Method for improved key management for ATMs and other remote devices

• US 7,908,474 B2
• Filed: 09/22/2006
• Issued: 03/15/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 09/22/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Wiese, Jesper, Frehr, Carsten D., Jacobsen, Kurt S., Kelly, Michael J., Marik, Mark D., Dames, Elizabeth A., Arnold, Todd W.
• Primary Examiner(s): Zand; Kambiz
• Assistant Examiner(s): Wyszynski; Aubrey H
• Application Number:
  US11/534,232
• Publication Number:
  US 20100031021A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,635 Days
• Field of Search: 713/169, 713/155, 713/190
• US Class Current: 713/155
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0637 Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures

Abstract

A method, article, and system for providing an effective implementation of a data structure comprising instructions that are cryptographically protected against alteration or misuse, wherein the instructions further comprise a trusted block that defines specific key management policies that are permitted when an application program employs the trusted block in application programming interface (API) functions to generate or export symmetric cryptographic keys. The trusted block has a number of fields containing rules that provide an ability to limit how the trusted block is used, thereby reducing the risk of the trusted block being employed in unintended ways or with unintended keys.

Claims

1. A computer implemented method for securely transferring symmetric cryptographic keys to other devices, wherein said method utilizes a data structure comprising instructions that are cryptographically protected against alteration or misuse, wherein said instructions further comprise a trusted block that defines specific key management policies that are permitted when applications employ said trusted block to generate or export said symmetric cryptographic keys, and wherein said applications comprise:

application programming interfaces (API);

embedded firmware;

operating system code;

and hardware configured operations; and

wherein said applications further comprise;

a Trusted_Block_Create (TBC) function;

a Remote_Key_Export (RKX) function;

wherein said TBC function creates said trusted block; and

wherein said RKX function uses said Trusted Block to generate or export symmetric keys according to a set of parameters in said Trusted Block; and

wherein said trusted block has a number of fields containing rules that provide an ability to limit how said trusted block is used, thereby reducing the risk of said trusted block being employed in unintended ways or with unintended keys; and

wherein said method comprises;

receiving instructions from at least two separate individuals in order to create said trusted block.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said trusted block has a data structure comprising:

zero or one trusted public key section, zero or more rule sections, zero or one trusted block label section, one trusted block information section, and zero or one application defined data section.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein said trusted block is protected by a MAC that is computed over the contents of said data structure;

and

wherein said trusted block contains a public key and optional rules to control export of other keys associated with said other device(s) that use that public key; and

wherein for remote key distribution, said public key will be the root certification key for the other device, and said public key will be used to verify the signature on public key certificates for individual devices; and

wherein it is also possible for the Trusted Block to be used simply as a trusted public key container, in which case said public key in said trusted block will be used in functions such as Digital Signature Verify.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein said rules in said trusted block further comprise a function to generate or export said symmetric cryptographic keys;

and

wherein said function to generate or export said symmetric cryptographic keys is said RKX function; and

wherein said RKX function creates a RKX token; and

wherein said RKX token holds said symmetric cryptographic keys so as to bind them to said trusted block, and allows sequences of RKX calls to be bound together as if they are an atomic operation.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein said RKX function provides for secure transport of said symmetric keys from a security module to another device.