Method for detection of a hacked decoder

• US 8,824,685 B2
• Filed: 08/21/2008
• Issued: 09/02/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 10/15/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Sony Corporation (Sony Group Corp.), Sony Electronics Inc. (Sony Group Corp.)
• Original Assignee: Sony Corporation (Sony Group Corp.), Sony Electronics Inc. (Sony Group Corp.)
• Inventors: Candelore, Brant L.
• Primary Examiner(s): Najjar, Saleh
• Assistant Examiner(s): Pan, Peiliang
• Application Number:
  US12/195,660
• Publication Number:
  US 20090097659A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,203 Days
• Field of Search: 380277-278, 726/2, 726 22- 23, 726 26- 27
• US Class Current: 380/278
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0833 involving conference or group key network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/26606 for generating or managing entitlement messages, e.g. Entitlement Control Message [ECM] or Entitlement Management Message [EMM] arrangements for conditional access to broadcast information or to broadcast-related services H04H60/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/26613 for generating or managing keys in general key distribution for secret or secure communication involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] H04L9/083; network support of key management H04L63/06; key management for network security in communication control or processing H04W12/04
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/42623 involving specific decryption arrangements
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 21/44236 Monitoring of piracy processes or activities protecting computer platforms against harmful, malicious or unexpected behaviour or activities using intrusion detection and counter measures G06F21/566; computer virus detection and handling G06F21/56
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 7/1675 Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence pseudo-random number generators in general G06F7/58

Abstract

A method of identifying a receiver device from which pirated video decryption keys have been obtained consistent with certain embodiments involves organizing a population of receiver devices into a plurality of N groups; associating the N groups with a plurality of N decryption keys, where each of the N groups is associated with one of the N decryption keys, where the N decryption keys are used for either decryption of content or decryption of other decryption keys; causing the plurality of N decryption keys to be obtained by their associated N groups of receiver devices by direct delivery or by derivation at the receiver devices; and identifying a pirated key as being associated with one of the N groups so as to identify the receiver device from which the pirated video decryption keys have been obtained as belonging to one of the N groups. This abstract is not to be considered limiting, since other embodiments may deviate from the features described in this abstract.

Claims

1. A method of identifying a receiver device from which pirated video decryption keys have been obtained, comprising:

splitting a population of receiver devices into a compromised population and a non-compromised population N groups;

detecting a pirated video decryption key in one or more of the N groups;

aggregating the groups comprising those groups in which a pirated video decryption key was not detected into a non-compromised population group;

isolating the non-compromised population group;

organizing the compromised population of receiver devices into a plurality of N new groups, where one of the N new groups is the non-compromised population group and the remainder of the N new groups is the group or groups containing the pirated video decryption key divided into subgroups;

associating the N new groups with a plurality of N decryption keys, where each of the N new groups is associated with one of a plurality of N decryption keys;

causing the plurality of N decryption keys to be obtained by their associated N new groups of receiver devices by direct delivery or by derivation at the receiver devices; and

encrypting one or more entitlement control messages (ECMs) using one of a plurality of N periodic keys so as to produce N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups in order to segregate the receiver devices by virtue of their use of multiple decryption keys to decrypt content.

2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising identifying a pirated key as being associated with one of the N new groups so as to identify the receiver device from which the pirated video decryption keys have been obtained as belonging to one of the N new groups.

3. The method according to claim 2, where the identified pirated key comprises a program key.

4. The method according to claim 2, where the identified pirated key comprises a content key.

5. The method according to claim 2, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N content keys which are used to decrypt selectively multiple encrypted content.

6. The method according to claim 2, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N content keys which are calculated or derived from one of N periodic keys or N program keys.

7. The method according to claim 2, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N program keys which are calculated or derived from N periodic keys.

8. The method according to claim 1, further comprising testing of authenticated encryption keys in a receiver that is suspected of decoding content utilizing a periodic key that is not legally assigned to that receiver.

9. The method according to claim 8, where said testing of authenticated encryption key comprises multiple deliveries of data content comprising multiple conditional access (CA) packets, each packet of which is operative to eliminate receivers and groups of receivers such that each testing operation narrows down the field of receiver identities.

10. The method according to claim 9, where the inclusion of the plurality of CA packets adds no more than approximately 3.5% additional data to the data content that is transmitted to a receiver.

11. The method according to claim 9, where the field of receiver identities is narrowed to a single receiver.

12. The method according to claim 10 where the identified receiver is revoked by a license authority.

13. The method according to claim 1, where a single ECM is decrypted by N periodic keys producing N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups.

