Method for detecting the removal of a processing unit from a printed circuit board

• US 8,308,819 B2
• Filed: 12/19/2006
• Issued: 11/13/2012
• Est. Priority Date: 12/19/2006
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Pitney Bowes Incorporated (Böwe Systec AG)
• Original Assignee: Pitney Bowes Incorporated (Böwe Systec AG)
• Inventors: Kirschner, Wesley A., Sisson, Robert W., Hurd, John A., Ryan, Frederick W. Jr., Jacobson, Gary S.
• Primary Examiner(s): Hoffman, Brandon
• Assistant Examiner(s): Ambaye, Samuel
• Application Number:
  US11/641,180
• Publication Number:
  US 20080148415A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,156 Days
• Field of Search: 726 34- 35
• US Class Current: 726/35
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/554 involving event detection and direct action
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/725 operating on a secure reference time value
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/86 Secure or tamper-resistant housings
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 17/00314 Communication within apparatus, personal computer [PC] system, or server, e.g. between printhead and central unit in a franking machine
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00258 Electronic hardware aspects, e.g. type of circuits used
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00322 Communication between components/modules/parts, e.g. printer, printhead, keyboard, conveyor or central unit
• CPC Class Codes: G07B 2017/00411 Redundant storage, e.g. back-up of registers

Abstract

Various methods for detecting the removal of a processing unit, such as a microprocessor or a microcontroller, form a printed circuit board in a secure printing system, such as a postage metering system are provided. The methods utilize one or more of a real time clock provided internal to the processing unit, a CMOS device provided on the printed circuit board external to the processing unit, and CMOS memory internal to the processing unit to detect the removal of the processing unit and therefore an attack.

Claims

1. A method for detecting that an attack has occurred as a result of a processing unit being removed from a printed circuit board, comprising:

providing said processing unit on said printed circuit board, said processing unit having a real time clock internal thereto;

providing a power source on said printed circuit board separate from said processing unit;

electrically connecting said power source to said real time clock to provide power to said real time clock;

monitoring the date reported by said real time clock to determine whether the attack has occurred as a consequence of the processing unit being removed from said printed circuit board,

determining that the attack has occurred when one of the following is determined;

that said real time clock is not enabled, and said real time clock is reporting a date that is prior to a predetermined stored date that is later than a default date of the real time clock.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said power source is a battery.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein said printed circuit board is included within a secure printing system;

and further comprising reporting that an attack may have occurred.

4. A method for detecting that an attack has occurred as a result of a processing unit being removed from a printed circuit board wherein said printed circuit board is included within a secure printing system and wherein said processing unit stores state information relating to one or more items printed by or to be printed by said secure printing system,

said processing unit disposed on said printed circuit board, said processing unit having a real time clock internal thereto, and said real time clock having one or more registers;

the method comprising;

providing a power source on said printed circuit board separate from said processing unit;

electrically connecting said power source to said real time clock to provide power to said real time clock;

storing a representation of said state information in said one or more registers, wherein said one or more registers are able to store said representation only if said power is provided to said real time clock;

monitoring said one or more registers;

determining that said processing unit has been removed from, and returned to, said printed circuit board if it determined that said one or more registers no longer store said representation of said state information.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein said power source is a battery.

6. The method according to claim 4, wherein representation of said state information is a hash of said state information;

and further comprising reporting that an attack may have occurred.

7. A method of protecting a processing unit included within a secure printing system from an attack wherein said processing unit is removed from an associated printed circuit board, comprising:

providing said processing unit on said printed circuit board, said processing unit having an internal memory;

providing a power source on said printed circuit board separate from said processing unit;

electrically connecting said power source to said internal memory to provide power to said internal memory; and

storing in said internal memory state information relating to one or more items printed by or to be printed by said secure printing system, wherein said internal memory is able to store said state information only if said power is provided to said internal memory;

wherein if said processing unit is removed from said printed circuit board, said power source will no longer be electrically connected to said internal memory and said state information will no longer be stored in said internal memory, thereby indicating the attack.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein said power source is a battery.

9. The method according to claim 7, wherein said internal memory is CMOS memory.

10. The method according to claim 7, wherein said internal memory is provided with a key, wherein said internal memory is able to store said key only if said power is provided to said internal memory, wherein if said processing unit is removed from said printed circuit board, said power source will no longer be electrically connected to said internal memory and said key will no longer be stored in said internal memory, the method further comprising allowing said secure printing system to print one or more items only if said key is stored in said internal memory.

11. A method for detecting that an attack has occurred as a result of a processing unit being removed from a printed circuit board, comprising:

providing said processing unit having an internal real time clock on said printed circuit board;

providing a power source on said printed circuit board separate from said processing unit;

electrically connecting said power source to said real time clock to provide power to said real time clock;

monitoring the functioning of said real time clock to determine whether an attack has occurred as a consequence of the processing unit being removed from, and subsequently returned to, said printed circuit board, and

determining that an attack has occurred when said real time clock reports a date that is prior to a predetermined stored date that is later than a default date of the real time clock.

12. The method according to claim 11, further including the step of reporting that an attack may have occurred.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein said power source is a battery.

14. The method according to claim 12, wherein said printed circuit board is included within a secure printing system.