Secure processing module and method for making the same

• US 8,930,717 B2
• Filed: 03/01/2012
• Issued: 01/06/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 03/01/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: ANGEL Secure Networks, Inc.
• Original Assignee: ANGEL Secure Networks, Inc.
• Inventors: Smith, Fred Hewitt
• Primary Examiner(s): PERUNGAVOOR, VENKATANARAY
• Application Number:
  US13/410,204
• Publication Number:
  US 20120227117A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,041 Days
• US Class Current: 713/192
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/305 by remotely controlling device operation
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/56 Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/57 Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/76 in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2115 Third party
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 22/20 Sequence of activities consisting of a plurality of measurements, corrections, marking or sorting steps
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data

Abstract

Described herein are devices and techniques related to implementation of a trustworthy electronic processing module. During fabrication, a manufacturer is provided with partial technical specifications that intentionally exclude at least one critical design feature. Fabrication of the electronic processing module is monitored from a trusted remote location; wherefrom, the intentionally excluded at least one critical design feature is implemented, thereby completing manufacture of the trustworthy electronic processing module. At least one of the acts of monitoring and implementing can be accomplished by instantiating executable software remotely from a trusted remote location and immediately prior to execution. It is the executable software that enables at least one of the acts of monitoring and implementing. Further, the instantiated executable software is removed or otherwise rendered inoperable immediately subsequent to execution. In some embodiments the critical design feature can be implemented within a configurable element, such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA).

Claims

1. A method of making a trustworthy electronic processing module, comprising:

providing remotely, by a system comprising a processor, an untrustworthy fabrication facility with a partial technical specification of the electronic processing module, intentionally excluding a critical hardware design feature of the electronic processing module to obtain an excluded critical hardware design feature during the fabrication of the electronic processing module at the untrustworthy fabrication facility;

monitoring, by the system, from a trustworthy remote location, manufacture of the electronic processing module;

implementing remotely, by the system, from a trustworthy facility remote from the untrustworthy fabrication facility, the excluded critical hardware design feature, thereby completing manufacture of the trustworthy electronic processing module; and

monitoring, by the system, from a trustworthy remote location, one of trustworthiness of the electronic processing module, manufacturing methods of the untrustworthy fabrication facility, or both, and where the critical hardware design feature corresponds to a semiconductor chip design,

wherein tests for manufacturing integrity at the untrusted fabrication facility comprise using orthogonal values from a scenario in which the module is being fabricated.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising irrevocably changing, by the system, a state of the electronic processing module responsive to the monitoring detecting a lack of trustworthiness.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the irrevocably changing of the state of the electronic processing module renders the electronic processing module unfit for an intended purpose.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the monitoring occurs during subsequent use of a manufactured electronic processing module.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the implementing remotely of the excluded critical hardware design feature comprises enabling, by the system, communication between the electronic processing module and the trustworthy remote location using a controlled-access agent process.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein one of the monitoring, the implementing, or both are accomplished by:

instantiating, by the system, at a trustworthy location remote from the untrustworthy fabrication facility, executable software in the electronic processing module to obtain instantiated executable software enabling the one of the monitoring, the implementing or both, wherein the instantiating occurs immediately prior to execution of the executable software; and

rendering inoperable, by the system, the instantiated executable software immediately subsequent to execution.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein at least one of instantiating and removing comprises pre-enabling, by the system, communication between the electronic processing module and the trustworthy facility using a controlled-access agent process.

8. The method of claim 2, wherein irrevocably changing the state of the electronic processing module is detectable by monitors of subsequent manufacturing processes of the electronic processing module.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the monitoring of the trustworthiness of the electronic processing module comprises inserting, from a remote monitor, executable software into the electronic processing module to obtain inserted monitoring, wherein the inserting of the software occurs immediately before execution of the executable software.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the inserting of the software to obtain inserted software immediately before execution minimizes exposure of the inserted software to a manufacturing process of the electronic processing.

11. The method of claim 10, further comprising inserting software into the remote manufacturing process to obtain inserted software, wherein the software is inserted just in time into the manufacturing process.

12. The method of claim 10, wherein the inserted software imprints a number into the module, while being fabricated at one facility responsive to an investigation undertaken by the software, and wherein the remote monitor tests the number later in the manufacturing process at a second fabrication facility.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the tests at the second fabrication facility involves tests developed just-in-time that do not require the number being sent outside the module being manufactured.

14. The method of claim 1, wherein the monitoring comprises:

obtaining an image of a hardware design of the electronic processing module as the manufacture of the electronic processing module proceeds to obtain an image of a manufactured hardware design of the electronic processing module; and

comparing the image of the manufactured hardware design with a correct hardware design.

15. A machine-readable storage medium, comprising executable instructions which, responsive to being executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising:

providing remotely, by a system comprising a processor, an untrustworthy fabrication facility with a partial technical hardware specification of an electronic processing module, intentionally excluding a critical hardware design feature of the electronic processing module to obtain an excluded critical hardware design feature during the fabrication of the electronic processing module at the untrustworthy fabrication facility;

monitoring, by the system, from a trustworthy remote location, manufacture of the electronic processing module;

implementing remotely, by the system, from a trustworthy facility remote from the untrustworthy fabrication facility, the excluded critical hardware design feature, thereby completing manufacture of the electronic processing module; and

monitoring, by the system, from a trustworthy remote location, one of trustworthiness of the electronic processing module, manufacturing methods of the untrustworthy fabrication facility, or both, and where the critical hardware design feature corresponds to a semiconductor chip design,

wherein tests for manufacturing integrity at the untrusted fabrication facility comprise using orthogonal values from a scenario in which the module is being fabricated.

16. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 15, further comprising

irrevocably changing a state of the electronic processing module responsive to the monitoring detecting a lack of trustworthiness.

17. The machine-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein one of the monitoring, the implementing, or both are accomplished by:

instantiating remotely from a trustworthy remote location and immediately prior to execution, executable software to obtain instantiated executable software enabling one of the monitoring, the implementing or both; and

rendering inoperable the instantiated executable software immediately subsequent to execution.