Method and system for secure authentication of a user by a host system

• US 8,650,625 B2
• Filed: 09/21/2012
• Issued: 02/11/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 12/16/2003
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Citicorp Credit Services Incorporated (Citigroup Incorporated)
• Original Assignee: Citibank Development Center Incorporated (Citigroup Incorporated)
• Inventors: Grandcolas, Michael, Guzman, Marc, Yee, Thomas, Parekh, Dilip, Chen, Yongqiang
• Primary Examiner(s): Yalew, Fikremariam A
• Assistant Examiner(s): HOANG, DANIEL L
• Application Number:
  US13/624,030
• Publication Number:
  US 20130097429A1
• Time in Patent Office: 508 Days
• Field of Search: 713/2, 726/5
• US Class Current: 726/5
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0825 using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083

Abstract

A method and system for securely logging onto a banking system authentication server so that a user credential never appears in the clear during interaction with the system in which a user'"'"'s credential is DES encrypted, and the DES key is PKI encrypted with the public key of an application server by an encryption applet before being transmitted to the application server. Within the HSM of the application server, the HSM decrypts and re-encrypts the credential under a new DES key known to the authentication server, the re-encrypted credential is forwarded to the authentication server, decrypted with the new DES key known to the authentication server, and verified by the authentication server.

Claims

1. A method for allowing a user to securely log on to a host system via an electronic interface, comprising:

receiving, at a processor of an application server computer, a user'"'"'s personal identification number (PIN) encrypted with a symmetric key and the symmetric key and a replay prevention ID encrypted with a public key of a public/private key pair of the application server computer from a browser application on a user'"'"'s computing device via a processor of a web server computer, said symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID being encrypted and digitally signed within a single sign-on token;

decrypting, using the processor of the application server computer, the single sign-on token and passing, using the processor of the application server computer, the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and the public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID into a tamper-proof physical hardware security module of the application server computer;

decrypting, using a microprocessor of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID with the private key of the public/private key pair, and decrypting, using the microprocessor of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN with the decrypted symmetric key;

re-encrypting, using the microprocessor of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the decrypted user'"'"'s PIN with a new symmetric key, and passing, using the microprocessor of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the re-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and decrypted replay prevention ID out of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module;

sending, using the processor of the application server computer, the re-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN to a processor of an authentication server computer for verification; and

decrypting, using the processor of the authentication server computer, the re-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN with the new symmetric key, and verifying, using the processor of the authentication server computer, the decrypted user'"'"'s PIN.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending an encryption applet to the user'"'"'s browser.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein sending the encryption applet to the user'"'"'s browser further comprises sending the encryption applet contained in a single class file containing functionality necessary to encrypt the user'"'"'s PIN.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein sending the encryption applet to the user'"'"'s browser further comprises sending an encryption applet sized to be downloaded to the user'"'"'s browser on each logon.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein sending the encryption applet to the user'"'"'s browser further comprises sending an encryption applet that persists on the user'"'"'s browser for a duration of a current browser session.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending the public key of the public/private key pair of the application server computer to the user'"'"'s browser, the private key for which is known by the tamper-proof physical hardware security module.

7. The method of claim 2, further comprising encrypting the user'"'"'s PIN with the symmetric key generated by the encryption applet.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising generating the symmetric key by the encryption applet based on a random number generated by the encryption applet.

9. The method of claim 2, further comprising encrypting, using the encryption applet, the user'"'"'s PIN with a DES key to produce a cipherPIN.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising encrypting, using the encryption applet, the DES key with a public key to produce a cipherKey.

11. The method of claim 2, further comprising encrypting, using the encryption applet, the user'"'"'s PIN with a symmetric key and encrypting the symmetric key with the public key.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID further comprising receiving the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID by the application server via a portal application.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein receiving the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID by the application server via the portal application further comprises encrypting and digitally signing the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and the public key-encrypted symmetric key within the single sign-on token and sending the token to the application server by the portal application.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein receiving the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID by the application server via the portal application further comprises verifying that the decrypted single sign-on token was received via the portal application as a trusted source.

15. A system for allowing a user to securely log on to a host system via an electronic interface, comprising:

an application server computer having a processor coupled to memory, said application server computer processor being programmed for;

receiving a user'"'"'s personal identification number (PIN) encrypted with a symmetric key and the symmetric key and a replay prevention ID encrypted with a public key of a public/private key pair of the application server computer from a browser application on a user'"'"'s computing device via a processor of a web server computer,

said symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID being encrypted and digitally signed within a single sign-on token,

decrypting the single sign-on token and passing the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and the public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID into a tamper-proof physical hardware security module of the application server computer;

the tamper-proof physical hardware security module having a microprocessor coupled to memory, said tamper-proof physical hardware security module microprocessor being programmed for;

decrypting, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the public key-encrypted symmetric key and replay prevention ID with the private key of the public/private key pair,

decrypting, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the symmetric key-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN with the decrypted symmetric key,

re-encrypting, internally within the tamper-proof physical hardware security module, the decrypted user'"'"'s PIN with a new symmetric key, and

passing the re-encrypted user'"'"'s PIN and decrypted replay prevention ID out of the tamper-proof physical hardware security module;

the application server computer processor being further programmed for sending the re-encrypted user'"'"'s credentials to an authentication server computer for verification; and

the authentication server computer having a processor coupled to memory, said authentication server computer processor being programmed for decrypting the re-encrypted user'"'"'s credentials with the new symmetric key and for verifying the decrypted user'"'"'s credentials.