Method of validating consumable authentication chip

• US 7,757,084 B2
• Filed: 02/15/2007
• Issued: 07/13/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 02/15/2000
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Memjet Technology Ltd. (Memjet Limited)
• Original Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Limited
• Inventors: Silverbrook, Kia, Walmsley, Simon Robert
• Primary Examiner(s): Lanier; Benjamin E
• Application Number:
  US11/706,329
• Publication Number:
  US 20070143623A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,244 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/043 of tables, e.g. lookup, substitution or mapping
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/26 Testing cryptographic entity, e.g. testing integrity of encryption key or encryption algorithm
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

A method of validating a consumable authentication chip is provided having the steps of: numerously calling a trusted chip'"'"'s test function with an incorrect value to generate an invalid response or not generate the response thereby invalidating the consumable chip; if generated, in the trusted chip, generating a secret random number, calculating its signature and symmetrically encrypting the number/signature using a first secret key; calling the consumable chip'"'"'s read function with the encrypted number/signature to symmetrically decrypt the encrypted number/signature using the first key, calculate the decrypted number'"'"'s signature, compare the signatures, and if they match, symmetrically encrypt the decrypted random number and a data message using a second secret key; calling the trusted chip'"'"'s test function with the message and the encrypted number/message to symmetrically encrypt the number and message using the second key, compare the encrypted numbers/messages, validate the consumable chip if they match, and invalidate otherwise.

Claims

1. A method of validating a consumable authentication integrated circuit, the method comprising the steps of:

calling, in a trusted authentication integrated circuit, a test function multiple times with a known incorrect value, the test function either generating an expected invalid response or not generating an expected invalid response and invalidating the consumable integrated circuit;

if the invalid response is generated, in the trusted integrated circuit, generating a secret random number and calculating its signature using a signature function;

encrypting, in the trusted integrated circuit, the random number and its signature using a symmetric encryption function with a first secret key;

calling, in the consumable integrated circuit, a read function with the encrypted random number and signature from the trusted integrated circuit, the read function;

decrypting the encrypted random number and signature using a symmetric decryption function with the first secret key;

calculating a signature for the decrypted random number using the signature function;

comparing the calculated and decrypted signatures; and

if the signatures match, encrypting the decrypted random number and a data message read from the consumable integrated circuit using the symmetric encryption function with a second secret key;

calling, in the trusted integrated circuit, the test function with the data message and the encrypted random number and data message from the consumable integrated circuit, the test function;

encrypting the random number and the data message using the symmetric encryption function with the second secret key;

comparing the encrypted random numbers and data messages;

if they match, validating the consumable integrated circuit; and

if they do not match, invalidating the consumable integrated circuit.

2. A method according to claim 1, where the two secret keys are held in both the trusted and consumable integrated circuits and are kept secret.

3. A method according to claim 1, where the random number is generated from an initial seed value only in the trusted integrated circuit, and the seed value is changed for generating a new random number only after each successful validation.

4. A method according to claim 1, where the data message is a memory vector of the consumable integrated circuit.

5. A method according to claim 4, where part of the vector space is different for each, consumable integrated circuit of it is constant read only for each consumable, and part of it is decrement only.

6. A method according to claim 1, where the encryption function is held in both the trusted and consumable integrated circuits.

7. A method according to claim 1, where the decryption function is held only in the consumable integrated circuit.

8. A method according to claim 1, where the signature function is held in both the trusted and consumable integrated circuits to generate the digital signatures.

9. A method according to claim 8, where the digital signatures are between 128 bits and 160 bits long, inclusive.

10. A method according to claim 1, where a test function is held only in the trusted integrated circuit to return an indication that the consumable integrated circuit is valid and advance the random number, if the consumable integrated circuit is valid;

otherwise it returns an indication that the consumable integrated circuit is invalid.

11. A method according to claim 10, where the time taken to return an indication that the consumable integrated circuit is invalid is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to return an indication that the consumable integrated circuit is valid is identical for all good inputs.

12. A method according to claim 1, where a read function in the consumable integrated circuit decrypts the random number and signature, calculates its own signature for the decrypted random number and compares the two signatures, then it returns the data message and a re-encrypted random number in combination with the data message if the locally generated signature is the same as the decrypted signature;

otherwise it returns an indication that the consumable integrated circuit is invalid.

13. A method according to claim 12, where the time taken to return the invalid indication is identical for all bad inputs, and the time taken to make a return for a good input is the same for all good inputs.