Method for ensuring security and privacy in a wireless cognitive network

• US 8,898,468 B2
• Filed: 12/03/2010
• Issued: 11/25/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 12/08/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Incorporated (BAE Systems Plc)
• Original Assignee: BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Incorporated (BAE Systems Plc)
• Inventors: Reddy, Ranga, Kiernan, Thomas, Mody, Apurva N.
• Primary Examiner(s): Rashid, Harunur
• Application Number:
  US12/959,732
• Publication Number:
  US 20110138183A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,453 Days
• Field of Search: 713/168, 713/169, 713/171, 713/175, 380/270
• US Class Current: 713/169
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 2203/18 for wireless local area networks or WLAN
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/25 based on characteristics of target signal or of transmission as countermeasure against surveillance H04K3/827, e.g. using direct sequence spread spectrum or fast frequency hopping spread spectrum techniques H04B1/69
• CPC Class Codes: H04K 3/65 using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/062 applying encryption of the keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0457 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply dynamic encryption, e.g. stream encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for stream encryption H04L9/065
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/037 of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/08 Access security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 16/14 Spectrum sharing arrangements between different networks

Abstract

In some embodiments, authentication, confidentiality, and privacy are enhanced for a wireless network of cognitive radios by encryption of network management and control messages as well as data traffic, thereby protecting information pertaining to node identification, node location, node-sensed incumbent transmissions, CRN frequency channel selections, and such like. During initial network registration, a temporary ID can be issued to a node, and then replaced once encrypted communication has been established. This prevents association of initial, clear-text messages with later encrypted transmissions. Elliptic curve cryptography can be used for mutual authentication between subscribers and the base station. ECC-based implicit digital certificates can be embedded in co-existence beacons used by CRN nodes to coordinate use of frequency channels, thereby preventing denial of service attacks due to transmitting of falsified beacons. Similar certificates can be embedded within identity beacons used to protect certain incumbents from interference by the CRN.

Claims

1. A method for ensuring security and privacy of communications over a wireless network of cognitive radios (“

CRN”

), the CRN including a managing base station in communication with at least one candidate node, the method comprising;

the managing base station receiving from the candidate node a request to join the CRN;

the managing base station transmitting to the candidate node a temporary node identifier;

the managing base station establishing encrypted communication with the candidate node using the temporary node identifier;

the managing base station authorizing the candidate node to join the CRN;

the managing base station conveying to the candidate node by encrypted transmission a permanent node identifier in replacement of the temporary node identifier; and

the candidate node joining the CRN using the permanent node identifier,

wherein establishing encrypted communication and authorizing the candidate node to join the CRN includes;

receiving a registration request from the candidate node, the registration request including a subscriber digital certificate and a subscriber public key;

determining an authenticity of the subscriber digital certificate;

if the subscriber digital certificate is authentic, applying authorization criteria to the candidate node;

if the authorization criteria are met, authorizing participation of the candidate node in the CRN;

using the subscriber public key, encrypting an authorization key and transmitting the encrypted authorization key to the candidate node, the candidate node being able to derive therefrom a key-encryption-key (“

KEK”

), and a “

management-message-protection-key (“

MMP”

), an MMP expiration criterion being associated with the MMP so as to cause the MMP to expire when the MMP expiration criterion is met;

generating a transmission-encryption-key (“

TEK”

), encrypting the TEK using the KEK, and transmitting the encrypted TEK to the candidate node, a TEK expiration criterion being associated with the TEK so as to cause the TEK to expire when the TEK expiration criterion is met;

using the TEK, encrypting all data communication with the candidate node over the CRN;

using the MMP, encrypting all management and control communication with the candidate node over the CRN;

using the KEK, encrypting a replacement TEK and transmitting the encrypted replacement TEK to the candidate node before the TEK expiration criterion is met;

using the KEK, encrypting a replacement MMP and transmitting the encrypted replacement MMP to the candidate node before the MMP expiration criterion is met; and

so long as the candidate node continues to participate in the CRN, repeating the encrypting of a replacement TEK and of a replacement MMP, and the transmitting the encrypted replacement TEK and the encrypted replacement MMP to the candidate node before the TEK and MMP expiration criteria are met.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the base station is able to withdraw authorization from an authorized candidate node so as to remove the candidate node from the CRN.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the method further comprises withdrawing of authorization by the managing base station from the candidate node due to at least one of:

transmitting of spurious noise by the candidate node; and

determining by the managing base station that the subscriber is within a protected zone surrounding a known incumbent.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein receiving from the candidate node a request to join the CRN includes receiving from the candidate node information specifying ID information, location information, configuration information, and capability information of the candidate node.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is applied in encrypting at least one of:

an authorization key;

the TEK;

all data communication with the candidate node over the CRN;

all management and control communication with the candidate node over the CRN;

a replacement TEK; and

a replacement MMP.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving from the candidate node a request to join the CRN includes receiving from the candidate node information specifying a location of the candidate node.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the authorization criteria include a requirement that the candidate node is not located within a protected region assigned to a valid incumbent using a frequency that is in use by the CRN.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the application of authorization criteria includes collaborative sensing by nodes in the CRN of spurious signals, and the authorization criteria include a requirement that the candidate node is not a source of spurious signals that might interfere with the CRN.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving from the candidate node a registration request includes receiving information from the candidate node specifying compliance of the candidate node with at least one of specified security protocols and specified regulatory protocols.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the authorization criteria include a requirement that the candidate node comply with at least one of the specified security protocols and the specified regulatory protocols.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the expiration criterion is an elapsing of a time interval.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the expiration criterion is the encryption of a specified number of data packets using the TEK.

13. The method of claim 1, further comprising after a specified re-authorization criterion is met, requiring re-authorization of the candidate node, and only permitting continued participation by the candidate node in the CRN if the re-authorization is successful.