Method and device for detecting an attempt to substitute an original casing portion of an electronic system with a replacement casing portion

• US 8,572,402 B2
• Filed: 05/22/2008
• Issued: 10/29/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 05/24/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Banks And Acquirers International Holding
• Original Assignee: Ingenico France
• Inventors: Coussieu, Alain, Eck, Alain
• Primary Examiner(s): Song, Hosuk
• Application Number:
  US12/601,704
• Publication Number:
  US 20100180122A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,986 Days
• Field of Search: 713/176, 713168-170, 713189-194, 726/2, 726 26- 30, 380277-278, 380/46
• US Class Current: 713/189
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/55 Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/86 Secure or tamper-resistant housings
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2129 Authenticate client device independently of the user
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/082 Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H05K 5/0208 Interlock mechanisms; Means for avoiding unauthorised use or function, e.g. tamperproof

Abstract

The invention relates to an electronic system comprising a casing consisting of at least first and second casing portions and containing a device for detecting the substitution of the first casing portion. The device comprises a first integrated circuit intended to be fixed to the first casing portion and a second integrated circuit intended to be fixed to the second casing portion. The second circuit is adapted to transmit to the first integrated circuit successive random or pseudo-random digital signals (R). The first integrated circuit is adapted to return to the second integrated circuit, for each digital signal, the first encrypted signature (S) from said digital signal. The second integrated circuit is adapted to determine a second encrypted signature (S′) from said digital signal and to detect a substitution of the first casing portion if the first and second encrypted signatures are different.

Claims

1. A card reader comprising a package formed of at least one first package portion connected to a second package portion, a display screen, a keyboard having keys, the first package portion comprising openings for the display screens and the keys, the package containing a printed circuit attached to the second package portion and a device for detecting substitution of the first package portion, said device comprising:

a first integrated circuit attached to the first package portion; and

a second integrated circuit attached to the printed circuit and operative to transmit to the first integrated circuit successive random or pseudo-random digital signals, the first integrated circuit operative to send back to the second integrated circuit, for each digital signal, a first signature encrypted based on said digital signal, the second integrated circuit operative to determine a second signature encrypted based on said digital signal and to detect a substitution of the first package portion if the first and second encrypted signatures are different.

2. The card reader of claim 1, wherein the first integrated circuit comprises a first memory in which are stored an identification number and a first key and the second integrated circuit comprises a second memory in which is stored a second key, the first integrated circuit operative to transmit the identification number to the second integrated circuit, the second integrated circuit operative to transmit the identification number to an activation tool external to the card reader and to receive the second key, equal to the first key, determined by the activation tool by a first encryption function based on the identification number and on a third key, the first integrated circuit operative to determine, for each digital signal, the first signature encrypted by a second encryption function based on said digital signal and on the first key, the second integrated circuit operative to determine the second signature encrypted by the second encryption function based on said digital signal and on the second key.

3. The card reader of claim 1, wherein the first integrated circuit is connected to the second integrated circuit by a wire link.

4. The card reader of claim 1, wherein the first integrated circuit is connected to the second integrated circuit by a capacitive link.

5. The card reader of claim 1, wherein the first integrated circuit is connected to the second integrated circuit by a long-haul link.

6. A method for detecting substitution of a first package portion of a card reader, the card reader further comprising a second package portion connected to the first package portion, the first package portion and the second package portion forming a package, the card reader further comprising a display screen, a keyboard having keys, the first package portion comprising openings for the display screens and the keys, the package containing a printed circuit attached to the second package portion, the method comprising:

providing a first integrated circuit attached to the first package portion and a second integrated circuit attached to the printed circuit;

having the second integrated circuit transmit to the first integrated circuit successive random or pseudo-random signals;

having the first integrated circuit send back to the second integrated circuit, for each digital signal, a first signature encrypted based on said digital signal; and

having the second integrated circuit determine a second signature encrypted based on said digital signal and detect a substitution of the first package portion if the first and second encrypted signatures are different.

7. The detection method of claim 6, comprising the steps of:

a) storing in the first integrated circuit an identification number and a first key which is not accessible from the outside of the first integrated circuit;

b) having, in the activation phase, the first integrated circuit transmit the identification number to the second integrated circuit;

c) having, in the activation phase, the second integrated circuit transmit the identification number to an activation tool external to the card reader;

d) having, in the activation phase, the activation tool determine a second key, equal to the first key, by a first encryption function based on the identification number and on a third key;

e) having, in the activation phase, the activation tool transmit the second key to the second integrated circuit;

f) having, in a normal operating phase, the second integrated circuit transmit to the first integrated circuit the successive random or pseudo-random digital signals;

g) having, in the normal operating phase, the first integrated circuit send back to the second integrated circuit, for each digital signal, the first encrypted signature determined by a second encryption function based on said digital signal and on the first key; and

h) having, in the normal operating phase, the second integrated circuit determine the second signature encrypted by the second encryption function based on said digital signal and on the second key, and detect a substitution of the first package portion if the first and second encrypted signatures are different.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising the step of having the second integrated circuit delete the second key in the case where the first and second encrypted signatures are different at step h), reuse of the card reader then requiring a new implementation of steps b) to e).

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the first encryption function is a function of DES or Triple DES type and/or the second encryption function is a function of SHA type.