Method for programming on-chip non-volatile memory in a secure processor, and a device so programmed

• US 7,613,915 B2
• Filed: 11/16/2006
• Issued: 11/03/2009
• Est. Priority Date: 11/09/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
• Original Assignee: Broadon Communications Corp. (Acer, Inc.)
• Inventors: Srinivasan, Pramila, Princen, John
• Primary Examiner(s): Moazzami; Nasser G
• Assistant Examiner(s): POLTORAK, PIOTR
• Application Number:
  US11/601,323
• Publication Number:
  US 20080114984A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,083 Days
• Field of Search: 713/1, 713/173
• US Class Current: 713/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/33 using certificates
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/71 to assure secure computing or processing of information
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/73 by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3213 using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

An improved secure programming technique involves reducing the size of bits programmed in on-chip secret non-volatile memory, at the same time enabling the typical secure applications supported by secure devices. A technique for secure programming involves de-coupling chip manufacture from the later process of connecting to ticket servers to obtain tickets. A method according to the technique may involve sending a (manufacturing) server signed certificate from the device prior to any communication to receive tickets. A device according to the technique may include chip-internal non-volatile memory to store the certificate along with the private key, in the manufacturing process.

Claims

1. A device comprising:

on-chip non-volatile memory including;

a device ID;

a private key;

an issuer ID;

a first signature;

a certificate generating module coupled to the non-volatile memory configured to;

read the device ID, the private key, the issuer ID, and the first signature from the non-volatile memory;

compute a public key as a function of the private key;

construct a device certificate as a function of the device ID, the issuer ID, the public key, and the first signature;

an interface coupled to the certificate generating module, wherein, in operation, a request for the device certificate is received on the interface, the certificate generating module constructs the device certificate, and the device certificate is sent via the interface in response to the request;

wherein the device is further configured to;

create a temporary key pair having two keys, a temporary public key and a temporary private key, using a number generator;

create an application certificate by signing data including the temporary public key, using a stored private key;

using the temporary private key to compute a second signature as a function of a random number;

wherein the second signature and the random number are sent via the interface in response to the request, along with the device certificate.

2. The device of claim 1, wherein the certificate generating module is further configured to:

compute the public key as a function of the private key and common parameters;

construct the device certificate as a function of the device ID, the issuer ID, the public key, the first signature, and the common parameters.

3. The device of claim 1, wherein, the device is further configured to compute the second signature as a function of a random number and the private key, wherein the interface receives the random number, and the second signature and the random number are sent via the interface in response to the request, along with the device certificate.

4. The device of claim 1, wherein the application certificate is sent to a server, along with the second signature, the random number, and the device certificate.

5. The device of claim 1, wherein, the device is further configured to create temporary key pairs for applications.

6. The device of claim 1, wherein the on-chip non-volatile memory is read-only memory (ROM) and includes a secret seed random number.

7. The device of claim 1, wherein the certificate generating module is further configured to compute the public key as a function of the private key using an elliptic curve based algorithm.

8. A device, comprising:

a means for computing a public key as a function of a private key;

a means for constructing a device certificate as a function of a device ID, an issuer ID, the public key, and a first signature;

a means for receiving a request for the device certificate;

a means for creating a temporary key pair having two keys, a temporary public key and a temporary private key, using a number generator;

a means for creating an application certificate by signing data including the temporary public key, using a stored private key;

a means for using the temporary private key to compute a second signature as a function of a pseudo-random number;

a means for sending the second signature and the pseudo-random number in response to a request, along with the device certificate.

9. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for computing the public key as a function of the private key and common parameters.

10. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for constructing the device certificate as a function of the device ID, the issuer ID, the public key, the first signature, and common parameters.

11. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for computing a second signature as a function of the pseudo-random number and the private key.

12. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for receiving the pseudo-random number.

13. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for sending the second signature and the pseudo-random number in response to the request, along with the device certificate.

14. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for sending the application certificate to a server, along with the second signature, the pseudo-random number, and the device certificate.

15. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for creating temporary key pairs for applications.

16. The device of claim 8, further comprising a means for computing the public key as a function of the private key using an elliptic curve based algorithm.

17. A method, comprising:

using a computer processor;

computing a public key as a function of a private key;

constructing a device certificate as a function of a device ID, an issuer ID, the public key, and a first signature;

receiving a request for the device certificate;

creating a temporary key pair having two keys, a temporary public key and a temporary private key, using a number generator;

creating an application certificate by signing data including the temporary public key, using a stored private key;

using the temporary private key to compute a second signature as a function of a pseudo-random number;

sending the second signature and the pseudo-random number in response to a request, along with the device certificate.

18. The method of claim 17, further comprising computing the public key as a function of the private key and common parameters.

19. The method of claim 17, further comprising constructing the device certificate as a function of the device ID, the issuer ID, the public key, the first signature, and common parameters.

20. The method of claim 17, further comprising computing a second signature as a function of the pseudo-random number and the private key.

21. The method of claim 17, further comprising sending the second signature and the pseudo-random number in response to the request, along with the device certificate.

22. The method of claim 17, further comprising sending the application certificate to a server, along with the second signature, the pseudo-random number, and the device certificate.

23. The method of claim 17, further comprising creating temporary key pairs for applications.

24. The method of claim 17, further comprising computing the public key as a function of the private key using an elliptic curve based algorithm.