Method and apparatus to provide public key authentication with low complexity devices
First Claim
1. An apparatus to authenticate limited processing-power systems (LPPS) using elliptic cryptography within a well known elliptic curve E, over a well known finite field F(E(F)), the apparatus comprising:
- a random number generator to choose a random value b, of a similar order of magnitude to the order of E(F);
a challenge calculator to calculate a value C=bP, a challenge, and send the challenge to a limited power processing system (LPPS), where P is a point on the elliptic curve E(F) which was used as a basis for generating a private key, a, for the LPPS;
an RFID reader to receive a challenge response, R=aC=abP from the LPPS;
a crypto calculator to calculate bQ, based on a public key, Q=aP, of the LPPS; and
a comparison logic to;
determine that aC=abP=baP=bQ; and
authenticate the LPPS based on the determination.
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Abstract
A method and apparatus to authenticate limited processing-power systems (LPPS) using elliptic cryptography within a well known elliptic curve E, over a well known finite field F((E(F)). The apparatus comprises a random number generator to choose a random value b, of a similar order of magnitude to the order of E(F). The apparatus further comprises a challenge calculator to calculate a value C=bP and send the challenge to the LPPS, where P is a point on the elliptic curve E(F) which was used as a basis for generating a private key, a, for the LPPS. The apparatus further comprising an RFID reader to receive a challenge response, R=aC=abP from the LPPS, and a crypto calculator to calculate bQ, based on a public key, Q, of the LPPS. The apparatus further comprising a comparison logic to authenticate the LPPS if bQ=aC=abP.
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Citations
23 Claims
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1. An apparatus to authenticate limited processing-power systems (LPPS) using elliptic cryptography within a well known elliptic curve E, over a well known finite field F(E(F)), the apparatus comprising:
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a random number generator to choose a random value b, of a similar order of magnitude to the order of E(F); a challenge calculator to calculate a value C=bP, a challenge, and send the challenge to a limited power processing system (LPPS), where P is a point on the elliptic curve E(F) which was used as a basis for generating a private key, a, for the LPPS; an RFID reader to receive a challenge response, R=aC=abP from the LPPS; a crypto calculator to calculate bQ, based on a public key, Q=aP, of the LPPS; and a comparison logic to; determine that aC=abP=baP=bQ; and authenticate the LPPS based on the determination. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)
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12. An RFID system for enabling cryptographic verification of an identity of an RFID tag, the RFID system comprising:
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a challenge calculator to calculate a challenge, C=bP, where b is a random number, and P is a point on an elliptic curve E(F) which was used as a basis for generating a private key, a, for a limited processing-power system (LPPS); an RFID reader to receive a challenge response, R, and a tag identifier from the RFID tag; a look-up logic to look up a public key, Q, associated with the tag identifier; a crypto calculator to calculate a value of bQ on an elliptic curve over a finite field; and a comparison logic to; compare the bQ to the challenge response, R=aC=abP, received from the RFID tag to determine if bQ=R=aC=abP, and authenticate the RFID tag if it is determined that bQ=R=aC=abP. - View Dependent Claims (13, 14, 15, 16, 17)
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18. A method of using public key cryptography for authentication of a limited processing-power system (LPPS) using elliptic cryptography within a well known elliptic curve E, over a well known finite field F (E(F)), the method comprising:
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generating a private key, a, for the LPPS; requesting the LPPS to generate a public key, Q, by multiplying an originating point P with the LPPS'"'"'s private key, a; requesting a digital certificate for the public key; generating a random number, b, and requesting the LPPS to calculate abP, in response to challenge bP; calculating a value of bQ; comparing abP to bQ, to determine whether bQ=abP; and authenticating the LPPS if it is determined that bQ=abP. - View Dependent Claims (19, 20, 21, 22, 23)
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Specification