Method of and apparatus for reproducing information, and security module

• US 8,055,909 B2
• Filed: 07/30/2003
• Issued: 11/08/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 07/30/2002
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Fujitsu Limited
• Original Assignee: Fujitsu Limited
• Inventors: Morioka, Kiyonori, Yoshitake, Toshiyuki, Kohiyama, Kiyoshi, Watanabe, Yasuhiro
• Primary Examiner(s): Barron, Jr.; Gilberto
• Assistant Examiner(s): PERUNGAVOOR, VENKATANARAY
• Application Number:
  US10/629,853
• Publication Number:
  US 20040059934A1
• Time in Patent Office: 3,023 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/191
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/1064 Restricting content processing at operating system level
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/1077 Recurrent authorisation
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/109 by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/52 during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6281 at program execution time, where the protection is within the operating system
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/64 Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/87 by means of encapsulation, e.g. for integrated circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00086 Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy indicating unauthorised use of record carriers in general G11B23/28; scrambling for television signal recording H04N5/913; network architectures or network protocols for network security H04L63/00; cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/0021 involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00253 wherein the key is stored on the record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 2005/91364 the video signal being scrambled
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/4143 embedded in a Personal Computer [PC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/4181 for conditional access
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/4325 by playing back content from the storage medium reproduction of recorded television signals H04N5/76; reproduction of recorded television signals H04N9/79
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/4405 involving video stream decryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 5/913 for scrambling ; for copy protection
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 7/163 by receiver means only

Abstract

An information reproducing apparatus of the present invention includes a secure module and a main memory. The information in the secure module can not be accessed from outside. The secure module reads, using a direct access method, information relating to software stored in the main memory. The secure module checks a falsification of the software by comparing the information read with the information stored in advance in the secure module.

Claims

1. An information reproducing apparatus using an operating system, comprising:

a hardware secure module having a tamper resistant module structure inaccessible from outside that stores information related to secure software;

a memory that stores the secure software;

a storage controller that is loaded on the hardware secure module and stores an updated secure software in an unswappable area of the memory using a direct access method;

a falsification checking unit that is loaded on the hardware secure module, wherein the falsification checking unit reads the secure software from the memory by direct access without using the operating system, compares the read secure software with the information related to the secure software stored in the hardware secure module, and checks whether the secure software is falsified based on a result of the comparison; and

a processor that executes the secure software when a result of the check by the falsification checking unit is that the secure software is not falsified, and

wherein the storage controller instructs the processor to change over from the secure software executed to the updated secure software stored in the unswappable area of the memory and to execute the updated secure software.

2. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the falsification checking unit reads all of the secure software.

3. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the falsification checking unit reads a part of the secure software.

4. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the falsification checking unit performs the comparison of the information and the secure software using a checksum method.

5. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the falsification checking unit reads the secure software from the memory on an irregular basis.

6. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein:

the storage controller that is loaded on the hardware secure module and that updates the secure software in the memory using the direct access method.

7. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein the storage controller updates the secure software on an irregular basis.

8. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein the storage controller updates a part of the secure software.

9. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein the falsification checking unit reads the secure software updated by the storage controller.

10. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein when the secure software is updated, the storage controller changes over the secure software which has been updated.

11. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein the storage controller stores encrypted data in the memory after encryption using a key that exists in the hardware secure module.

12. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising:

a key managing unit that is loaded in the hardware secure module, wherein the key managing unit holds a key used to encrypt or decode data stored in the memory, and the key managing unit outputs the key, if the falsification checking unit does not detect a falsification.

13. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 12, wherein the key supplied by the key managing unit is valid only for a predefined period of time.

14. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 12, wherein the key managing unit changes the key each time the key managing unit outputs the key.

15. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 12, wherein when the falsification checking unit detects a falsification, the key managing unit does not output the key.

16. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising:

a writing unit that is loaded in the hardware secure module, wherein the writing unit writes a secret information within the hardware secure module into the memory using the direct access method, wherein

the falsification checking unit checks falsification of the secure software based on response information corresponding to the secret information.

17. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 16, wherein the secret information is stored in a controlled memory space, wherein

the controlled memory space is such that a correct information is read out from the memory space at a first time and an incorrect information is read out at a second time.

18. The information reproducing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the secure software has a function of decoding encrypted MPEG data.

