Key management using quasi out of band authentication architecture

• US 8,713,325 B2
• Filed: 04/19/2011
• Issued: 04/29/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 04/19/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Payfone Incorporated
• Original Assignee: Authentify, Inc. (Early Warning Services, LLC)
• Inventors: Ganesan, Ravi
• Primary Examiner(s): CHAO, MICHAEL W
• Application Number:
  US13/089,430
• Publication Number:
  US 20120272056A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,106 Days
• Field of Search: 713/185
• US Class Current: 713/184
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/082 applying multi-factor authentication cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0838 using one-time-passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1483 service impersonation, e.g. phishing, pharming or web spoofing detection of rogue wireless access points H04W12/12
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/18 using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths H04L9/0827; cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for authentication using a plurality of channels H04L9/3215
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0819 Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) network architectures or network communication protocols for key distribution in a packet data network H04L63/062
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3215 using a plurality of channels network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0433 Key management protocols

Abstract

To provide key management layered on a quasi-out-of-band authentication system, a security server receives a request for activation of a user interface window for a particular user from a network device via a communication channel. It then transmits an activation PIN to an out of band authentication system for forwarding to the user'"'"'s telephone via a voice or text message. It next receives the previously transmitted PIN from the network device via the communication channel, and authenticates the user based on the received PIN. After authenticating the user, it establishes a secure, independent, encrypted communication channel between the user interface window and the security server on top of the original communication channel. It then generates and transmits to the user interface window and/or receives from the user interface window via the secure communication channel, key material and certificate material for public key and/or symmetric key cryptography based operations.

Claims

1. A method of operating a security server to provide key management layered on a quasi out of band authentication system, comprising:

receiving, via a communication channel from a network device associated with a user, a request for activation of a user interface window for that particular user at the network device;

transmitting, to an out of band authentication system, an activation personal identification number (PIN) to be forwarded to the user'"'"'s telephone via a voice or text message;

receiving, via the communication channel from the network device, the previously transmitted activation PIN;

authenticating the user based on the received activation PIN;

establishing, on top of the communication channel after authenticating the user, a secure, independent, encrypted communication channel between the user interface window and the security server; and

at least one of (i) generating and transmitting to the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel key material for cryptography based operations and (ii) receiving from the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, key material for cryptography based operations.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the key material is for public key cryptography based operations and is generated and transmitted, and further comprising:

receiving, from the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, a public key Pu of a private/public key pair Du/Pu associated with the user and previously generated at user interface window; and

transmitting to the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, a certificate, which is signed by the security server or an external certificate authority and associates the user with the received public key Pu, and instructions for storage of the certificate.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the security server acts as an Intermediate or Root Certificate Authority, and further comprising:

generating and signing the certificate using locally stored certificate authority key material.

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein the certificate is signed by an external certificate authority, and further comprising:

transmitting an unsigned certificate to the external certificate authority; and

receiving the signed certificate from the certificate authority prior to transmitting the signed certificate to the user interface window.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein the transmitted storage instruction requires storage of the user private key Du and signed certificate (i) in memory, or (ii) in the key store of an operating system of the network device, or (iii) both.

6. The method according to claim 2, wherein the transmitted storage instruction explicitly or implicitly, by providing no instruction, leaves the storage decision to the user interface window.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the key material is for symmetric key cryptography based operations and is generated and transmitted by the security server, and further comprising:

receiving, from the user interface window or a network site, an authenticated request containing unique identifying information associated with the user or with a file;

generating, using a one way function, a unique symmetric key K, wherein the value of the key K is derived from the received unique identifying information and a secret known only to the security server; and

;

transmitting, to the requester, the generated symmetric key K.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the security server performs public key cryptography based operations to obtain a digital signature on a transaction, and further comprising:

receiving, from a network site, the transaction and a request for digital signing of the transaction;

transmitting, to the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, the transaction and a request for a digital signature;

receiving, from the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, a hash of the transmitted transaction digitally signed with a private key Du of a private/public key pair Du/Pu associated with the user; and

transmitting to the network site, the received digitally signed hash of the transaction and a certificate, with explicit or implicit instructions for the network site to verify the digital signature by recomputing the hash and comparing it with the hash recovered from the transmitted digitally signed hash by applying the user'"'"'s public key Pu included in the transmitted certificate to the transmitted digitally signed hash.

