Programming on-chip non-volatile memory in a secure processor using a sequence number

• US 8,856,513 B2
• Filed: 10/09/2009
• Issued: 10/07/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 11/09/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
• Original Assignee: Acer Cloud Technology, Inc. (Acer, Inc.)
• Inventors: Srinivasan, Pramila, Princen, John
• Primary Examiner(s): Poltorak, Peter
• Application Number:
  US12/576,356
• Publication Number:
  US 20100091988A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,824 Days
• Field of Search: None
• US Class Current: 713/156
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/33 using certificates
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/71 to assure secure computing or processing of information
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/73 by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3213 using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos network architectures or network communication protocols for entities authentication using tickets in a packet data network H04L63/0807
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

An improved secure programming technique involves reducing the size of bits programmed in on-chip secret non-volatile memory, at the same time enabling the typical secure applications supported by secure devices. A technique for secure programming involves de-coupling chip manufacture from the later process of connecting to ticket servers to obtain tickets. A method according to the technique may involve sending a (manufacturing) server signed certificate from the device prior to any communication to receive tickets. A device according to the technique may include chip-internal non-volatile memory to store the certificate along with the private key, in the manufacturing process.

Claims

1. A device comprising:

on-chip non-volatile (NV) memory including;

a secret seed random number;

on-chip writable memory including;

a stored sequence number;

a means for receiving a request for a device certificate;

a means for initializing a state variable in the on-chip writable memory to an initial value in response to a power up event of the device;

a means for computing a key as a function of the secret seed random number and the sequence number;

a means for incrementing the sequence number;

a means for storing the incremented sequence number;

a means for generating a first random number as a function of the key and the state variable;

a means for incrementing the state variable;

a means for creating the device certificate based on the first random number and the request for the device certificate, the device certificate adapted to provide a security signature for accessing protected resources by a secure application;

a means for executing at least a portion of the secure application, the executing using at least a portion of the protected resources;

a means for clearing the state variable from the on-chip writable memory before a power down event of the device.

2. The device of claim 1 further comprising a means for generating a second random number using the key and the incremented state variable.

3. The device of claim 1, wherein the means for computing the key and for generating the first random number is selected from a group consisting of cryptographically strong encryption, decryption, and hash functions.

17. The device of claim 1, wherein the key is one or more of a public key and a private key.

18. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is executed in response to the power up event of the device.

4. A method comprising:

receiving, using a processor, a request for a device certificate;

initializing, using the processor, a state variable in on-chip writable memory to an initial value in response to a power up event of a device containing the processor;

computing, using the processor, a key as a function of a secret seed random number and a sequence number;

incrementing, using the processor, the sequence number;

generating, using the processor, a first random number as a function of the key and the state variable;

incrementing, using the processor, the state variable;

generating, using the processor, a second random number using the key and the incremented state variable;

creating, using the processor, the device certificate based on the first random number and the request for the device certificate, the device certificate adapted to provide a security signature for accessing protected resources by a secure application;

executing at least a portion of the secure application, the executing using at least a portion of the protected resources;

clearing the state variable from the on-chip writable memory before a power down event of the device.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein computing the key comprises executing one or more of:

cryptographically strong encryption, decryption, and hash functions.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein generating the first random number comprises executing one or more of:

cryptographically strong encryption, decryption, and hash functions.

7. The method of claim 4, wherein the key is one or more of a public key and a private key.

8. The method of claim 4, wherein the secret seed random number is stored on an on-chip non-volatile (NV) memory.

9. The method of claim 4, wherein the sequence number is a stored sequence number included in the on-chip writable memory.

10. A system, comprising:

an on-chip non-volatile (NV) memory including a secret seed random number;

an on-chip writable memory including a stored sequence number;

a client-side interface associated with a registered client;

a certificate generation module;

wherein, in operation;

the client-side interface is configured to receive a request for a device certificate and to transmit a validated device certificate;

the certificate generation module is configured to;

initialize a state variable in the on-chip writable memory to an initial value in response to a power up event of a device containing the certificate generation module;

compute a key as a function of the secret seed random number and the sequence number;

increment the sequence number;

generate a first random number as a function of the key and the state variable;

increment the state variable;

create the validated device certificate based on the first random number and the request for the device certificate, the validated device certificate adapted to provide a security signature for accessing protected resources by a secure application, at least a portion of the secure application executed on the system, the execution using at least a portion of the protected resources;

clear the state variable from the on-chip writable memory before a power down event of the device.

11. The system of claim 10 wherein, in operation, the certificate generation module is configured to generate a second random number using the key and the incremented state variable.

12. The system of claim 10, wherein computing the key comprises executing one or more of:

cryptographically strong encryption, decryption, and hash functions.

13. The system of claim 10, wherein generating the first random number comprises executing one or more of:

cryptographically strong encryption, decryption, and hash functions.

14. The system of claim 10, further comprising a server comprising:

a certificate database storing a registered device identity corresponding to the registered client;

a certificate request module;

a server interface communicatively coupled to the client-side interface;

a certificate verification module;

wherein, in operation;

the certificate request module creates the request for the device certificate based on the registered device identity;

the server interface transmits the request for the device certificate to the client-side interface and receives the validated device certificate from the client-side interface;

the certificate verification module verifies the validated device certificate.

15. The system of claim 14, wherein:

the server comprises a pseudo random number (PRN) generator configured to generate a second random number; and

the certificate request module creates the request for the device certificate based on the second random number.

16. The system of claim 10, wherein the key is one or more of a public key and a private key.

19. The system of claim 10, wherein, in operation, the request for the device certificate occurs in response to the power up event of the device.