19. An information reproducing method using an operating system, comprising:

reading a secure software stored in a memory using direct access method without using the operating system, by a hardware secure module having a tamper resistant module structure inaccessible from outside which stores information related to the secure software;

storing an updated secure software in an unswappable area of the memory using a direct access method;

checking falsification by a falsification checking unit that is loaded on the hardware secure module, by comparing the secure software read at the reading with the information related to the secure software stored in the hardware module;

determining whether the secure software is falsified based on a result of the comparison; and

executing the secure software by a processor when a result of determining is that the secure software is not falsified, and

wherein the storing includes instructing the processor to change over from the secure software executed to the undated secure software stored in the unswappable area of the memory and to execute the updated secure software.

20. A hardware secure module mounted to an information reproducing apparatus, comprising:

a reading unit that reads a secure software from a memory mounted to the information reproducing apparatus by direct access without using an operating system; and

a storage controller that stores an updated secure software in an unswappable area of the memory using a direct access method;

a falsification checking unit that compares the secure software read at the reading with information related to the secure software stored in the hardware secure module, and checks a falsification of the secure software based on a result of the comparison, and

wherein the hardware secure module has a tamper resistant module structure inaccessible from outside and when the result of the comparison shows that the secure software is not falsified, the secure software is executed by the information reproducing apparatus, and

wherein the storage controller instructs the information reproducing apparatus to change over from the secure software executed to the updated secure software stored in the unswappable area of the memory and to execute the updated secure software.

21. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein the reading unit reads all of the secure software.

22. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein the reading unit reads a part of the secure software.

23. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein the falsification checking unit performs the comparison of the information and the secure software using a checksum method.

24. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein the reading unit reads the secure software from the memory on an irregular basis.

25. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein

a storage controller stores the secure software in the memory using the direct access method.

26. The hardware secure module according to claim 25, wherein the storage controller updates the secure software on an irregular basis.

27. The hardware secure module according to claim 25, wherein the storage controller updates a part of the secure software.

28. The hardware secure module according to claim 25, wherein the falsification checking unit reads the secure software updated by the storage controller.

29. The hardware secure module according to claim 25, wherein when the secure software is updated, the storage controller changes over the secure software which has been updated.

30. The hardware secure module according to claim 25, wherein the storage controller stores encrypted data in the memory after encryption using a key that exists in the secure module.

31. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, further comprising:

a key managing unit that holds a key used to encrypt or decode data stored in the memory, and the key managing unit outputs the key, if the falsification checking unit does not detect a falsification.

32. The hardware secure module according to claim 31, wherein the key supplied by the key managing unit is valid only for a predefined period of time.

33. The hardware secure module according to claim 31, wherein the key managing unit changes the key each time the key managing unit outputs the key.

34. The hardware secure module according to claim 31, wherein when the falsification checking unit detects a falsification, the key managing unit does not output the key.

35. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, further comprising:

a writing unit that writes a secret information within the secure module into the memory using the direct access method, wherein

the falsification checking unit determines falsification of the secure software based on response information corresponding to the secret information.

36. The hardware secure module according to claim 35, wherein the secret information is stored in a controlled memory space, wherein the controlled memory space is such that a correct information is read out from the memory space at a first time and an incorrect information is read out at a second time.

37. The hardware secure module according to claim 20, wherein the secure software has a function of decoding encrypted MPEG data.

38. A recording medium that records a program for causing a hardware secure module mounted to an information reproducing apparatus to execute a process, the process comprising:

reading secure software stored in a memory using a direct access method and without using an operating system, by the hardware secure module having a tamper resistant module structure inaccessible from outside that stores information related to the secure software;

storing an updated secure software in an unswappable area of the memory using a direct access method;

checking falsification by comparing the secure software read at the reading with the information related to the secure software stored in the hardware secure module, and determining a falsification of the secure software based on a result of the comparison; and

executing the secure software when the result of the comparison is that the secure software is not falsified, and

wherein the storing includes instructing the executing to change over from the secure software executed to the updated secure software stored in the unswappable area of the memory and to execute the updated secure software.

39. A method of a reproducing verified information, comprising:

executing a secure software stored in a memory accessible to an information reproducing apparatus using a direct access method, when comparison of the secure software read by direct access method with information related to the secure software stored in a hardware secure module having a tamper resistant module structure inaccessible from outside, indicates that the secure software is not falsified; and

storing an updated secure software in an unswappable area of the memory using a direct access method; and

wherein the storing includes instructing the executing to change over from the secure software executed to the updated secure software stored in the unswappable area of the memory and to execute the updated secure software.