Verification of integrated circuits against malicious circuit insertions and modifications using non-destructive X-ray microscopy

• US 8,139,846 B2
• Filed: 11/05/2008
• Issued: 03/20/2012
• Est. Priority Date: 11/05/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Carl Zeiss X-ray Microscopy, Inc. (Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung), University of Southern California
• Original Assignee: University of Southern California, Xradia
• Inventors: Bajura, Michael A., Damoulakis, John N., Boulghassoul, Younes, Tkachuk, Andrei V., Feser, Michael P. K.
• Primary Examiner(s): Nguyen, Sang
• Application Number:
  US12/265,562
• Publication Number:
  US 20110002528A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,231 Days
• Field of Search: 382/145, 382/100, 382/131, 382/141, 382/255, 716/1, 716/5, 716/11, 716/119, 702/65, 702/155, 250/492.2, 250/458.1, 378/43, 378/84
• US Class Current: 382/145
• CPC Class Codes: G01N 2223/611 patterned objects; electronic devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 2207/10056 Microscopic image
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 2207/10116 X-ray image
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 2207/30148 Semiconductor; IC; Wafer
• CPC Class Codes: G06T 7/001 using an image reference approach

Abstract

A method and system for verifying the integrity of integrated circuits (ICs) by detecting the presence of unauthorized circuit insertions or modifications using non-destructive x-ray microscopy is disclosed. A reference image based on a trusted IC or a trusted design file may be generated. An un-trusted IC may be received from an un-trusted foundry, which IC is manufactured in response to the trusted design file provided to the foundry. An x-ray microscope may record a plurality of sets of base images of the un-trusted IC, each set corresponding to a different viewing angle. One or more un-trusted images may be produced from the base images. The reference images may be compared with the un-trusted images to illuminate any additions or modifications in circuit elements or other parameters.

Claims

1. A system for verifying the integrity of integrated circuits (ICs) procured from an un-trusted source, comprising:

an x-ray imaging device; and

a processing system configured to;

cause said x-ray imaging device to generate one or more base images of an un-trusted IC;

produce at least one un-trusted image using said one or more base images, said at least one un-trusted image comprising a plurality of connected components from said un-trusted IC;

compare said at least one un-trusted image with at least one reference image comprising a plurality of connected elements from a trusted source; and

identify one or more differences in said connected elements

between said un-trusted image and said reference image.

2. The system of claim 1 wherein said un-trusted IC is fabricated from an un-trusted foundry pursuant to a design file provided to said foundry, and wherein said at least one reference image is generated based on said design file.

3. The system of claim 1 wherein said at least one reference image is generated based on one or more images of a trusted IC.

4. The system of claim 1 wherein said one or more base images comprise a plurality of sets of two-dimensional (2D) base images, wherein each said set of 2D base images is generated using a different viewing angle of said x-ray imaging device, and wherein said generating at least one un-trusted image further comprises:

assembling, for each set of 2D base images, a composite 2D image by combining the 2D images in the set;

producing said at least one un-trusted image as a three dimensional (3D) image based on said plurality of assembled composite 2D images.

5. The system of claim 1 wherein said producing at least one un-trusted image using said one or more base images comprises formatting said one or more base images to obtain said at least one un-trusted image.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein said x-ray imaging device comprises an x-ray microscope.

7. The system of claim 6 wherein an x-ray source of said x-ray microscope comprises a synchrotron.

8. The system of claim 1 wherein said un-trusted IC is annealed following exposure to said x-ray imaging device to reduce an effect of radiation damage.

9. The system of claim 1 wherein said design file comprises one of a GDSII design file and an OASIS design file.

10. The system of claim 1, wherein said producing said at least one un-trusted image comprises using 3D tomography.

11. A method for verifying the integrity of integrated circuits (ICs) procured from an un-trusted source by detecting unauthorized circuit insertions or modifications, comprising:

generating, from an x-ray microscope, one or more base images of an un-trusted IC;

producing at least one un-trusted image using said one or more base images, said at least one un-trusted image comprising a plurality of connected elements from said un-trusted IC;

comparing said at least one un-trusted image with at least one reference image comprising a plurality of connected elements from a trusted source; and

identifying one or more differences in said connected elements between said un-trusted image and said reference image using a processing system.

12. The method of claim 11 wherein said un-trusted IC is fabricated from an un-trusted foundry pursuant to a design file provided to said foundry, and wherein said at least one reference image is generated based on said design file.

13. The method of claim 11 wherein said at least one reference image is generated based on one or more images of a trusted IC.

14. The method of claim 11 wherein said one or more base images comprise a plurality of sets of two-dimensional (2D) base images, wherein each said set of 2D base images is generated using a different viewing angle of said x-ray imaging device, and wherein said generating at least one un-trusted image further comprises:

assembling, for each set of 2D base images, a composite 2D image by combining the 2D images in the set;

producing said at least one un-trusted image as a three dimensional (3D) image based on said plurality of assembled composite 2D images.

15. The method of claim 11 wherein said producing at least one un-trusted image using said one or more base images comprises formatting said one or more base images to obtain said at least one un-trusted image.

16. The method of claim 11 wherein an x-ray source of said x-ray microscope comprises a synchrotron.

17. The method of claim 11 wherein said un-trusted IC is annealed following exposure to said x-ray imaging device to reduce an effect of radiation damage.

18. The method of claim 11 wherein said design file comprises one of a GDSII design file and an OASIS design file.

19. The method of claim 11 wherein said producing said at least one un-trusted image comprises using 3D tomography.

20. A system for verifying the integrity of integrated circuits (ICs) procured from an un-trusted source, comprising:

x-ray microscope means for generating base images of an un-trusted IC;

stitching means for producing un-trusted images using said base images, said un-trusted images comprising a plurality of connected elements from said un-trusted IC;

comparison means for comparing said un-trusted images with a reference image comprising a plurality of connected elements from a trusted source; and

determining means for identifying differences in said connected elements between said un-trusted images and said reference images.

21. The system of claim 20 wherein said un-trusted IC is fabricated from an un-trusted foundry pursuant to a design file provided to said foundry, and wherein said reference images are generated based on said design file.

22. The system of claim 20 wherein said reference images are generated based on one or more images of a trusted IC.

23. A system for verifying that an un-trusted integrated circuit is an accurate replica of a desired integrated circuit, comprising:

an x-ray imaging device; and

a processing system configured to;

cause the x-ray imaging device to generate one or more images of connected elements within the un-trusted integrated circuit;

compare the one or more images, or information derived therefrom, with reference information indicative of connected elements within the desired integrated circuit; and

identify one or more differences between the connected elements in the un-trusted integrated circuit and the connected elements in the desired integrated circuit based on the comparison.