9. The method according to claim 8, further comprising:

transmitting, to the user interface window, for presentation to the user, via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, a signature PIN with which to electronically sign the transaction presented in a browser window displayed at the network device.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein the signature PIN corresponds to a secret shared by the security server and the network site, but not by the user.

11. The method according to claim 8, wherein the transmitted transaction includes an explicit or implicit instruction to present the transaction to the user in the user interface window and obtain approval of the user prior to digitally signing of the transaction.

12. The method according to claim 8, further comprising:

receiving, from the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, the public key Pu; and

transmitting to the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, the certificate signed by the security server or an external authenticating authority and associating the user with the received public key Pu, and instructions for storage of the certificate and the user'"'"'s private key Du;

wherein the instructions explicitly or implicitly instruct the user interface window to manage storage of the user'"'"'s private key Du and the signed certificate (i) in memory, or (ii) in the key store of an operating system of the network device, or (iii) both for the benefit of other local applications.

13. The method according to claim 8, further comprising:

recomputing the hash and comparing it with the hash recovered from the received digitally signed hash by applying the user'"'"'s public key Pu included in the received certificate to the received digitally signed hash, to thereby verify the digital signature.

14. The method according to claim 1, wherein the security server performs symmetric key cryptography based operations, and the symmetric key cryptography based operations include sharing encryption keys, and further comprising:

receiving, from a network site, a request for one or more encryption keys associated with particular combinations of sender identification, recipient identification and document identification, collectively referred to as DocumentID;

generating, one or more symmetric encryption keys for each DocumentID, based on a one way function, the DocumentID, a secret known only to the security server and other information;

transmitting, to the network site, the encryption keys, with explicit or implicit instructions to encrypt the document represented by the applicable DocumentID with the appropriate encryption key or keys and to transmit the encrypted document to the user;

receiving, from software, other than the user interface window, that is operating on the network device and being used to open the encrypted document represented by an applicable DocumentID, a request for the one or more symmetric encryption keys required to decrypt the encrypted document represented by the applicable DocumentID, wherein the request includes the applicable DocumentID;

recomputing or receiving the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys; and

transmitting, to the user interface window, the recomputed or received applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys, with explicit or implicit instructions to present the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys to the user for entry into the software to decrypt the encrypted document represented by the applicable DocumentID.

15. The method according to claim 14, wherein the request for the one or more symmetric encryption keys from the software is received via a network site which is in communication with the software attempting to open the encrypted document.

16. The method according to claim 14, wherein:

the security server receives the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys from a network site which is in communication with the software attempting to open the document; and

the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys transmitted to the user interface window are the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys received from the network site.

17. The method according to claim 14, wherein:

the security server recomputes, based on the one way function, the applicable DocumentID, the secret known only to the security server and the other information, the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys; and

the applicable one or more symmetric encryption keys transmitted to the user interface window are the recomputed one or more symmetric encryption keys.

18. A method according to claim 1, wherein the security server performs symmetric key cryptography based operations, and the symmetric key cryptography based operations include providing a seed for token authenticator hardware or software, and further comprising:

receiving, from the user interface window, a request for a token seed, and at least one of (i) a user identifier and (ii) a token identifier for which the seed is requested;

generating, the seed, based on a one way function, the at least one identifier, a secret known only to the security server and other information; and

transmitting, to the user interface window via the secure, independent, encrypted communication channel, the generated seed, with explicit or implicit instructions to either (i) present the transmitted seed to the user on the user interface window display for entry by the user into a seeding interface of the token or (ii) enter the transmitted seed into the seeding interface of the token directly without user intervention.

19. A method according to claim 18, wherein the transmitted seed is an intermediate seed for processing by the token software to generate the final seed.