Systems and methods for computer worm defense

• US 8,516,593 B2
• Filed: 10/12/2012
• Issued: 08/20/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 04/01/2004
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Fireeye Security Holdings US LLC
• Original Assignee: FireEye, Inc.
• Inventors: Aziz, Ashar
• Primary Examiner(s): CHEN, SHIN HON
• Application Number:
  US13/651,331
• Publication Number:
  US 20130047257A1
• Time in Patent Office: 312 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 726/24
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45587 Isolation or security of virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45591 Monitoring or debugging support
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45595 Network integration; Enabling network access in virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/53 by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/55 Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/554 involving event detection and direct action
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/56 Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/566 Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/034 Test or assess a computer or a system
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45537 Provision of facilities of other operating environments, e.g. WINE I/O emulation G06F13/105
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45558 Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/10 specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0227 Filtering policies mail message filtering H04L51/212
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/101 Access control lists [ACL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1408 by monitoring network traffic monitoring network traffic per se H04L43/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1416 Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1425 Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1433 Vulnerability analysis
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/145 the attack involving the propagation of malware through the network, e.g. viruses, trojans or worms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1491 : using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 : for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227

Abstract

A computer worm defense system comprises multiple containment systems tied together by a management system. Each containment system is deployed on a separate communication network and contains a worm sensor and a blocking system. In various embodiments, the computer worm may be transported from a production network, where the computer worm is not readily identifiable, to an alternate network in the worm sensor where the computer worm may be readily identifiable. Computer worm identifiers generated by a worm sensor of one containment system can be provided not only to the blocking system of the same containment system, but can also be distributed by the management system to blocking systems of other containment systems.

Claims

1. A computer worm defense system comprising:

a plurality of computer worm containment systems, each computer worm containment system comprising

a worm sensor implemented in a computing device and configured to generate a computer worm identifier for a computer worm propagating within a communication network, the worm sensor comprising

an alternate computer network, communications traffic being monitored on a communication network and filtered from the communication network for analysis by the alternate computer network, the filtered communications traffic having one or more suspicious characteristics of a computer worm, wherein the one or more suspicious characteristics indicating that the filtered communication traffic should be analyzed to determine whether or not the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm; and

a controller configured to monitor the alternate computer network, and to determine whether the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm by analysis of the filtered communications traffic, the controller being operable to

monitor a replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic within the alternate computer network, and

when the filtered communications traffic is determined to comprise a computer worm, generate the computer worm identifier for the computer worm based on anomalous behavior caused within the alternate computer network during replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic by the computer worm.

2. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 each worm containment system further comprising:

a management system in communication with the plurality of computer worm containment systems and configured to obtain a computer worm identifier from a worm sensor of a first computer worm containment system of the plurality of computer worm containment systems and distribute the computer worm identifier to a computer worm blocking system of a second computer worm containment system of the plurality of computer worm containment systems.

3. The computer worm defense system of claim 2 wherein the management system automatically distributes the computer worm identifier to the computer worm blocking system of the second computer worm containment system.

4. The computer worm defense system of claim 2 wherein the management system charges a fee to a subscriber associated with the second computer worm containment system for distributing the computer worm identifier to the computer worm blocking system of the second computer worm containment system.

5. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the alternate computer network is transparent to and separate from the communication network.

6. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the communication network is a production network.

7. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the computer worm identifier comprises a signature.

8. The computer worm defense system of claim 7 wherein the signature comprises a URL and the computer worm blocking system is capable of filtering by URL.

9. The computer worm defense system of claim 7 wherein the signature is for use by an inline signature based intrusion detection system, the signature being shared with the inline signature based intrusion detection system.

10. The computer worm defense system of claim 7 wherein the signature comprises an ACL entry for a network device capable of filtering network traffic, the signature being shared with the network device.

11. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the controller of each computer worm containment system is further configured to generate a recovery script.

12. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the controller of each computer worm containment system is further configured to copy at least a portion of network traffic from the communication network and monitor the replay of the copied portion of network traffic.

13. The computer worm defense system of claim 12 wherein the controller of each computer worm containment system is further configured to suppress return traffic generated by the at least a portion of network traffic copied from the communication network characteristic of a computer worm.

14. The computer worm defense system of claim 1 wherein the alternate computer network comprises a virtual computer system using machine virtualization technologies.

15. A computer worm defense method comprising:

monitoring communications traffic from a communication network;

filtering the communications traffic from the communication network, the filtered communications traffic having one or more suspicious characteristics of a computer worm, wherein the one or more suspicious characteristics indicating that the filtered communication traffic should be analyzed to determine whether or not the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm;

determining whether the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm by analyzing the filtered communications traffic, the analyzing comprising monitoring a replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic within an alternate computer network of a computer worm containment system; and

when the filtered communications traffic is determined to comprise a computer worm, generating a computer worm identifier for the computer worm based on anomalous behavior caused within the alternate computer network during replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic by the computer worm.

16. The method of claim 15 further comprising distributing the computer worm to another computer worm containment system.

17. The method of claim 16 further comprising blocking the computer worm from propagating in a communication network associated with the other computer worm containment system.

18. The method of claim 16 wherein distributing the computer worm identifier is performed automatically.

19. The method of claim 16 wherein distributing the computer worm identifier is performed by a management system.

20. The method of claim 16 wherein distributing the computer worm identifier comprises charging a fee to a subscriber associated with the other computer worm containment system.

21. The method of claim 15 wherein the alternate computer network is transparent to and separate from the communication network.

22. The method of claim 15 wherein the monitoring further comprises copying at least a portion of network traffic from the communication network, and wherein the filtering and the analyzing are performed on the copied portion of network traffic.

23. The method of claim 22, wherein analyzing comprises simulating transmission of the portion of network traffic to a destination device.

24. The method of claim 23, wherein analyzing comprises:

executing a virtual machine;

configuring a replayer to transmit the portion of network traffic to the destination device; and

identifying the anomalous behavior by analyzing a response of the virtual machine to the portion of network traffic, wherein an analysis environment comprising the virtual machine provides the alternative network.

25. The method of claim 15 wherein the communication network is a production network.

26. The method of claim 15 wherein generating the computer worm identifier further comprises

generating a sequence of network activities within the alternate computer network based on an orchestration pattern;

and

determining the computer worm identifier by comparing observed behavior in the alternate computer network with orchestrated behavior expected from the orchestration pattern.

27. The method of claim 15 wherein generating the computer worm identifier further comprises generating a signature.

28. The method of claim 15 further comprising generating a recovery script.

29. The method of claim 15 wherein the alternate computer network comprises a virtual computer system using machine virtualization technologies.

30. A non-transitory machine readable medium having embodied thereon executable code, the executable code being executable by a processor to perform a computer worm defense method comprising:

monitoring communications traffic from a communication network;

filtering the communications traffic from the communication network, the filtered communications traffic having one or more suspicious characteristics of a computer worm, wherein the one or more suspicious characteristics indicating that the filtered communication traffic should be analyzed to determine whether or not the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm;

determining whether the filtered communications traffic comprises a computer worm by analyzing the filtered communications traffic, the analyzing comprising monitoring a replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic within an alternate computer network of a computer worm containment system; and

when the filtered communications traffic is determined to comprise a computer worm, generating a computer worm identifier for the computer worm based on anomalous behavior caused within the alternate computer network during replay of transmission of the filtered communications traffic by the computer worm.