Signed manifest for run-time verification of software program identity and integrity

• US 8,601,273 B2
• Filed: 05/27/2011
• Issued: 12/03/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 06/30/2005
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Original Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Inventors: Schluessler, Travis, Durham, David, Cox, George, Grewal, Karanvir Ken
• Primary Examiner(s): Blair, April Y
• Application Number:
  US13/118,017
• Publication Number:
  US 20110231668A1
• Time in Patent Office: 921 Days
• Field of Search: 713/176, 713/187, 713/179, 713/180, 713/181, 713/191, 717/126, 711/216, 380/204
• US Class Current: 713/176
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/54 by adding security routines or objects to programs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/60 Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/004 for fault attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 using cryptographic hash functions

Abstract

A measurement engine performs active platform observation. A program includes an integrity manifest to indicate an integrity check value for a section of the program'"'"'s source code. The measurement engine computes a comparison value on the program'"'"'s image in memory and determines if the comparison value matches the expected integrity check value. If the values do not match, the program'"'"'s image is determined to be modified, and appropriate remedial action can be triggered. The integrity manifest can include a secure signature to verify the validity of the integrity manifest.

Claims

1. An article of manufacture comprising a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having content stored thereon to provide instructions which, when executed, result in a performance of operations including:

loading, by an active management platform, a known good integrity check value into a memory local to a measurement engine of the active management platform, the active management platform and measurement engine executed outside a context of a host operating system on which an agent in system memory is executed, the active management platform and measurement engine executed on a same hardware host machine as the agent, and executed on processing resources inaccessible to the host operating system;

computing, by the measurement engine, an algorithm on a section of agent code of the agent in system memory to generate an integrity check value for the agent in system memory, which represents an identify of the section of agent code as a hash value of executable code, static configuration data, and relocation fix-ups for the section of agent code, wherein the section of agent code is kept in system memory by an agent initialization module that records values used for relocation fix-ups; and

comparing the generated integrity check value with the known good integrity check value to determine when the generated and known good integrity check values match, to detect when the agent has been modified from a known good state.

2. An article of manufacture according to claim 1, further comprising the content to provide instructions to result in:

determining for a dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent a memory address offset as applied to the dynamically assigned address in conjunction with loading the agent into the system memory;

wherein computing the algorithm to generate the integrity check value on the portion of the agent comprises reversing the offset to determine a pre-offset value for the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent, and computing the algorithm on the section of agent code of the agent with the pre-offset value.

3. An article of manufacture according to claim 2, wherein the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent comprises a dynamically addressed function call.

4. An article of manufacture according to claim 1, further comprising the content to provide instructions to result in:

halting execution of the software program if the generated integrity check value and the expected value do not match.

5. An article of manufacture according to claim 1, further comprising the content to provide instructions to result in:

generating the integrity check value in response to occurrence of an integrity check event, including at least one occurrence from the group consisting of;

a configuration parameter change, a data packet transmission, or terminate execution of the software program.

6. An article of manufacture according to claim 1, further comprising the content to provide instructions to result in:

obtaining information pinned to a memory location by an agent initialization module in the agent'"'"'s code, the information used to compute the algorithm.

7. An article of manufacture according to claim 1, further comprising the content to provide instructions to result in:

registering the agent as an agent to be monitored by the measurement engine, wherein the comparing is performed at registration of the agent.

8. A method comprising:

loading, by an active management platform, a known good integrity check value into a memory local to a measurement engine of the active management platform, the active management platform and measurement engine executed outside a context of a host operating system on which an agent in system memory is executed, the active management platform and measurement engine executed on a same hardware host machine as the agent, and executed on processing resources inaccessible to the host operating system;

computing, by the measurement engine, an algorithm on a section of agent code of the agent in system memory to generate an integrity check value for the agent in system memory, which represents an identify of the section of agent code as a hash value of executable code, static configuration data, and relocation fix-ups for the section of agent code, wherein the section of agent code is kept in system memory by an agent initialization module that records values used for relocation fix-ups; and

comparing the generated integrity check value with the known good integrity check value to determine when the generated and known good integrity check values match, to detect when the agent has been modified from a known good state.

9. A method according to claim 8, further comprising:

determining for a dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent a memory address offset as applied to the dynamically assigned address in conjunction with loading the agent into the system memory;

wherein computing the algorithm to generate the integrity check value on the portion of the agent comprises reversing the offset to determine a pre-offset value for the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent, and computing the algorithm on the section of agent code of the agent with the pre-offset value.

10. A method according to claim 8, wherein the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent comprises a dynamically addressed function call.

11. A method according to claim 8, further comprising:

halting execution of the software program if the generated integrity check value and the expected value do not match.

12. A method according to claim 8, further comprising:

generating the integrity check value in response to occurrence of an integrity check event, including at least one occurrence from the group consisting of;

a configuration parameter change, a data packet transmission, or terminate execution of the software program.

13. A method according to claim 8, wherein computing the algorithm further comprises:

obtaining information pinned to a memory location by an agent initialization module in the agent'"'"'s code, the information used to compute the algorithm.

14. A method according to claim 8, further comprising:

registering the agent as an agent to be monitored by the measurement engine, wherein the comparing is performed at registration of the agent.

15. A system comprising:

a host processor on a hardware host machine to execute a host operating system and programs under the operating system, including an agent loaded into memory from a storage device;

a service processor on the hardware host machine having processing resources separate from the host processor, the service processor to execute an active management platform, and to

load a known good integrity check value into a memory local to a measurement engine of the active management platform;

compute an algorithm on a section of agent code of the agent in system memory to generate an integrity check value for the agent in system memory, which represents an identify of the section of agent code as a hash value of executable code, static configuration data, and relocation fix-ups for the section of agent code, wherein the section of agent code is kept in system memory by an agent initialization module that records values used for relocation fix-ups; and

compare the generated integrity check value with the known good integrity check value to determine when the generated and known good integrity check values match, to detect when the agent has been modified from a known good state.

16. A system according to claim 15, wherein the service processor to further determining for a dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent a memory address offset as applied to the dynamically assigned address in conjunction with loading the agent into the system memory;

wherein computing the algorithm to generate the integrity check value on the portion of the agent comprises reversing the offset to determine a pre-offset value for the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent, and computing the algorithm on the section of agent code of the agent with the pre-offset value.

17. A system according to claim 15, wherein the dynamically assigned address referenced within the agent comprises a dynamically addressed function call.

18. A system according to claim 15, wherein the service processor to further halt execution of the software program if the generated integrity check value and the expected value do not match.

19. A system according to claim 15, wherein the service processor to further generate the integrity check value in response to occurrence of an integrity check event, including at least one occurrence from the group consisting of:

a configuration parameter change, a data packet transmission, or terminate execution of the software program.

20. A system according to claim 15, wherein the service processor to further obtain information pinned to a memory location by an agent initialization module in the agent'"'"'s code, the information used to compute the algorithm.

21. A system according to claim 15, wherein the service processor to further

register the agent as an agent to be monitored by the measurement engine, wherein the comparing is performed at registration of the agent.