Motor vehicle control device

• US 8,683,233 B2
• Filed: 07/23/2003
• Issued: 03/25/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 08/21/2002
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Audi AG (Volkswagen AG)
• Original Assignee: Audi AG (Volkswagen AG)
• Inventors: Feilen, Oliver, Stadtmuller, Rudiger
• Primary Examiner(s): Cervetti, David Garcia
• Assistant Examiner(s): Traore, Fatoumata
• Application Number:
  US10/525,229
• Publication Number:
  US 20060100749A1
• Time in Patent Office: 3,898 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/194
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/572 Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/79 in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for protecting at least one motor vehicle component against manipulation in a control device, which comprises at least one microcomputer (μC) and at least one memory module (2, 3), characterized in that the microcomputer (μC) reads out a specific original identifier (ID) of at least one memory module (2, 3) from the memory module (2, 3) and stores it. Furthermore the invention relates to a control device for a motor vehicle component which comprises at least one microcomputer (μC) and at least one memory module (2, 3), characterized in that at least one memory module (2, 3) has at least one specific identifier (ID) and the microcomputer (μC) has at least one area (11) in which at least one specific original identifier is stored.

Claims

1. A system mountable in a motor vehicle effective in preventing manipulation of a memory module functional in operating a control device of a component of said vehicle, comprising:

means for reading a first identifier stored in a first area of a first memory module functional in operating said control device;

means for reading a first encrypted code stored in a second area of the first memory module functional in operating said control device;

means for storing said first identifier in a read only memory of said system;

means for reading a second identifier stored in a third area of a second memory module intended to replace the first memory module;

means for reading a second encrypted code stored in a fourth area of the second memory module intended to replace the first memory module; and

means for authenticating said second memory module by comparing the second identifier of said second memory module with the first identifier stored in said read only memory and by decrypting the second encrypted code using a master code stored in the read only memory,

wherein the first area and third area are one-time programmable areas, and the second area and fourth area are rewriteable areas,

the decrypting the second encrypted code using the master code comprises determining whether the second encrypted code has been manipulated by using at least one of a key stored in the read only memory, a linear/CRC checksum formation, and a hash value formation, and

if the second memory module is authentic, the second encrypted code corresponds to the first encrypted code.

2. A system according to claim 1 wherein said read only memory comprises a one-time programmable module.

3. A system according to claim 1 including a microprocessor provided with said storing and authenticating means.

4. A system according to claim 3 wherein said storing means of said system comprises a one-time programmable module.

5. A system according to claim 4 wherein said storing means comprises a flash memory.

6. A system according to claim 4 including means for encrypting data stored in said storing means which can be decrypted by a key comprising said identifier.

7. A system according to claim 1 wherein said control device comprises one of a group consisting of the engine, transmission, turbocharger, oil cooler and brake control devices of said vehicles.

8. A system according to claim 1, wherein the first memory module stores programs and data used to operate the control device.

9. A system according to claim 8, wherein the data include adaptation values for controlling an engine control device.

10. A system according to claim 1, wherein the first identifier stored in the first memory module is specific to the first memory module, and the second identifier stored in the second memory module is specific to the second memory module.

11. A system according to claim 1, wherein the authenticating means detects that the first memory module is replaced by the second memory module when the read second identifier does not match the first identifier stored in the read only memory.

12. A system according to claim 1 wherein the control device operates using both the first encrypted code and the master code, and the master code is protected from being read out of the read-only memory.

13. A method of preventing manipulation of a memory

module provided in a system, functional in operating a control device of a motor vehicle component, comprising:

storing a readable first identifier in a first area of a first memory module connectable to said system, functional in operating said control device;

storing a first encrypted code in a second area of the first memory module functional in operating said control device;

reading said first identifier stored in said first memory module;

storing said first identifier in a second memory, wherein the second memory is a read only memory;

reading a second identifier stored in a third area of a third memory module intended to replace said first memory module;

reading a second encrypted code stored in a fourth area of the third memory module intended to replace the first memory module; and

authenticating said third memory module by comparing said first identifier of said second memory with said second identifier stored in said third memory, and by decrypting the second encrypted code using a master code stored in the read only memory,

wherein the first area and third area are one-time programmable areas, and the second area and fourth area are rewriteable areas,

the decrypting the second encrypted code using the master code comprises determining whether the second encrypted code has been manipulated by using at least one of a key stored in the read only memory, a linear/CRC checksum formation, and a hash value formation, and

if the second memory module is authentic, the second encrypted code corresponds to the first encrypted code.

14. A method according to claim 13, wherein the first memory module functional and operating said control device is a memory module of a removable vehicle control chip.

15. A system mountable in a motor vehicle effective in preventing manipulation of a memory module functional in operating a control device of a component of said vehicle, comprising:

a microcomputer configured to read a first identifier stored in a first area of a first memory module functional in operating said control device, to read a first encrypted code stored in a second area of the first memory module, functional in operating said control device, to store said first identifier in a read only memory of said system, to read a second identifier stored in a third area of a second memory module intended to replace an installed memory module, functional in operating said control device, and to read a second encrypted code stored in a fourth area of the second memory module intended to replace the installed memory module, functional in operating said control device,

wherein the microcomputer comprises an authentication unit configured to authenticate said second memory module by comparing the second identifier of said second memory module with the first identifier stored in said read only memory, and by decrypting the second encrypted code using a master code stored in the read only memory,

wherein the first area and third area are one-time programmable areas, and the second area and fourth area are rewriteable areas,

the decrypting the second encrypted code using the master code comprises determining whether the second encrypted code has been manipulated by using at least one of a key stored in the read only memory, a linear/CRC checksum formation, and a hash value formation, and

if the second memory module is authentic, the second encrypted code corresponds to the first encrypted code.