of a monetary value of a winning bid.

2. A method according to claim 1, wherein if the number of bidding suppliers is not between five and thirty, then also causing display in the graphica1 user interface of the suggestion for the rank-only visibility structure for the auction.

3. A method according to claim 2, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a price visibility in which dynamic price ranges are distributed to all bidders.

4. A method according to claim 3, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of another prompt for value-added pricing.

5. A method according to claim 4, when the user authorizes value-added pricing, then further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of suggested weighting factors that influence selection of a winning bidder.

6. A method according to claim 5 further comprising determining whether only a single item is being auctioned.

7. A method according to claim 6, wherein if multiple items are being auctioned, then further comprising causing display of a suggestion in the graphical user interface to combine different items if at least two suppliers are capable of bidding on all items.

8. A method according to claim 6, wherein if only the single item is being auctioned, then further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a volume discount option offered by the supplier.

9. A method according to claim 1, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion for a pricing decrement for the reverse Vickrey auction.

10. A method according to claim 1, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion of the reverse Vickrey auction for awarding a contract to maintain Digital Subscriber Line services.

11. A method according to claim 1, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion of the reverse Vickrey auction for awarding a contract to maintain a local loop in a telecommunications network.

12. A method according to claim 1, further comprising causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion of the reverse Vickrey auction for awarding a contract to maintain fiber optic cable in a telecommunications network.

13. A system, comprising:

a processor communicating with memory;

the processor causing display of an interactive graphical user interface having data fields for specifying the structure of the auction;

the processor prompting a user to input details of the auction into the data fields;

the processor presenting an annotation in the graphical user interface that a minimum number of bidding suppliers should be four or more;

the processor receiving, in the data fields, the input details describing an auction name, an auction date, a market price, a current price, and a number of bidding suppliers that will submit bids in the auction;

the processor causing display of annotations in the graphical user interface that educate the user of an impact of the input details on the auction;

if the number of bidding suppliers is less than three, then the processor presents a message in the graphical user interface advising that a reverse auction structure is not recommended;

if the number of bidding suppliers is three, then the processor presents a message in the graphical user interface advising that the bidding suppliers should be competitive and non-collusive;

if the number of bidding suppliers is four, then the processor presents another message in the graphical user interface that more bidding suppliers should be obtained;

if the number of bidding suppliers is greater than four but less than thirty, the processor causes display of a market price prompt within the graphical user interface, the market price prompt requesting whether the market price is increasing or decreasing from the current price;

the processor receiving a selection within the graphical user interface of whether the market price is stable, increasing or declining from the current price;

if the market price is stable or declining, then

the processor establishing a reserve price that is less than or equal to the contract price, and

the processor establishing a target price below the current contract price;

if, however, the market price is increasing, then

the processor setting the reserve price approximately equal to the contract price, and

when the market price is above the contract price, then the processor setting the target price equal to the current contract price;

if the number of bidding suppliers is between five and thirty, then the processor causing display in the graphical user interface of a recommendation for a reverse Vickrey auction structure for sourcing goods and services based on the input details, such that suppliers compete against each other to supply the goods and services to the user; and

if, however, the user declines the reverse Vickrey auction, then the processor causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion for a rank-only visibility structure for the auction, such that each bidder to the auction is only informed of a ranking of the bidder'"'"'s bid, and each bidder is not informed of a monetary value of a winning bid.

14. A computer program product comprising a computer readable medium storing processor-executable instructions for performing a method of recommending a structure for an auction, the method comprising:

causing display of an interactive graphical user interface having data fields for specifying the structure of the auction;

prompting a user to input details of the auction into the data fields;

presenting an annotation in the graphical user interface that a minimum number of bidding suppliers should be four or more;

receiving, in the data fields, the input details describing an auction name, an auction date, a market price, a current price, and a number of bidding suppliers that will submit bids in the auction;

causing display of annotations in the graphical user interface that educate the user of an impact of the input details on the auction;

if the number of bidding suppliers is less than three, then presenting a message in the graphical user interface advising that a reverse auction structure is not recommended;

if the number of bidding suppliers is three, then presenting a message in the graphical user interface advising that the bidding suppliers should be competitive and non-collusive;

if the number of bidding suppliers is four, then presenting another message in the graphical user interface that more bidding suppliers should be obtained;

if the number of bidding suppliers is greater than four but less than thirty, causing display of a market price prompt within the graphical user interface, the market price prompt requesting whether the market price is increasing or decreasing from the current price;

receiving a selection within the graphical user interface of whether the market price is stable, increasing or declining from the current price;

if the market price is stable or declining, then

establishing a target price below the current contract price; and

establishing a target price below the current contact price;

if, however, the market price is increasing, then

setting the reserve price approximately equal to the contract price, and

when the market price is above the contract price, then setting the target price equal to the current contract price;

if the number of bidding suppliers is between five and thirty, then causing display in the graphical user interface of a recommendation for a reverse Vickrey auction structure for sourcing goods and services based on the input details, such that suppliers compete against each other to supply the goods and services to the user; and

if, however, the user declines the reverse Vickrey auction, then causing display in the graphical user interface of a suggestion for a rank-only visibility structure for the auction, such that each bidder to the auction is only informed of a ranking of the bidder'"'"'s bid, and each bidder is not informed of a monetary value of a winning bid.