Method of modifying secrets included in a cryptographic module, notably in an unprotected environment

• US 8,411,864 B2
• Filed: 02/27/2008
• Issued: 04/02/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 03/06/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Thales SA
• Original Assignee: Thales SA
• Inventors: D'athis, Thierry, Dailly, Philippe, Ratier, Denis
• Primary Examiner(s): Kim, Jung
• Assistant Examiner(s): PARSONS, THEODORE C
• Application Number:
  US12/528,183
• Publication Number:
  US 20100135496A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,861 Days
• Field of Search: 380/277, 705/41
• US Class Current: 380/277
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6209 to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6218 to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/77 in smart cards
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2129 Authenticate client device independently of the user

Abstract

A method of modifying a set of secrets in a cryptographic module, to ensure that the modifying is either successful or invalid. The module includes readable version numbers for each secret and for the set of secrets. If the version number of the set of secrets is equal to a version number requiring the loading of a set of new secrets, the version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module is set to a distinctive number indicating that the cryptographic module is being reloaded. Next, for each secret, if the version number of the secret is different from the version number of the corresponding new secret to be loaded, the new secret and its version number are loaded. Next the version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module is set to the version number of the set of new secrets.

Claims

1. A method of modifying secrets included in a cryptographic module on a card, the cryptographic module including a set version number that corresponds to a set of a plurality of secrets in the cryptographic module, wherein the cryptographic module:

indicates whether a loading of a secret is either successful, or invalid; and

allows reading of a version number for each secret;

wherein the method comprises the steps of;

assigning a predetermined number to the set version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module, if the set version number of the set of secrets is equal to a version number that requires a set of new secrets to be loaded, in order to indicate that the cryptographic module is being reloaded;

for each secret in the set of secrets, loading a corresponding new secret and a version number of said new secret if a version number of the secret is different from the version number of the corresponding new secret to be loaded;

assigning a set version number of the set of new secrets to the set version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module;

wherein the set version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module on the card is recorded in a file of the cryptographic module of the card accessible via an immutable secret.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the set version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module on the card is recorded as a secret used to indicate a global version of the secrets.

3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the set version number of the set of secrets of the cryptographic module on the card is recorded as the last of the secrets to be reloaded in the step of loading the new secret and its version number.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the loading of said new secret and its version number comprises verifying the version number of each secret by mutual authentication of one or more secrets until an interruption point is found.