Detecting counterfeit electronic components using EMI telemetric fingerprints

• US 8,069,490 B2
• Filed: 10/16/2007
• Issued: 11/29/2011
• Est. Priority Date: 10/16/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Oracle America, Inc. (Oracle Corporation)
• Inventors: Gross, Kenny C., Dhanekula, Ramakrishna C., Lewis, Andrew J.
• Primary Examiner(s): Lanier; Benjamin
• Assistant Examiner(s): ALMEIDA, DEVIN E
• Application Number:
  US11/974,788
• Publication Number:
  US 20090099830A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,505 Days
• Field of Search: 726/34
• US Class Current: 726/34
• CPC Class Codes: G01R 31/2813 Checking the presence, location, orientation or value, e.g. resistance, of components or conductors orientation of the DUT with respect to the test fixture G01R1/06705, G01R31/281
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 18/24133 Distances to prototypes

Abstract

One embodiment of the present invention provides a system that non-intrusively detects counterfeit components in a target computer system. During operation, the system collects target electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals generated by the target computer system using one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the target computer system. The system then generates a target EMI fingerprint for the target computer system from the target EMI signals. Next, the system compares the target EMI fingerprint against a reference EMI fingerprint to determine whether the target computer system contains a counterfeit component.

Claims

1. A method for non-intrusively detecting counterfeit components in a target computer system, comprising:

collecting reference electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals generated by a reference computer system using one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the reference computer system, wherein the reference EMI signals are generated by the reference computer system while a load script is executed by the reference computer system;

generating a reference EMI fingerprint for the reference computer system from the reference EMI signals;

collecting target EMI signals generated by the target computer system using one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the target computer system, wherein the target EMI signals are generated by the target computer system while the load script is executed by the target computer system;

generating a target EMI fingerprint for the target computer system from the target EMI signals; and

comparing the target EMI fingerprint to the reference EMI fingerprint to determine whether the target computer system contains a counterfeit component.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein generating the reference EMI fingerprint involves:

transforming the reference EMI signals from a time-domain representation to a frequency-domain representation, which is comprised of a plurality of discrete frequencies;

for each of the plurality of discrete frequencies, constructing an amplitude-time series based on the reference EMI signals collected over a predetermined time period;

selecting a subset of frequencies from the plurality of discrete frequencies based on the associated amplitude-time series; and

generating the reference EMI fingerprint using the amplitude-time series associated with the selected frequencies.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein selecting the subset of frequencies involves:

computing cross-correlations between pairs of amplitude-time series associated with pairs of the plurality of frequencies;

computing an average correlation coefficient for each of the plurality of frequencies; and

selecting the subset of frequencies that are associated with the highest average correlation coefficients.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein generating the target EMI fingerprint involves:

transforming the target EMI signals from a time-domain representation to a frequency-domain representation; and

for each of the selected frequencies in the reference EMI fingerprint, generating an amplitude-time series based on the frequency-domain representation of the target EMI signals collected over time.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the method further comprises training a non-linear, non-parametric regression model using the reference EMI fingerprint for the reference computer system.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein comparing the target EMI fingerprint against the reference EMI fingerprint involves:

for each of the selected frequencies,

producing an estimated amplitude-time series signal using the regression model; and

comparing a corresponding amplitude-time series signal in the target EMI fingerprint with the estimated amplitude-time series signal produced by the regression model; and

determining from the comparison whether the target EMI fingerprint matches the estimated signals produced by the regression model.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein determining whether the target EMI fingerprint matches the estimated signals involves:

computing a residual signal between a corresponding pair of amplitude-time series; and

detecting anomalies in the residual signal by using sequential detection techniques.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned outside of the chassis of the target computer system.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned at a predetermined distance from and orientation to the chassis of the target computer system.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned in the vicinity of a target component with the target computer system.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein multiple antennas are positioned in the vicinity of multiple target components within the target computer system.

13. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more antennas used to collect the reference EMI signals are placed in substantially the same manner with respect to the reference computer system as the one or more antennas used to collect the reference EMI signals are placed with respect to the target computer system.

14. The method of claim 1, wherein each antenna can be a wire.

15. The method of claim 13, wherein the wire is a striped wire.

10. The method of clam 1, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned inside the chassis of the target computer system.

16. An apparatus that non-intrusively detects counterfeit components in a target computer system, comprising:

one or more antennas;

a collecting mechanism coupled to the one or more antennas, wherein the collecting mechanism is configured to collect reference electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals generated by a reference computer system using the one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the reference computer system, wherein the reference EMI signals are generated by the reference computer system while a load script is executed by the reference computer system;

a generating mechanism configured to generate a reference EMI fingerprint for the reference computer system from the reference EMI signals;

wherein the collecting mechanism is further configured to collect target EMI signals generated by the target computer system using the one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the target computer system, wherein the target EMI signals are generated by the target computer system while the load script is executed by the target computer system;

wherein the generating mechanism is further configured to generate a target EMI fingerprint for the target computer system from the target EMI signals; and

a comparison mechanism configured to compare the target EMI fingerprint to the reference EMI fingerprint to determine whether the target computer system contains a counterfeit component.

17. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned outside of the chassis of the target computer system.

18. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned inside the chassis of the target computer system.

19. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the one or more antennas are positioned in the vicinity of a target component within the target computer system.

20. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein each antenna can be a wire.

21. A method for non-intrusively detecting counterfeit components in a target computer system, comprising:

collecting reference electromagnetic interference (EMI) signals generated by a target component within a reference computer system using one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the target component, wherein the reference EMI signals are generated by the component while a load script is executed by the reference computer system;

generating a reference EMI fingerprint for the target component from the reference EMI signals;

collecting target EMI signals generated by the target component within the target computer system using one or more antennas positioned in close proximity to the target component, wherein the target EMI signals are generated by the target component while the load script is executed by the target computer system;

generating a target EMI fingerprint for the target component from the target EMI signals;

comparing the target EMI fingerprint to the reference EMI fingerprint; and

determining whether the target component within the target computer system is a counterfeit component based on the comparison result.