Method of testing validity of authentication IC

• US 7,941,661 B2
• Filed: 07/08/2010
• Issued: 05/10/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 02/15/2000
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Memjet Technology Ltd. (Memjet Limited)
• Original Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Limited
• Inventors: Silverbrook, Kia, Walmsley, Simon Robert
• Primary Examiner(s): Lanier; Benjamin E
• Application Number:
  US12/832,950
• Publication Number:
  US 20100275063A1
• Time in Patent Office: 306 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/166
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/043 of tables, e.g. lookup, substitution or mapping
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/26 Testing cryptographic entity, e.g. testing integrity of encryption key or encryption algorithm
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

A method in which a test function is called in a system'"'"'s internal authentication IC multiple times with a known incorrect value such that, if the internal IC is invalid, an expected invalid response is not generated and, otherwise, the internal IC generates a secret random number and its signature and encrypts these using a first secret key, an external authentication IC connected to the system calls a read function which decrypts the encrypted random number and signature using the first key, calculates the decrypted random number'"'"'s signature, compares the signatures and upon a match encrypts the decrypted random number and a message of the external IC using a second secret key, the internal IC calls the test function which encrypts the random number and message using the second key, compares the encrypted random numbers and messages, validates the external IC if they match and invalidates the external IC otherwise.

Claims

1. A method of testing validity of an external authentication integrated circuit connected to a system having an internal authentication integrated circuit, the method comprising:

calling, in the internal integrated circuit, a test function multiple times with a known incorrect value so that, if the internal authentication integrated circuit is invalid, the test function does not generate an expected invalid response and, otherwise, the test function does generate the expected invalid response;

if the expected invalid response is generated, in the internal integrated circuit, generating a secret random number and its signature using a signature function;

encrypting, in the internal integrated circuit, the random number and its signature using a first secret key;

calling, in the external integrated circuit, a read function which decrypts the encrypted random number and signature using the first secret key, calculates a signature of the decrypted random number using the signature function, compares the calculated and decrypted signatures and, if the signatures match, encrypts the decrypted random number and a data message of the external integrated circuit using a second secret key;

calling, in the internal integrated circuit, the test function which encrypts the generated random number and the data message using the second secret key, compares the encrypted random numbers and data messages, if they match, validates the external integrated circuit, and, if they do not match, invalidates the external integrated circuit.

2. A method according to claim 1, where the two secret keys are held in both integrated circuits and are kept secret.

3. A method according to claim 1, where the random number is generated from an initial seed value only in the internal integrated circuit, and the seed value is changed for generating a new random number only after each successful validation.

4. A method according to claim 1, where the data message is a memory vector of the external integrated circuit.

5. A method according to claim 1, where the signature function is held in both integrated circuits.

6. A method according to claim 1, where the signatures are between 128 bits and 160 bits long, inclusive.