14. A method of identifying a receiver device from which pirated video decryption keys have been obtained, comprising:

splitting a population of receiver devices into N groups;

detecting a pirated video decryption key in one or more of the N groups;

aggregating the groups comprising those groups in which a pirated video decryption key was not detected into a non-compromised population group;

isolating the non-compromised population group;

organizing the compromised population of receiver devices into a plurality of N new groups, where one of the N new groups is the non-compromised population group and the remainder of the N new groups is the group or groups containing the pirated video decryption key divided into subgroups;

associating the N new groups with a plurality of N decryption keys, where each of the N new groups is associated with one of the N decryption keys;

causing the plurality of N decryption keys to be obtained by their associated N new groups of receiver devices by direct delivery or by derivation at the receiver devices;

encrypting one or more entitlement control messages (ECMs) using a plurality of N periodic keys so as to produce N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups;

identifying a pirated key as being associated with one of the N new groups so as to identify the receiver device from which the pirated video decryption keys have been obtained as belonging to one of the N new groups; and

testing authenticated encryption keys in a receiver that is suspected of decoding content utilizing a periodic key that is not legally assigned to that receiver, where said testing of authenticated encrypted keys comprises delivering multiple sets of data content comprising multiple conditional access (CA) packets, each packet of which is operative to eliminate receivers and groups of receivers such that each testing operation narrows down the field of receiver identities.

15. The method according to claim 14, where the identified pirated key comprises a program key.

16. The method according to claim 14, where the identified pirated key comprises a content key.

17. The method according to claim 14, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N content keys which are used to decrypt selectively multiple encrypted content.

18. The method according to claim 14, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N content keys which are calculated or derived from one of N periodic keys or N program keys.

19. The method according to claim 14, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N program keys which are calculated or derived from N periodic keys.

20. The method according to claim 14, where the inclusion of the plurality of CA packets adds no more than approximately 3.5% additional data to the data content that is transmitted to a receiver.

21. The method according to claim 14, where the field of receiver identities is narrowed to a single receiver.

22. The method according to claim 14, where the identified receiver is revoked by a license authority.

23. The method according to claim 14, where a single ECM is decrypted by N periodic keys producing N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups.

24. A method of identifying a receiver device from which pirated video decryption keys have been obtained, comprising:

splitting a population of receiver devices into N groups;

detecting a pirated video decryption key in one or more of the N groups;

aggregating the groups comprising those groups in which a pirated video decryption key was not detected into a non-compromised population group;

isolating the non-compromised population group;

organizing the compromised population of receiver devices into a plurality of N new groups, where one of the N new groups is the non-compromised population group and the remainder of the N new groups is the group or groups containing the pirated video decryption key divided into subgroups;

associating the N new groups with a plurality of N content keys that are derived from N periodic keys, where each of the N new groups is associated with one of the N periodic keys and content keys;

causing the plurality of N periodic keys and N content keys to be obtained by their associated N new groups of receiver devices by direct delivery or by derivation at the receiver devices;

encrypting an entitlement control message (ECMs) using the N periodic keys so as to produce the N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups;

identifying a pirated key as being associated with one of the N new groups so as to identify the receiver device from which the pirated video decryption keys have been obtained as belonging to one of the N new groups;

testing authenticated encryption keys in a receiver that is suspected of decoding content utilizing a periodic key that is not legally assigned to that receiver, where said testing of authenticated encrypted keys comprises delivering multiple sets of data content comprising multiple CA packets, each packet of which is operative to eliminate receivers and groups of receivers such that each testing operation narrows down the field of receiver identities to a single receiver identity; and

revoking the identified receiver.

25. The method according to claim 24, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N content keys which are used to decrypt selectively multiple encrypted content.

26. A method of identifying a receiver device from which pirated video decryption keys have been obtained, comprising:

splitting a population of receiver devices into N groups;

detecting a pirated video decryption key in one or more of the N groups;

aggregating the groups comprising those groups in which a pirated video decryption key was not detected into a non-compromised population group;

isolating the non-compromised population group;

organizing the compromised population of receiver devices into a plurality of N new groups, where one of the N new groups is the non-compromised population group and the remainder of the N new groups is the group or groups containing the pirated video decryption key divided into subgroups;

associating the N new groups with a plurality of N decryption keys, where each of the N new groups is associated with one of the N decryption keys, where the N decryption keys are used for either decryption of content or for decryption, calculation or derivation of other decryption keys;

causing the plurality of N periodic keys and N content keys to be obtained by their associated N groups of receiver devices by direct delivery or by derivation at the receiver devices;

encrypting one or more entitlement control messages (ECMs) using one of a plurality of N periodic keys so as to produce N sequences of content keys respectively associated with the N new groups in order to segregate the receiver devices by virtue of their use of multiple decryption keys to decrypt content; and

identifying a pirated key as being associated with one of the N new groups so as to identify the receiver device from which the pirated video decryption keys have been obtained as belonging to one of the N new groups.

27. The method according to claim 26, where the identified pirated key comprises one of a program key, a content key, or a periodic key.

28. The method according to claim 26, where the identified pirated key comprises one of N keys which are used to decrypt selectively multiple encrypted content.

29. The method according to claim 26, further comprising successively narrowing down the number of receivers in the N new groups in order to identify a smaller group of receiver identities from which pirate decryption keys are obtained.

30. The method according to claim 26, where at least one identified receiver is revoked by a license authority.