System, method, and service for tracing traitors from content protection circumvention devices

• US 7,986,787 B2
• Filed: 12/08/2006
• Issued: 07/26/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 12/08/2006
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: GlobalFoundries, Inc.
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Zigoris, Philip Anastasios, Jin, Hongxia, Lotspiech, Jeffrey Bruce
• Primary Examiner(s): Arani; Taghi T
• Assistant Examiner(s): LEE, JASON T
• Application Number:
  US11/608,268
• Publication Number:
  US 20080137864A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,691 Days
• Field of Search: 726/26, 703/13, 380/277, 380/200
• US Class Current: 380/277
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 5/00 Ciphering apparatus or methods not provided for in the preceding groups, e.g. involving the concealment or deformation of graphic data such as designs, written or printed messages
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/606 Traitor tracing
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Abstract

A traitor tracing system generates a hypothesized model of the circumvention device that models a hypothesized set of device keys compromised by the circumvention device. The system iteratively invokes a subset tracing system to identify a compromised device key until substantially all the compromised device keys in the set of compromised device keys are identified so as to disable the circumvention device. A subset tracing system generates a circumvention device model that models behavior of a circumvention device using prior knowledge and The system iteratively selects and applies to the circumvention device a test based on the hypothesized model and the circumvention device model and receives a response from the circumvention device indicating a success of the test in playing protected content on the circumvention device. The system updates the hypothesized model using the received response, the selected test, a current version of the hypothesized model, and a current version of the circumvention device model to focus the test selecting process in determining the device keys obtained from the traitor.

Claims

1. A processor-implemented method of tracing a traitor from a circumvention device, the circumvention device comprising a set of compromised device keys obtained from the traitor, the method comprising:

generating a hypothesized model using a computer processor on a hypothesized set of device keys that models a hypothesis that the circumvention device comprises the hypothesized set of device keys, wherein the hypothesized model is represented by any of a tabular form, a function, a graphical model, and a Bayesian network;

passing the hypothesized model to a subset tracing method to identify a first compromised device key, the subset tracing method comprising;

generating a circumvention device model that models a behavior of the circumvention device, wherein

the circumvention device model comprises a set of tests from which tests are selected, a set of key sets comprising one key set for each of the set of tests, and a probability for each of the key sets indicating a probability that the circumvention device will play the one of the set of tests associated with the key set, with the probability based on a history of iterative tests; and

the circumvention device model is represented by any of a tabular form, a function, a graphical model, and a Bayesian network;

selecting a test, utilizing gained informativeness information and based on the hypothesized model and the circumvention device model, to apply to the circumvention device, wherein the selected test comprises a forensic media key block that obtains informative data about the first compromised device key by observing the response;

encrypting the test;

storing the history of the iterative tests;

receiving a response from the circumvention device, the response indicating a success of the selected test in playing a protected content on the circumvention device;

updating the hypothesized model using the received response, incorporating the response into the hypothesized model using any of a graphic model or a Bayesian network, and using the selected test, a current version of the hypothesized model, and a current version of the circumvention device model for selecting at least one test that identifies the compromised device keys obtained from the traitor and incorporating predetermined hypotheses regarding hypothesized compromised keys; and

testing the hypothesized model to determine the strength of the belief that the first compromised device key is contained in the circumvention device;

removing the first compromised device key, adding new keys to the hypothesized set of keys and updating the hypothesized model, wherein updating the hypothesized model comprises;

generating the probabilities of the newly added keys being in the circumvention device; and

applying an inference logic using any of a variable elimination, a belief propagation, and a junction tree, wherein the inference logic utilizes an approximation algorithm comprising any of a sample based approximation, a partition-based approximation, and a loopy belief propagation;

iteratively detecting additional compromised device keys from the set of compromised device keys, until substantially all the compromised device keys in the set of compromised device keys are identified so as to disable the circumvention device; and

creating a media key block (MKB) on the hypothesized set of device keys that disables the circumvention device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method determines a probability regarding whether the circumvention device is capable of playing the media key block often enough to pose a threat.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method identifies one of the set of compromised device keys in the media key block and removes the identified one of the set of compromised device keys from the media key block.