Asymmetric cryptography for wireless systems

• US 8,627,092 B2
• Filed: 03/22/2007
• Issued: 01/07/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 03/22/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: LG Electronics, Inc. (LG Corporation)
• Original Assignee: LG Electronics, Inc. (LG Corporation)
• Inventors: Fischer, Patrick, Belenko, Vyacheslav
• Primary Examiner(s): Kyle, Tamara T
• Assistant Examiner(s): VOSTAL, ONDREJ C
• Application Number:
  US12/293,806
• Publication Number:
  US 20100293372A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,483 Days
• Field of Search: 713/181
• US Class Current: 713/181
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 65/1069 Session establishment or de-establishment
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 65/611 for multicast or broadcast systems for broadcast or conference H04L12/18; arrangements for broadcast or distribution combined with broadcast H04H20/00; arrangements for broadcast applications with a direct linkage to broadcast information or to broadcast space-time H04H60/00; selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS], H04W4/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/10 Integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/61 Time-dependent
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/02 Data link layer protocols

Abstract

A method for authenticating messages in a communication network includes forming a super message having a plurality of individual messages such that at least two of the individual messages are intended for separate receiving entities. The method further includes creating a message authentication code (MAC) using a private key, such that the MAC is configured to permit authentication of the super message using a public key.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating messages in a communication network, the method comprising:

forming a super message comprising a plurality of individual messages, wherein at least two of the individual messages are intended for separate receiving entities of a plurality of receiving entities;

creating a message authentication code (MAC) using a private key and a counter value comprising 4 least significant bits and a plurality of most significant bits, the 4 least significant bits of the counter value formed by a sequence number, the plurality of most significant bits of the counter value formed by a hyper frame number, wherein the MAC is configured to permit authentication of the super message using a public key and to protect confidentiality of a permanent user identity (IMSI) of each of the plurality of receiving entities; and

transmitting, to the plurality of receiving entities, the 4 least significant bits of the counter value to be used for authenticating the super message.

2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

transmitting the super message in conjunction with the MAC to the plurality of receiving entities.

3. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

transmitting the public key to the plurality of receiving entities using an integrity protected message.

4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

transmitting the public key to the plurality of receiving entities using a ciphered message.

5. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

associating the counter value with a timing reference.

6. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

associating the counter value with a system frame number (SFN).

7. A method for providing message protection, the method comprising:

receiving, in a receiving entity, a first data block from a transmitting entity, wherein the first data block comprises a first message authentication code (MAC), a second data block and only 4 least significant bits of a first counter value, the first counter value corresponding to the first data block and comprising a hyper frame number and a sequence number, wherein the 4 least significant bits of the first counter value correspond only to the sequence number, wherein 28 most significant bits of the counter value correspond only to the hyper frame number, and wherein the first MAC is configured to protect confidentiality of a permanent user identity (IMSI) of the receiving entity;

generating a second MAC based upon least significant bits of a second counter value stored in the receiving entity, an integrity protection key, and the second data block;

comparing the second MAC with the first MAC; and

requesting retransmission of the second data block if the second MAC does not correspond to the first MAC.

8. The method according to claim 7, further comprising:

receiving a sequence number in the receiving entity that corresponds to the second data block and to the 4 least significant bits of the first counter value.

9. The method according to claim 7, wherein the first data block further comprises a sequence number corresponding to the second data block and to the least significant bits of the second counter value.

10. The method according to claim 7, wherein the transmitting entity comprises a nodeB.

11. The method according to claim 7, wherein the transmitting entity comprises a user equipment (UE).

12. A method for providing message protection, the method comprising:

generating a message authentication code (MAC) based upon a counter value, an integrity protection key, and a first data block, wherein the counter value comprises 4 least significant bits and a plurality of most significant bits, the 4 least significant bits of the counter value formed by a sequence number, the plurality of most significant bits of the counter value formed by a hyper frame number;

transmitting, to a receiving entity, the 4 least significant bits of the counter value to be used for authenticating a second data block;

generating the second data block that is integrity protected, wherein the second data block comprises the MAC and the first data block, wherein the MAC is configured to permit a request for retransmission of the second data block upon detection of unsuccessful reception of the second data block at the receiving entity using the 4 least significant bits of the counter value and to protect confidentiality of a permanent user identity (IMSI) of the receiving entity; and

transmitting the second data block to the receiving entity without using a cyclic redundancy code (CRC) with the second data block.

13. The method according to claim 12, further comprising:

transmitting a sequence number to the receiving entity, wherein the sequence number corresponds to the first data block and to the 4 least significant bits of the counter value.

14. The method according to claim 12, wherein generating the second data block comprises:

including a sequence number in the second data block, wherein the sequence number corresponds to the first data block and to the 4 least significant bits of the counter value.

15. The method according to claim 12, wherein the transmitting is performed by a nodeB and the receiving entity comprises a user equipment (UE).

16. The method according to claim 12, wherein the transmitting is performed by a user equipment (UE) and the receiving entity comprises a nodeB.

17. A method for authenticating messages in a communication network, the method comprising:

receiving a public key in a first message from a first transmitting entity; and

authenticating a second message received from a second transmitting entity based upon the first message, the public key, an authentication algorithm, and only 4 least significant bits of a counter value that comprises a hyper frame number and a sequence number, wherein the 4 least significant bits of the counter value correspond only to the sequence number, and wherein 28 most significant bits of the counter value correspond to the hyper frame number,

wherein the public key and the second message are for protecting confidentiality of a permanent user identity (IMSI) of a receiving entity.

18. The method according to claim 17, wherein authenticating the second message is further based upon a timing offset set between respective time references of the first transmitting entity and the second transmitting entity.

19. The method according to claim 17, further comprising:

receiving a cell-specific code from the first transmitting entity which identifies the second transmitting entity, and wherein authenticating the second message is further based upon the cell-specific code.

20. A method for authenticating messages in a communication network, the method comprising:

receiving at least one broadcast message;

receiving a public key in a secure message;

receiving a message authentication code (MAC);

receiving only 4 least significant bits of a counter value that comprises a hyper frame number and a sequence number, wherein the 4 least significant bits of the counter value correspond only to the sequence number, and wherein 28 most significant bits of the counter value correspond only to the hyper frame number;

defining the 4 least significant bits of the counter value as a time difference between reception of the MAC and a timing reference; and

authenticating the MAC using the 4 least significant bits of the counter value, the at least one broadcast message, an authentication algorithm, and the public key,

wherein the public key and the MAC are for protecting confidentiality of a permanent user identity (IMSI) of a receiving entity.

21. The method according to claim 20, wherein the secure message is integrity protected.

22. The method according to claim 20, wherein the secure message is ciphered.

23. The method according to claim 20, wherein the 4 least significant bits of the counter value are associated with a system frame number (SFN).

24. The method according to claim 20, wherein the at least one broadcast message is a multimedia broadcast multicast service (MBMS) message.

25. The method according to claim 20, wherein the at least one broadcast message is a system information message.